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19542
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It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
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Full Idea:
The proposition that understanding does not involve knowledge is widespread (for example, in discussions of what philosophy aims at), but hardly withstands scrutiny. If you do not know how a jet engine works, you do not understand how it works.
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From:
Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (Experience First (and reply) [2014], p.24)
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A reaction:
This seems a bit disingenuous. As in 'Theaetetus', knowing the million parts of a jet engine is not to understand it. More strongly - how could knowledge of an infinity of separate propositional truths amount to understanding on their own?
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19541
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Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
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Full Idea:
If we say our cognitive aim is to get knowledge, the opposing views are the naturalistic view that what matters is just true belief (or just 'getting by'), or that there are rival epistemic goods such as understanding and wisdom.
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From:
Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P (Experience First (and reply) [2014], p.17)
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A reaction:
[compressed summary] I'm a fan of understanding. The accumulation of propositional knowledge would relish knowing the mass of every grain of sand on a beach. If you say the propositions should be 'important', other values are invoked.
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6217
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Natural law is supplied to the human mind by reality and human nature [Cumberland]
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Full Idea:
Some truths of natural law, concerning guides to moral good and evil, and duties not laid down by civil law and government, are necessarily supplied ot the human mind by the nature of things and of men.
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From:
Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.I)
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A reaction:
I agree that some moral truths have the power of self-evidence. If you say they are built into the mind, we now ask what did the building, and evolution is the only answer, and hence we distance ourselves from the truths, seeing them as strategies.
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6221
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If there are different ultimate goods, there will be conflicting good actions, which is impossible [Cumberland]
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Full Idea:
If there be posited different ultimate ends, whose causes are opposed to each other, then there will be truly good actions likewise opposed to each other, which is impossible.
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From:
Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.V.XVI)
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A reaction:
A very interesting argument for there being one good rather than many, and an argument which I don't recall in any surviving Greek text. A response might be to distinguish between what is 'right' and what is 'good'. See David Ross.
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6220
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The happiness of all contains the happiness of each, and promotes it [Cumberland]
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Full Idea:
The common happiness of all contains the greatest happiness for each, and most effectively promotes it. …There is no path leading anyone to his own happiness, other than the path which leads all to the common happiness.
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From:
Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.VI)
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A reaction:
I take this as a revolutionary idea, which leads to utilitarianism. It is doing what seemed to the Greeks unthinkable, which is combining hedonism with altruism. There is no proof for it, but it is a wonderful clarion call for building a civil society.
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6216
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Natural law is immutable truth giving moral truths and duties independent of society [Cumberland]
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Full Idea:
Natural law is certain propositions of immutable truth, which guide voluntary actions about the choice of good and avoidance of evil, and which impose an obligation to act, even without regard to civil laws, and ignoring compacts of governments.
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From:
Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.I.I)
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A reaction:
Not a popular view, but I am sympathetic. If you are in a foreign country and find a person lying in pain, there is a terrible moral deficiency in anyone who just ignores such a thing. No legislation can take away a person's right of self-defence.
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