46 ideas
| 13736 | Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure [Schaffer,J on Quine] |
| Full Idea: The Quinean task in metaphysics is to say what exists. What exists forms the domain of quantification. The domain is a set (or class, or plurality) - it has no internal structure. In other words, the Quinean task is to list the beings. | |
| From: comment on Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Jonathan Schaffer - On What Grounds What 1.1 | |
| A reaction: I really warm to this thesis. The Quinean version is what you get when you think that logic is the best tool for explicating metaphysics. Schaffer goes on to say that the only real aim for Quine is the cardinality of what exists! |
| 3302 | Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| Full Idea: Quine has showed us how set theory - now recognised to be positively awash in Platonistic metaphysics - can and should be prevented from infecting logic proper. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Intro |
| 10211 | Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists [Quine, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Quine suggests that V = L be accepted in set theory because it makes for a cleaner theory, even though most set theorists are skeptical of V = L. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: Shapiro cites it as a case of a philosopher trying to make recommendations to mathematicians. Maddy supports Quine. |
| 3336 | Two things can never entail three things [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| Full Idea: Two things can never entail three things. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.17 |
| 8453 | If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers [Quine] |
| Full Idea: Since one wants to say that real numbers exist and yet one cannot name each of them, it is not unreasonable to relinquish the connection between naming an object and making an existence claim about it. | |
| From: Willard Quine (works [1961]), quoted by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: One could say that same about people, such as 'the most recent citizen of Brazil'. Some sort of successful reference seems to be needed, such as 'the next prime beyond the biggest so far found'. Depends what your predicate is going to be. |
| 10311 | No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts [Quine, by Hale] |
| Full Idea: Quine says that no good sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: This is because poor old Quine was trapped in a world of language, and had lost touch with reality. I can quantify over the things you are thinking about, as long as you are thinking about things that can be quantified over. |
| 10538 | Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction [Quine, by Dummett] |
| Full Idea: Quine even asserts that where we have no infinite domains, quantification can be eliminated in favour of finite disjunction and conjunction. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Michael Dummett - Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) Ch.14 | |
| A reaction: Thus ∃x is expressed as 'this or this or this...', and ∀ is expressed as 'this and this and this...' Dummett raises an eyebrow, but it sounds OK to me. |
| 10793 | Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
| Full Idea: Quine at first regarded substitutional quantification as incoherent, behind which there lurked use-mention confusions, but has over the years, given his nominalist dispositions, come to notice its appeal. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Ruth Barcan Marcus - Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers p.166 |
| 8466 | For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: Quine feels that the intuitionist's ontology of abstract objects is too slight to serve the needs of classical mathematics. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: Quine, who devoted his life to the application of Ockham's Razor, decided that sets were an essential part of the ontological baggage (which made him, according to Orenstein, a 'reluctant Platonist'). Dummett defends intuitionism. |
| 8467 | Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit' [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: Intuitionists will not admit any numbers which are not properly constructed out of rational numbers, ...but classical mathematics appeals to the real numbers (a non-denumerable totality) in notions such as that of a limit | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: (See Idea 8454 for the categories of numbers). This is a problem for Dummett. |
| 10667 | A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Quine, by Hossack] |
| Full Idea: Quine's test of ontological commitment says that anything that can be said truly at all must be capable of being said in a logically perfect language, so there must be a paraphrase of every truth into the language of logic. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Keith Hossack - Plurals and Complexes 2 | |
| A reaction: A very nice statement of the Quinean view, much more persuasive than other statements I have encountered. I am suddenly almost converted to a doctrine I have hitherto despised. Isn't philosophy wonderful? |
| 16021 | Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Quine, by Noonan] |
| Full Idea: The highly intuitive methodological programme enunciated by Quine says that as our knowledge expands we should unhesitatingly expand our ideology, our stock of predicables, but should be much more wary about ontology, the name variables. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Harold Noonan - Identity §3 | |
| A reaction: I suddenly embrace this as a crucial truth. This distinction allows you to expand on truths without expanding on reality. I would add that it is also crucial to distinguish properties from predicates. A new predicate isn't a new property. |
| 3325 | For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| Full Idea: Theoretical entities (which is everything, according to Quine) are postulated by us in a threefold fashion as an object (1) to which we refer, (2) of which we predicate, and (3) over which we quantify. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.12 |
| 8534 | Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications [Quine, by Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Quine's doctrine is that the predicate of a true statement carries no ontological implications. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by David M. Armstrong - Properties §1 | |
| A reaction: Quine is ontologically committed to the subject of the statement (an object). The predicate seems to be an inseparable part of that object. Quine is, of course, a holist, so ontological commitment isn't judged in single statements. |
| 10295 | Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Quine, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Quine doubts the existence of properties, and, trying to be helpful, suggests that variables ranging over properties be replaced with variables ranging over respectable extensional entities like sets, so we can 'identify' a property with a singleton set. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Stewart Shapiro - Higher-Order Logic 2.1 | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a classic modern heresy, a slippery slope that loses all grip on what a property is, replacing it with entities that mean nothing, but make the logic work. |
| 3322 | Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| Full Idea: Quine assures us that if the specific mission of second-order logic is quantifying over properties, the task can readily be performed by first-order predicate logic, as in (Ex) x is a property, and (y) y has x. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.10 |
| 6078 | Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [Quine, by McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Quine brought classes into semantics in order to oust properties. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Colin McGinn - Logical Properties Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: Quine's view has always struck me as odd, as I don't see how you can decide what set something belongs to if you haven't already decided its properties. But then I take it that nature informs you of most properties, and set membership is not arbitrary. |
| 8479 | Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: Quine proposes that 'red is a colour' does not require analysis, such as 'there is an x which is the property of being red and it is a colour' which needs an ontology of properties. We can just say that all red things are coloured things. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: The question of the ontology of properties is here approached, in twentieth century style, as the question 'what is the logical form of property attribution sentences?' Quine's version deals in sets of prior objects, rather than abstract entities. |
| 3751 | Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true [Quine, by Jacquette] |
| Full Idea: Abstract entities (universals) are admitted to an ontology by Quine's criterion if they must be supposed to exist (or subsist) in order to make the propositions of an accepted theory true. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Dale Jacquette - Abstract Entity p.3 |
| 7970 | Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Quine, by Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: Armstrong dubs Quine an 'Ostrich Nominalist' (what problem??), but Quine calls himself a Platonist, because he is committed to classes or sets as well as particulars. He is not an extreme nominalist, and might best be called a Class Nominalist. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961], Ch.6 n15) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things | |
| A reaction: For someone as ontologically austere as Quine to show 'commitment' to sets deserves some recognition. If he wants to be a Platonist, I say that's fine. What on earth is a set, apart from its members? |
| 15783 | Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine] |
| Full Idea: Meinong characteristically refers to his Objects using definite descriptions, such as 'the golden mountain'. But on his view there are many golden mountains, with different features. How can 'the golden mountain' then succeed in denoting a single Object? | |
| From: comment on Willard Quine (works [1961]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 01 | |
| A reaction: Use of definite descriptions doesn't seem obligatory in this situation. 'Think of a golden mountain' - 'which one?' - 'never mind which one!'. |
| 15782 | Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Quine, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Quine notoriously demands identity and individuation-conditions for mere possibilia. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 01 | |
| A reaction: Demanding individuation before speaking of anything strikes me as dubious. 'Whoever did this should own up'. 'There must be something we can do'. Obviously you need some idea of what you are talking about - but not much. |
| 13766 | 'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey] |
| Full Idea: Ramsey suggested that 'if', 'given that' and 'on the supposition that' come to the same thing, and that the degrees of belief in the antecedent should then conform to probability theory. | |
| From: report of Frank P. Ramsey (Truth and Probability [1926]) by Frank P. Ramsey - Law and Causality B | |
| A reaction: [compressed] |
| 2796 | For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Quine, by Dancy,J] |
| Full Idea: Quine argues that no necessity can be known other than empirically. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 14.6 |
| 8450 | Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: Traditional empiricism takes impressions, ideas or sense data as the basic unit of empirical thought, but Quine takes account of the theoretical as well as the observational; the unit of empirical significance is whole systems of belief. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: This invites either the question of what components make up the whole systems, or (alternatively) what sort of mental events decide to accept a system as a whole. Should Quine revert either to traditional empiricism, or to rationalism? |
| 3868 | To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it [Quine, by Newton-Smith] |
| Full Idea: Truth, says the cultural relativist, is culture-bound. But if it were, then he, within his own culture, ought to see his own culture-bound truth as absolute. He cannot proclaim cultural relativism without rising above it. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by W.H. Newton-Smith - The Rationality of Science VII.10 |
| 4713 | For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations [Quine, by O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: Quine's epistemological position is instrumentalist. Our theories are instruments we use to make predictions about observations. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: This is the pragmatist in Quine. It fits the evolutionary view to think that the bottom line is prediction. My theory about the Pelopponesian War seems an exception. |
| 19143 | Ramsey gave axioms for an uncertain agent to decide their preferences [Ramsey, by Davidson] |
| Full Idea: Ramsey gave an axiomatic treatment of preference in the face of uncertainty, when applied to a particular agent. | |
| From: report of Frank P. Ramsey (Truth and Probability [1926]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 2 | |
| A reaction: This is evidently the beginnings of Bayesian decision theory. |
| 4712 | Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [Quine, by O'Grady] |
| Full Idea: Quine holds the doctrine of the 'inscrutability of reference', which means there is no fact of the matter about reference. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Paul O'Grady - Relativism Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: Presumably reference depends on conventions like pointing, or the functioning of words like "that", or the ambiguities of descriptions. If you can't define it, it doesn't exist? I don't believe him. |
| 7330 | The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants [Quine, by Miller,A] |
| Full Idea: Quine takes to the principle of charity to apply only to the translation of the logical constants. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 8.7 | |
| A reaction: Given how weird some people's view of the world seems to be, this very cautious approach has an interesting rival appeal to Davidson't much more charitable view, that people mostly speak truth. It depends whether you are discussing lunch or the gods. |
| 20014 | Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall] |
| Full Idea: There are different levels of action, including at least: unconscious and/or involuntary behaviour, purposeful or goal-directed activity, intentional action, and the autonomous acts or actions of self-consciously active human agents. | |
| From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1) | |
| A reaction: The fourth class is obviously designed to distinguish us from the other animals. It immediately strikes me as very optimistic to distinguish four (at least) clear categories, but you have to start somewhere. |
| 20019 | Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall] |
| Full Idea: Some say that the movement's of agent's body are never actions. It is only the agent's direct moving of, say, his leg that constitutes a physical action; the leg movement is merely caused by and/or incorporated as part of the act of moving. | |
| From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: [they cite Jennifer Hornsby 1980] It seems normal to deny a twitch the accolade of an 'action', so I suppose that is right. Does the continual movement of my tongue count as action? Only if I bring it under control? Does it matter? Only in forensics. |
| 20021 | Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall] |
| Full Idea: Some philosophers have favored the overt arm movement the agent performs, some favor the extended causal process he initiates, and some prefer the relevant event of trying that precedes and 'generates' the rest. | |
| From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: [Davidson argues for the second, Hornsby for the third] There seems no way to settle this, and a compromise looks best. Mere movement won't do, and mere trying won't do, and whole processes get out of control. |
| 20022 | To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall] |
| Full Idea: If someone fires a bullet to kill someone, misses, and dislodges hornets that sting him to death, this implies that an intentional action must include succeeding in a manner according to the original plan. | |
| From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
| A reaction: [their example, compressed] This resembles Gettier's problem cases for knowledge. If the shooter deliberately and maliciously brought down the hornet's nest, that would be intentional murder. Sounds right. |
| 20023 | If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall] |
| Full Idea: If someone enters the lottery with the bizarre belief that they can control who wins, and then wins it, that suggest that intentional actions must not depend on sheer luck, but needs competent exercise of the relevant skill. | |
| From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
| A reaction: A nice companion to Idea 20022, which show that a mere intention is not sufficient to motivate and explain an action. |
| 20025 | We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall] |
| Full Idea: If an agent tries to do something by two different means, only one of which can succeed, then the behaviour is rational, even though one of them is an attempt to do an action which cannot succeed. | |
| From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
| A reaction: [a concise account of a laborious account of an example from Bratman 1984, 1987] Bratman uses this to challenge the 'Simple View', that intention leads straightforwardly to action. |
| 20031 | On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall] |
| Full Idea: On the simple desire-belief model, an intention is a combination of desire-belief states, and an action is intentional in virtue of standing in the appropriate relation to these simpler terms. | |
| From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 4) | |
| A reaction: This is the traditional view found in Hume, and is probably endemic to folk psychology. They cite Bratman 1987 as the main opponent of the view. |
| 20028 | Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall] |
| Full Idea: Rational group action may involve a 'collectivising of reasons', with participants acting in ways that are not rationally recommended from the individual viewpoint. This suggests that groups can be rational, intentional agents. | |
| From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
| A reaction: [Pettit 2003] is the source for this. Gilbert says individuals can have joint commitment; Pettit says the group can be an independent agent. The matter of shared intentions is interesting, but there is no need for the ontology to go berserk. |
| 20027 | If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall] |
| Full Idea: An account of mutual obligation to do something may require that we give up reductive individualist accounts of shared activity and posit a primitive notion of 'joint commitment'. | |
| From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2) | |
| A reaction: [attributed to Margaret Gilbert 2000] If 'we' are trying to do something, that seems to give an externalist picture of intentions, rather like all the other externalisms floating around these days. I don't buy any of it, me. |
| 20016 | Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
| Full Idea: A Strong Cognitivist is someone who identifies an intention with a certain pertinent belief about what she is doing or about to do. | |
| From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: (Sarah Paul 2009 makes this distinction) The belief, if so, seems to be as much counterfactual as factual. Hope seems to come into it, which isn't exactly a belief. |
| 20017 | Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
| Full Idea: A Weak Cognitivist holds that intentions are partly constituted by, but are not identical with, relevant beliefs about the action. Grice (1971) said an intention is willing an action, combined with a belief that this will lead to the action. | |
| From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] I didn't find Strong Cognitivism appealing, but it seems hard to argue with some form of the weak version. |
| 20018 | Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall] |
| Full Idea: Strong Cognitivists say intentions/beliefs are not based on observation or evidence, and are causally reliable in leading to appropriate actions, so this is a mode of 'practical' knowledge that has not been derived from observation. | |
| From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed - Stanford unnecessarily verbose!] I see no mention in this discussion of 'hoping' that your action will turn out OK. We are usually right to hope, but it would be foolish to say that when we reach for the salt we know we won't knock it over. |
| 20012 | Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall] |
| Full Idea: Some have maintained that we explain why an agent acted as he did when we explicate how the agent's normative reasons rendered the action intelligible in his eyes. | |
| From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Modern psychology is moving against this, by showing how hidden biases can predominate over conscious reasons (as in Kahnemann's work). I would say this mode of explanation works better for highly educated people (but you can chuckle at that). |
| 20029 | Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall] |
| Full Idea: Most causalists allow that reason explanations are teleological, but say that such purposive explanations are analysable causally, where the primary reasons for the act are the guiding causes of the act. | |
| From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 3) | |
| A reaction: The authors observe that it is hard to adjudicate on this matter, and that the concept of the 'cause' of an action is unclear. |
| 20013 | It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall] |
| Full Idea: The view that reason explanations are somehow causal explanations remains the dominant position. | |
| From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I suspect that this is only because no philosopher has a better idea, and the whole issue is being slowly outflanked by psychology. |
| 17862 | Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Quine, by Almog] |
| Full Idea: Essence engenders a mere illusion of understanding | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Joseph Almog - Nature Without Essence Intro | |
| A reaction: [Almog quotes Quine, but doesn't give a reference] This is roughly the same as Popper's criticism of essentialism. |