8525
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Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K]
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Full Idea:
Because there cannot be relations without terms, in a meta-physic that makes first-order tropes the terms of all relations, relational tropes must belong to a second, derivative order.
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From:
Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §8)
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A reaction:
The admission that there could be a 'derivative order' may lead to trouble for trope theory. Ostrich Nominalists could say that properties themselves are derivative second-order abstractions from indivisible particulars. Russell makes them first-order.
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8513
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Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
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Full Idea:
If we have two cloths of the very same shade of redness, we can show there are two cloths by burning one and leaving the other unaffected; we show there are two cases of redness in the same way: dye one blue, leaving the other unaffected.
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From:
Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §1)
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A reaction:
This has to be one of the basic facts of the problem accepted by everyone. If you dye half of one of the pieces, was the original red therefore one instance or two? Has it become two? How many red tropes are there in a red cloth?
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8524
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Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
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Full Idea:
The metaphysics of abstract particulars gives a central place to space, or space-time, as the frame of the world. ...Tropes are, of their essence, regional, which carries with it the essential presence of shape and size in any trope occurrence.
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From:
Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §7)
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A reaction:
Trope theory has a problem with Aristotle's example (Idea 557) of what happens when white is mixed with white. Do two tropes become one trope if you paint on a second coat of white? How can particulars merge? How can abstractions merge?
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8519
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Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K]
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Full Idea:
Each individual is distinct from each other individual, so the bundle account of objects requires each bundle to be different from every other bundle. So the Identity of Indiscernibles must be a necessary truth, which, unfortunately, it is not.
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From:
Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §5)
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A reaction:
Clearly the Identity of Indiscernibles is not a necessary truth (consider just two identical spheres). Location and time must enter into it. Could we not add a further individuation requirement to the necessary existence of a bundle? (Quinton)
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22363
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You have only begun to do real science when you can express it in numbers [Kelvin]
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Full Idea:
When you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science, whatever the matter may be.
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From:
Lord Kelvin (Wm Thomson) (works [1881]), quoted by Reiss,J/Spreger,J - Scientific Objectivity 4.1
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A reaction:
[Popular Lectures 1 p.73] Clearly the writer is a physicist! Astronomers discover objects, geologists discover structures, biologists reveal mechanisms.
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8512
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Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K]
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Full Idea:
An item is abstract if it is got before the mind by an act of abstraction, that is, by concentrating attention on some, but not all, of what is presented.
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From:
Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §1)
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A reaction:
I think this point is incredibly important. Pure Fregean semantics tries to leave out the psychological component, and yet all the problems in semantics concern various sorts of abstraction. Imagination is the focus of the whole operation.
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20014
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Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
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Full Idea:
There are different levels of action, including at least: unconscious and/or involuntary behaviour, purposeful or goal-directed activity, intentional action, and the autonomous acts or actions of self-consciously active human agents.
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From:
Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1)
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A reaction:
The fourth class is obviously designed to distinguish us from the other animals. It immediately strikes me as very optimistic to distinguish four (at least) clear categories, but you have to start somewhere.
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20019
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Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
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Full Idea:
Some say that the movement's of agent's body are never actions. It is only the agent's direct moving of, say, his leg that constitutes a physical action; the leg movement is merely caused by and/or incorporated as part of the act of moving.
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From:
Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.2)
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A reaction:
[they cite Jennifer Hornsby 1980] It seems normal to deny a twitch the accolade of an 'action', so I suppose that is right. Does the continual movement of my tongue count as action? Only if I bring it under control? Does it matter? Only in forensics.
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20021
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Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
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Full Idea:
Some philosophers have favored the overt arm movement the agent performs, some favor the extended causal process he initiates, and some prefer the relevant event of trying that precedes and 'generates' the rest.
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From:
Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.2)
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A reaction:
[Davidson argues for the second, Hornsby for the third] There seems no way to settle this, and a compromise looks best. Mere movement won't do, and mere trying won't do, and whole processes get out of control.
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20022
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To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
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Full Idea:
If someone fires a bullet to kill someone, misses, and dislodges hornets that sting him to death, this implies that an intentional action must include succeeding in a manner according to the original plan.
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From:
Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
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A reaction:
[their example, compressed] This resembles Gettier's problem cases for knowledge. If the shooter deliberately and maliciously brought down the hornet's nest, that would be intentional murder. Sounds right.
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20023
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If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
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Full Idea:
If someone enters the lottery with the bizarre belief that they can control who wins, and then wins it, that suggest that intentional actions must not depend on sheer luck, but needs competent exercise of the relevant skill.
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From:
Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
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A reaction:
A nice companion to Idea 20022, which show that a mere intention is not sufficient to motivate and explain an action.
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20025
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We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
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Full Idea:
If an agent tries to do something by two different means, only one of which can succeed, then the behaviour is rational, even though one of them is an attempt to do an action which cannot succeed.
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From:
Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
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A reaction:
[a concise account of a laborious account of an example from Bratman 1984, 1987] Bratman uses this to challenge the 'Simple View', that intention leads straightforwardly to action.
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20031
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On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
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Full Idea:
On the simple desire-belief model, an intention is a combination of desire-belief states, and an action is intentional in virtue of standing in the appropriate relation to these simpler terms.
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From:
Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 4)
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A reaction:
This is the traditional view found in Hume, and is probably endemic to folk psychology. They cite Bratman 1987 as the main opponent of the view.
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20028
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Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
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Full Idea:
Rational group action may involve a 'collectivising of reasons', with participants acting in ways that are not rationally recommended from the individual viewpoint. This suggests that groups can be rational, intentional agents.
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From:
Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
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A reaction:
[Pettit 2003] is the source for this. Gilbert says individuals can have joint commitment; Pettit says the group can be an independent agent. The matter of shared intentions is interesting, but there is no need for the ontology to go berserk.
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20027
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If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
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Full Idea:
An account of mutual obligation to do something may require that we give up reductive individualist accounts of shared activity and posit a primitive notion of 'joint commitment'.
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From:
Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
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A reaction:
[attributed to Margaret Gilbert 2000] If 'we' are trying to do something, that seems to give an externalist picture of intentions, rather like all the other externalisms floating around these days. I don't buy any of it, me.
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20018
|
Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
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Full Idea:
Strong Cognitivists say intentions/beliefs are not based on observation or evidence, and are causally reliable in leading to appropriate actions, so this is a mode of 'practical' knowledge that has not been derived from observation.
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From:
Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1)
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A reaction:
[compressed - Stanford unnecessarily verbose!] I see no mention in this discussion of 'hoping' that your action will turn out OK. We are usually right to hope, but it would be foolish to say that when we reach for the salt we know we won't knock it over.
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8516
|
Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]
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Full Idea:
Not all singular causal statements are of Davidson's event-event type. Many involve conditions, so there are condition-event (weakness/collapse), event-condition (explosion/movement), and condition-condition (hot/warming) causal connections.
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From:
Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §3)
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A reaction:
Fans of Davidson need to reduce conditions to events. The problem of individuation keeps raising its head. Davidson makes it depend on description. Kim looks good, because events, and presumably conditions, reduce to something small and precise.
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20644
|
Energy has progressed from a mere formula, to a principle pervading all nature [Kelvin]
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Full Idea:
The name 'energy', first used by Thomas Young, has come into use after it was raised from a mere formula of mathematical dynamics to become a principle pervading all nature, and guiding every field of science.
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From:
Lord Kelvin (Wm Thomson) (works [1881]), quoted by Peter Watson - Convergence 01 'Principle'
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A reaction:
[bit compressed] As far as I can see energy behaves exactly as if it were a substance, like water conserved in rainfalls, and yet it isn't a stuff, and seems to result from a process of abstraction. I take it to be one of the biggest mysteries in physics.
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