Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Conceptions of Truth', 'The Value Problem' and 'The Life of Reason'

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom has a higher value than understanding, which has a higher value than knowledge [Greco]
     Full Idea: Intuitively, understanding is more valuable than knowledge and wisdom is more valuable than understanding.
     From: John Greco (The Value Problem [2011], 'Knowledge')
     A reaction: Down at the bottom is having an 'inkling' of something, I presume. Not convinced of this. I would rate understanding above knowledge, but wisdom seems rather different. It implies a breadth that does not focus on any particular topic.
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
He who is ignorant of the history of philosophy is doomed to repeat it [Santayana, by MacIntyre]
     Full Idea: Santayana remarked that he who is ignorant of the history of philosophy is doomed to repeat it.
     From: report of George Santayana (The Life of Reason [1906]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.1
     A reaction: Santayana's remark seems to have been about history in general, so this is a Macintyre thought. It obviously has a lot of truth, and most great philosophers seem hugely knowledgeable. However, ignorance brings a kind of freedom.
2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
The idea of 'making' can be mere conceptual explanation (like 'because') [Künne]
     Full Idea: If we say 'being a child of our parent's sibling makes him your first cousin', that can be paraphrased using 'because', and this is the 'because' of conceptual explanation: the second part elucidates the sense of the first part.
     From: Wolfgang Künne (Conceptions of Truth [2003], 3.5.2)
     A reaction: Fans of truth-making are certainly made uncomfortable by talk of 'what makes this a good painting' or 'this made my day'. They need a bit more sharpness to the concept of 'making' a truth.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
If value is practical, knowledge is no better than true opinion [Greco]
     Full Idea: Why should knowledge be more valuable than true opinion, if their practical value is the same?
     From: John Greco (The Value Problem [2011], Intro)
     A reaction: We have exam systems and academic titles to bestow social prestige on people who know, not to mention quiz shows. Modern society needs lots of knowledgeable citizens. I'm not sure what intrinsic value knowledge could have.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Externalist theories don't explain why knowledge has value [Greco]
     Full Idea: Externalist theories do not give knowledge the sort of value that internalists want knowledge to have.
     From: John Greco (The Value Problem [2011], Intro)
     A reaction: [He cites Pritchard 2008] This is not a very strong argument, given the uncertainties and complexities in the idea that we share a 'value'. If the value of knowledge is really instrumental (and loved no less because of that), then externalism could cope.