Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Conceptions of Truth', 'Rationality' and 'Precepts for Advancing Science and Arts'

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4 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
The idea of 'making' can be mere conceptual explanation (like 'because') [Künne]
     Full Idea: If we say 'being a child of our parent's sibling makes him your first cousin', that can be paraphrased using 'because', and this is the 'because' of conceptual explanation: the second part elucidates the sense of the first part.
     From: Wolfgang Künne (Conceptions of Truth [2003], 3.5.2)
     A reaction: Fans of truth-making are certainly made uncomfortable by talk of 'what makes this a good painting' or 'this made my day'. They need a bit more sharpness to the concept of 'making' a truth.
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
The ancient Memorists said virtually all types of thinking could be done simply by memory [Sorabji]
     Full Idea: The ancient medical Memorists said that ordinary thinking, inferring, reflecting, believing, assuming, examining, generalising and knowing can all be done simply on the basis of memory.
     From: Richard Sorabji (Rationality [1996], 'Inference')
     A reaction: The think there is a plausible theory that all neurons do is remember, and are mainly distinguished by the duration of their memories. We might explain these modes of thinking in terms of various combinations of the fast and the slow.
Stoics say true memory needs reflection and assent, but animals only have perceptual recognition [Sorabji]
     Full Idea: Stoics say memory proper involves reflection and assent. Animal memory, by contrast, is not memory proper, but mere perceptual recognition. The horse remembers the road when he is on it, but not when he is in the stable.
     From: Richard Sorabji (Rationality [1996], 'Other')
     A reaction: An interesting distinction. Do I remember something if I can never recall it, and yet recognise it when it reappears, such as a person I knew long ago? 'Memory' is ambiguous, between lodged in the mind, and recallable. Unfair to horses, this.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
I don't recommend universal doubt; we constantly seek reasons for things which are indubitable [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I do not think it necessary to recommend to people universal doubt ...in fact, we are constantly seeking reasons for thoughts about which there is no doubt at all.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Precepts for Advancing Science and Arts [1680], p.34)
     A reaction: Such confidence is, of course, asking for trouble. I prefer Peirce's fallibilism - that robust realism is the most coherent view, and the only one worth pursuing and relying on, but you never know....