Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Symposium', 'The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' and 'Introduction - Ontology'

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10 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
19044 Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson]
     Full Idea: The notion of fitting the totality of experience ...adds nothing intelligible to the simple concept of being true. ....Nothing, ...no thing, makes sentences and theories true: not experience, not surface irritations, not the world.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.11), quoted by Willard Quine - On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma p.39
     A reaction: If you don't have a concept of what normally makes a sentence true, I don't see how you go about distinguishing what is true from what is false. You can't just examine the sentence to see if it has the 'primitive' property of truth. Holism is involved....
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
5500 Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan]
     Full Idea: Biologists don't split living things into a 'structural' level and an 'abstract' level; ..rather, they are organised at many levels, each level 'abstract' with respect to those beneath it, but 'structural' as it realises those levels above it.
     From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.9)
     A reaction: This is a very helpful distinction. Compare Idea 4601. It seems to fit well with the 'homuncular' picture of a hierarchical mind, and explains why there are so many levels of description available for mental life.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
5494 'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan]
     Full Idea: There is such a thing as synthetic and a posteriori identity that is nonetheless genuine identity, as in lightning being electrical discharge, and the Morning Star being Venus.
     From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.5)
     A reaction: It is important to note that although these identities are synthetic a posteriori, that doesn't make them contingent. The early identity theorists like Smart seemed to think that it did. Kripke must be right that they are necessary identities.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
6400 Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson]
     Full Idea: The third dogma of empiricism is the dualism of scheme and content, of organizing system and something waiting to be organized, which cannot be made intelligible and defensible. If we give it up, it is not clear that any distinctive empiricism remains.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.189)
     A reaction: The first two dogmas were 'analyticity' and 'reductionism', as identified by Quine in 1953. Presumably Hume's Principles of Association (Idea 2189) would be an example of a scheme. A key issue is whether there is any 'pure' content.
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
6398 Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Different points of view make sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.184)
     A reaction: This seems right to me. I am very struck by the close similarities between people from wildly differing cultural backgrounds, as seen, for example, at the Olympic Games.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
5496 Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan]
     Full Idea: Functionalism has three distinct levels of description: a neurophysiological description, a functional description (relative to a program which the brain is realising), and it may have a further mental description.
     From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.6)
     A reaction: I have always thought that the 'levels of description' idea was very helpful in describing the mind/brain. I feel certain that we are dealing with a single thing, so this is the only way we can account for the diverse ways in which we discuss it.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
5499 A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan]
     Full Idea: Some theorists have said that the one-to-one correspondence between the organism and parts of its 'program' is too liberal, and suggest that the state and its functional role are seen teleologically, as functioning 'for' the organism.
     From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.9)
     A reaction: This seems an inevitable development, once the notion of a 'function' is considered. It has to be fitted into some sort of Aristotelian teleological picture, even if the functions are seen subjectively (by what?). Purpose is usually seen as evolutionary.
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6399 Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Studying the criteria of translation is a way of focusing on criteria of identity for conceptual schemes.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.184)
     A reaction: This is why it was an inspired idea of Quine's to make translation a central topic in philosophy. We must be cautious, though, about saying that the language is the conceptual scheme, as that leaves animals with no scheme at all.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
5845 Niceratus learnt the whole of Homer by heart, as a guide to goodness [Xenophon]
     Full Idea: Niceratus said that his father, because he was concerned to make him a good man, made him learn the whole works of Homer, and he could still repeat by heart the entire 'Iliad' and 'Odyssey'.
     From: Xenophon (Symposium [c.391 BCE], 3.5)
     A reaction: This clearly shows the status which Homer had in the teaching of morality in the time of Socrates, and it is precisely this acceptance of authority which he was challenging, in his attempts to analyse the true basis of virtue
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
5501 People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan]
     Full Idea: There is now a small but vigorous industry whose purpose is to explicate biological teleology in naturalistic terms, typically in terms of causes.
     From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.10)
     A reaction: This looks like a good strategy. In some sense, it seems clear that the moon has no purpose, but an eyeball has one. Via evolution, one would expect to reduce this to causation. Purposes are real (not subjective), but they are reducible.