Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Symposium', 'Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility' and 'A Dictionary of Philosophy'

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5 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity

12185	Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [Edgington, by McFetridge]
	Full Idea: Edgington's position is that logical necessity is an epistemic notion: epistemic necessity which, she claims, is the old notion of the a priori. Like Kripke, she thinks this is two-way independent of metaphysical necessity.
	From: report of Dorothy Edgington (Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility [1985]) by Ian McFetridge - Logical Necessity: Some Issues §1
	A reaction: [her paper was unpublished] She hence thinks an argument can be logically valid, while metaphysically its conclusion may not follow. Dubious, though I think I favour the view that logical necessity is underwritten by metaphysical necessity.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory

6455	Maybe 'sense-data' just help us to talk about unusual perceptual situations [Lacey]
	Full Idea: One possibility is that talk of sense-data is a mere linguistic convenience, providing a noun for talking about appearances, as when seeing a red object in sodium light (when it looks grey).
	From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196)
	A reaction: The term seems to have been coined to deal with situations where there is a gap between appearance and presumed reality, as in illusions. Maybe illusions prove the existence of sense-data, rather than it being a 'convenient' term.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data

6453	Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects [Lacey]
	Full Idea: Sometimes it is said that sense-data are public, and parts either of objects or of the surfaces of objects.
	From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196)
	A reaction: This suggests two drastically different theories, one making sense-data into mental events, the other placing them in the 'external' world. The latter theory can dovetail them with the physics, but then why would we need them?

6454	Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they? [Lacey]
	Full Idea: It is hard to individuate sense-data, saying where one ends and the next begins, and hard to say whether they can change; are they substances, qualities, events, or what?
	From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196)
	A reaction: The problem is not that these questions are unanswerable. The answer seems to be either that they are physical and external, or that they are mental and internal, and that there is no ontological space for them between the two.

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds

5845	Niceratus learnt the whole of Homer by heart, as a guide to goodness [Xenophon]
	Full Idea: Niceratus said that his father, because he was concerned to make him a good man, made him learn the whole works of Homer, and he could still repeat by heart the entire 'Iliad' and 'Odyssey'.
	From: Xenophon (Symposium [c.391 BCE], 3.5)
	A reaction: This clearly shows the status which Homer had in the teaching of morality in the time of Socrates, and it is precisely this acceptance of authority which he was challenging, in his attempts to analyse the true basis of virtue