Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Symposium', 'A Rsum of Metaphysics' and 'Causes and Counterfactuals'

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9 ideas

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Niceratus learnt the whole of Homer by heart, as a guide to goodness [Xenophon]
     Full Idea: Niceratus said that his father, because he was concerned to make him a good man, made him learn the whole works of Homer, and he could still repeat by heart the entire 'Iliad' and 'Odyssey'.
     From: Xenophon (Symposium [c.391 BCE], 3.5)
     A reaction: This clearly shows the status which Homer had in the teaching of morality in the time of Socrates, and it is precisely this acceptance of authority which he was challenging, in his attempts to analyse the true basis of virtue
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: An intelligent being's pleasure is simply the perception of beauty, order and perfection.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §18)
     A reaction: Leibniz seems to have inherited this from the Greeks, especially Pythagoras and Plato. Buried in Leibniz's remark I see the Christian fear of physical pleasure. He should have got out more. Must an intelligent being always be intelligent?
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
     Full Idea: The function of causal statements is 1) to explain events, 2) for predictive usefulness, 3) to help control events, 4) with agents, to attribute moral responsibility, 5) in physical theory. We should judge causal theories by how they account for these.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.207)
     A reaction: He suggests that Lewis's counterfactual theory won't do well on this test. I think the first one is what matters. Philosophy aims to understand, and that is achieved through explanation. Regularity and counterfactual theories explain very little.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]
     Full Idea: Kim has pointed out that there are a number of counterfactuals that have nothing to do with causation. If John marries Mary, then if John had not existed he would not have married Mary, but that is not the cause of their union.
     From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], 5.2) by Michael Tooley - Causation and Supervenience
     A reaction: One might not think that this mattered, but it leaves the problem of distinguishing between the causal counterfactuals and the rest (and you mustn't mention causation when you are doing it!).
Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
     Full Idea: Counterfactuals can express 'analytical' dependency, or the fact that one event is part of another, or an action done by doing another, or (most interestingly) an event can determine another without causally determining it.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205)
     A reaction: [Kim gives example of each case] Counterfactuals can even express a relation that involves no dependency. Or they might just involve redescription, as in 'If Scott were still alive, then the author of "Waverley" would be too'.
Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
     Full Idea: The sort of dependency expressed by counterfactual relations is considerably broader than strictly causal dependency, and causal dependency is only one among the heterogeneous group of dependency relationships counterfactuals can express.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205)
     A reaction: In 'If pigs could fly, one and one still wouldn't make three' there isn't even a dependency. Kim has opened up lines of criticism which make the counterfactual analysis of causation look very implausible to me.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]
     Full Idea: Kim gives a range of examples of counterfactual dependence without causation, as: 'if yesterday wasn't Monday, today wouldn't be Tuesday', and 'if my sister had not given birth, I would not be an uncle'.
     From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §3.3
     A reaction: This is aimed at David Lewis. The objection seems like commonsense. "If you blink, the cat gets it". Causal claims involve counterfactuals, but they are not definitive of what causation is.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Perfection is simply quantity of reality.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §11)
     A reaction: An interesting claim, but totally beyond my personal comprehension. I presume he inherited 'quantity of reality' from Plato, e.g. as you move up the Line from shadows to Forms you increase the degree of reality. I see 'real' as all-or-nothing.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Evils themselves serve a greater good, and the fact that pains are found in minds is necessary if they are to reach greater pleasures.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Résumé of Metaphysics [1697], §23)
     A reaction: How much pain is needed to qualify for the 'greater pleasures'? Some people receive an awful lot. I am not sure exactly how an evil can 'serve' a greater good. Is he recommending evil?