9 ideas
20420 | The emotion expressed is non-conscious, but feels oppressive until expression relieves it [Collingwood] |
Full Idea: The emotion expressed is one of whose nature the person feeling it is no longer conscious. As unexpressed, he feels it in a helpless and oppressed way; as expressed, the oppression has vanished. His mind is somehow lightened and eased. | |
From: R.G. Collingwood (The Principles of Art [1938], p.110), quoted by Gary Kemp - Croce and Collingwood 1 | |
A reaction: It sounds like the regular smoking of cigarettes. This is Collingwood answer the doubts I felt about Idea 20419. I would have thought the desire of Picasso was to create another painting, but not to express yet another new oppressive feeling. |
20421 | Art exists ideally, purely as experiences in the mind of the perceiver [Collingwood, by Kemp] |
Full Idea: For Collingwood (and Croce) the work of art is an ideal object; …they are things that exist only in the mind, that is, only when one perceives. …The physical work exists to make this experience available. | |
From: report of R.G. Collingwood (The Principles of Art [1938]) by Gary Kemp - Croce and Collingwood 2 | |
A reaction: This means that the paintings in a gallery cease to be works of art when the gallery is shut, which sounds odd. I suppose 'work of art' is ambiguous, between the experience (right) and the facilitator of the experience (wrong). |
20406 | Art clarifies the artist's mind and feelings, thus leading to self-knowledge [Collingwood, by Davies,S] |
Full Idea: Collingwood suggests art should be thought of not as product or artifact but as an act or process of expression through which the artist clarifies her initially vague emotions and states of mind. As such, it is a source of self-knowledge. | |
From: report of R.G. Collingwood (The Principles of Art [1938], Ch.6) by Stephen Davies - The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) 8.4 | |
A reaction: I might believe this of writing novels, but not much else. |
22392 | Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot] |
Full Idea: There is a sense in which morality is inescapable - in moral epithets such as 'dishonest', 'unjust', 'uncharitable'; these do not cease to apply to a man because he is indifferent to the ends of morality: they may indeed apply because of his indifference. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.172 n15) | |
A reaction: Odysseus was admired for lying, and charity wasn't a virtue in the ancient world. They won't go away as factual descriptions, but the values attached to them vary quite a lot. |
23685 | Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
Full Idea: In her middle period she changed her mind, and attacks moral rationalism. | |
From: report of Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro | |
A reaction: That is, she doubted whether moral reasons are sufficient to motivate moral actions, which presumably therefore need desires, as the Humeans claimed. Reasons rely on merely hypothetical rules. |
23691 | Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot] |
Full Idea: The man who rejects morality because he sees no reason to obey its rules can be convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.161) | |
A reaction: This is 'middle period' Foot, when she decided that Hume was right about the need for a desire as moral motivator. Before and after this time, she thought there were reasons to be moral, as well as desires. |
5845 | Niceratus learnt the whole of Homer by heart, as a guide to goodness [Xenophon] |
Full Idea: Niceratus said that his father, because he was concerned to make him a good man, made him learn the whole works of Homer, and he could still repeat by heart the entire 'Iliad' and 'Odyssey'. | |
From: Xenophon (Symposium [c.391 BCE], 3.5) | |
A reaction: This clearly shows the status which Homer had in the teaching of morality in the time of Socrates, and it is precisely this acceptance of authority which he was challenging, in his attempts to analyse the true basis of virtue |
22391 | Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot] |
Full Idea: 'One ought to be moral' makes no sense at all unless the 'ought' has the moral subscript, giving a tautology, or else relates morality to some other system such as prudence or etiquette. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.169 n18) | |
A reaction: This aims to undercut the Kantian view that morality is an absolute call to duty (filling us with wonder, like the starry heavens). Foot aims to root morality in the real world. |
22389 | Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot] |
Full Idea: Moral judgements have no better claim to be categorical imperatives than do statements about matters of etiquette. | |
From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.164) | |
A reaction: Her claim is that all moral judgements are responses to situations, and so are hypothetical. This judgement of hers is the culmination of a careful discussion. |