Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Symposium', 'Works of Love' and 'Elusive Knowledge'

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7 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
12899 The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis]
     Full Idea: I allow knowledge without belief, as in the case of the timid student who knows the answer but has no confidence that he has it right, and so does not believe what he knows.
     From: David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996], p.429)
     A reaction: [He cites Woozley 1953 for the timid student] I don't accept this example (since my views on knowledge are rather traditional, I find). Why would the student give that answer if they didn't believe it? Sustained timid correctness never happens.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
12897 To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis]
     Full Idea: If you claim that S knows that P, and yet grant that S cannot eliminate a certain possibility of not-P, it certainly seems as if you have granted that S does not after all know that P. To speak of fallible knowledge just sounds contradictory.
     From: David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996], p.419)
     A reaction: Starting from this point, fallibilism seems to be a rather bold move. The only sensible response seems to be to relax the requirement that not-P must be eliminable. Best: in one epistemic context P, in another not-P.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
12898 Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge [Lewis]
     Full Idea: I don't agree that the mark of knowledge is justification, first because justification isn't sufficient - your true opinion that you will lose the lottery isn't knowledge, whatever the odds; and also not necessary - for what supports perception or memory?
     From: David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996])
     A reaction: I don't think I agree. The point about the lottery is that an overwhelming reason will never get you to knowing that you won't win. But good reasons are coherent, not statistical. If perceptions are dubious, justification must be available.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
12895 Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
     Full Idea: The context-sensitivity of 'knows' is a function of contextual restrictions on the domain of quantification.
     From: report of David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996]) by Stewart Cohen - Contextualism Defended p.68
     A reaction: I think the shifting 'domain of quantification' is one of the most interesting features of ordinary talk. Or, more plainly. 'what are you actually talking about?' is the key question in any fruitful dialogue. Sophisticated speakers tacitly shift domain.
19562 We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
     Full Idea: S knows P if S's evidence eliminates every alternative. But the nature of the alternatives depends on context. So for Lewis, the context sensitivity of 'knows' is a function of contextual restrictions ln the domain of quantification.
     From: report of David Lewis (Elusive Knowledge [1996]) by Stewart Cohen - Contextualism Defended (and reply) 1
     A reaction: A typical modern attempt to 'regiment' a loose term like 'context'. That said, I like the idea. I'm struck by how the domain varies during a conversation (as in 'what we are talking about'). Domains standardly contain 'objects', though.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
15998 Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard]
     Full Idea: To love another in spite of his weaknesses and errors and imperfections is not perfect love. No, to love is to find him lovable in spite of, and together with, his weaknesses and errors and imperfections.
     From: Søren Kierkegaard (Works of Love [1847], p.158)
     A reaction: A true romantic at heart, Kierkegaard ideally posits perfect love as unconditional love, and not just of good attributes, predicates and conditions. However, the real question for both me and Kierkegaard is, is perfect love desirable or even possible?[SY]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
5845 Niceratus learnt the whole of Homer by heart, as a guide to goodness [Xenophon]
     Full Idea: Niceratus said that his father, because he was concerned to make him a good man, made him learn the whole works of Homer, and he could still repeat by heart the entire 'Iliad' and 'Odyssey'.
     From: Xenophon (Symposium [c.391 BCE], 3.5)
     A reaction: This clearly shows the status which Homer had in the teaching of morality in the time of Socrates, and it is precisely this acceptance of authority which he was challenging, in his attempts to analyse the true basis of virtue