Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Symposium', 'The Trouble with Possible Worlds' and 'Virtue Theory and Abortion'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

8 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
15787 Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
     Full Idea: It might be said that Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle.
     From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 02)
     A reaction: I don't buy this, if it meant to be dismissive of the relevance of the principle to truth. A deep question might be, what is so aesthetically attractive about simplicity? I'm inclined to think that application of the Razor has delivered terrific results.
15784 The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
     Full Idea: A Meinongian has already posited everything that could, or even could not, be; how, then, can any subsequent brandishing of Ockham's Razor be to the point?
     From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 02)
     A reaction: See the ideas of Alexius Meinong. Presumably these crazy Meinongians must make some distinction between what actually exists in front of your nose, and the rest. So the Razor can use that distinction too.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
15792 Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
     Full Idea: Meinong's Objects have sometimes been construed as sets of properties.
     From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09)
     A reaction: [Lycan cites Castaņeda and T.Parsons] You still seem to have the problem with any 'bundle' theory of anything. A non-existent object is as much intended to be an object as anything on my desk right now. It just fails to be.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15795 Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
     Full Idea: A mentalistic approach to possible worlds is daunted by the paucity of actual mental events.
     From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09)
     A reaction: Why do they have to be actual, any more than memories have to be conscious? The mental events just need to be available when you need them. They are never all required simultaneously. This isn't mathematical logic!
15796 Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]
     Full Idea: I believe the only promising choice of actual entities to serve as 'worlds' is that of sets of intensional objects, such as propositions or properties with stipulated interrelations.
     From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 12)
     A reaction: This is mainly in response to Lewis's construction of them out of actual concrete objects. It strikes me as a bogus problem. It is just a convenient way to think precisely about possibilities, and occasionally outruns our mental capacity.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
15794 If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
     Full Idea: If a 'world' is understood as a set of sentences, then possibility may be understood as consistency, ...but this seems circular, in that 'consistency' of sentences cannot adequately be defined save in terms of possibility.
     From: William Lycan (The Trouble with Possible Worlds [1979], 09)
     A reaction: [Carnap and Hintikka propose the view, Lewis 'Counterfactuals' p.85 objects] Worlds as sentences is not, of course, the same as worlds as propositions. There is a lot of circularity around in 'possible' worlds.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
5845 Niceratus learnt the whole of Homer by heart, as a guide to goodness [Xenophon]
     Full Idea: Niceratus said that his father, because he was concerned to make him a good man, made him learn the whole works of Homer, and he could still repeat by heart the entire 'Iliad' and 'Odyssey'.
     From: Xenophon (Symposium [c.391 BCE], 3.5)
     A reaction: This clearly shows the status which Homer had in the teaching of morality in the time of Socrates, and it is precisely this acceptance of authority which he was challenging, in his attempts to analyse the true basis of virtue
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
20195 Eudaimonia first; virtue is a trait which promotes it; right acts are what virtues produce [Hursthouse, by Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: Hursthouse defines a virtue as a trait humans need to flourish or live well, ...so 'eudaimonia' is conceptually foundational, the concept of virtue is then derived, and the concept of a right act is derived from that.
     From: report of Rosalind Hursthouse (Virtue Theory and Abortion [1992], p.226) by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind II.1
     A reaction: Zagzebski is mapping different types of virtue theory. The purest theories say that virtue is intrinsically good. The others seem to be instrumental, in varying degrees. Zagzebski makes good motivations prior.