Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Symposium', 'Natural Theology' and 'Causation in a Physical World'

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10 ideas

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds

5845	Niceratus learnt the whole of Homer by heart, as a guide to goodness [Xenophon]
	Full Idea: Niceratus said that his father, because he was concerned to make him a good man, made him learn the whole works of Homer, and he could still repeat by heart the entire 'Iliad' and 'Odyssey'.
	From: Xenophon (Symposium [c.391 BCE], 3.5)
	A reaction: This clearly shows the status which Homer had in the teaching of morality in the time of Socrates, and it is precisely this acceptance of authority which he was challenging, in his attempts to analyse the true basis of virtue

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation

8404	Explain single events by general rules, or vice versa, or probability explains both, or they are unconnected [Field,H]
	Full Idea: Some think singular causal claims should be explained in terms of general causal claims; some think the order should be reversed; some think a third thing (e.g. objective probability) will explain both; and some think they are only loosely connected.
	From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 2)
	A reaction: I think Ducasse gives the best account, which is the second option, of giving singular causal claims priority. Probability (Mellor) strikes me as a non-starter, and the idea that they are fairly independent seems rather implausible.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation

8401	Physical laws are largely time-symmetric, so they make a poor basis for directional causation [Field,H]
	Full Idea: It is sometimes pointed out that (perhaps with a few minor exceptions) the fundamental physical laws are completely time-symmetric. If so, then if one is inclined to found causation on fundamental physical law, it isn't evident how directionality gets in.
	From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
	A reaction: All my instincts tell me that causation is more fundamental than laws, and that directionality is there at the start. That, though, raises the nice question of how, if causation explains laws, the direction eventually gets left OUT!

8400	Identifying cause and effect is not just conventional; we explain later events by earlier ones [Field,H]
	Full Idea: It is not just that the earlier member of a cause-effect pair is conventionally called the cause; it is also connected with other temporal asymmetries that play an important role in our practices. We tend to explain later events in terms of earlier ones.
	From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
	A reaction: We also interfere with the earlier one to affect the later one, and not vice versa (Idea 8363). I am inclined to think that attempting to explain the direction of causation is either pointless or hopeless.

8402	The only reason for adding the notion of 'cause' to fundamental physics is directionality [Field,H]
	Full Idea: Although it is true that the notion of 'cause' is not needed in fundamental physics, even statistical physics, still directionality considerations don't preclude this notion from being consistently added to fundamental physics.
	From: Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
	A reaction: This only makes sense if the notion of cause already has directionality built into it, which I think is correct. The physicist might reply that they don't care about directionality, but the whole idea of an experiment seems to depend on it (Idea 8363).

28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof

21275	Unlike a stone, the parts of a watch are obviously assembled in order to show the time [Paley]
	Full Idea: When we come to inspect a watch we perceive (what we could not discover in a stone) that its several parts are put together for a purpose, to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day.
	From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], Ch 1)
	A reaction: Microscopic examination of the stone would have surprised Paley. Should we infer a geometer because the sun is spherical? Crytals look designed, but are explained by deeper chemistry.

21276	From the obvious purpose and structure of a watch we must infer that it was designed [Paley]
	Full Idea: The inference is inevitable that the watch had a maker; that there must have existed, at some time, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer, who designed its use.
	From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], Ch 1)
	A reaction: It rather begs the question to refer to an ordered structure as a 'design'. Why do we think it is absurd to think the the 'purpose' of the sun is to benefit mankind? Suppose we found a freakish natural sundial in the woods.

21277	Even an imperfect machine can exhibit obvious design [Paley]
	Full Idea: It is not necessary that a machine be perfect, in order to show with what design it was made.
	From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], Ch 1)
	A reaction: This encounters Hume's point that you will then have to infer that the designer contains similar imperfections. If you look at plagues, famines and mothers dying in childbirth (see Mill), you might wish the designer had never started.

21278	All the signs of design found in a watch are also found in nature [Paley]
	Full Idea: Every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature.
	From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], Ch.3)
	A reaction: This is far from obvious. It was crucial to the watch analogy that we immediately see its one self-evident purpose. No one looks at nature and says 'Aha, I know what this is all for'.

21357	No organ shows purpose more obviously than the eyelid [Paley]
	Full Idea: The eyelid defends the eye; it wipes it; it closes it in sleep. Are there, in any work of art whatever, purposes more evident than those which this organ fulfils?
	From: William Paley (Natural Theology [1802], p.24), quoted by Armand Marie LeRoi - The Lagoon: how Aristotle invented science 031
	A reaction: Nice to have another example, in addition to the watch. He is not wholly wrong, because it is impossible to give an evolutionary account of the development of the eyelid without referring to some sort of teleological aspect. The eyelid has a function.