15 ideas
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
22405 | Negative utilitarianism implies that the world should be destroyed, to avoid future misery [Smart] |
Full Idea: The doctrine of negative utilitarianism (that we should concern ourselves with the minimisation of suffering, rather than the maximisation of happiness) ...means we should support a tyrant who explodes the world, to prevent infinite future misery. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Outline of a System of Utilitarianism [1973], 5) | |
A reaction: That only seems to imply that the negative utilitarian rule needs supplementary rules. We are too fond of looking for one single moral rule that guides everything. |
22404 | Any group interested in ethics must surely have a sentiment of generalised benevolence [Smart] |
Full Idea: A utilitarian can appeal to the sentiment of generalised benevolence, which is surely present in any group with whom it is profitable to discuss ethical questions. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Outline of a System of Utilitarianism [1973], I) | |
A reaction: But ethics is not intended only for those who are interested in ethics. If this is the basics of ethics, then we must leave the mafia to pursue its sordid activities without criticism. Their lack of sympathy seems to be their good fortune. |
23262 | Experience, sympathy and history are sensible grounds for laying claim to rights [Grayling] |
Full Idea: Personal experience, social sympathies, and history together licence laying claim to rights …which we see to make good mutual as well as individual sense. | |
From: A.C. Grayling (The Good State [2020], 6) | |
A reaction: There are no such thing as natural rights, but there are clearly natural grounds on which it is very reasonable to base a claim for legal rights. If positive rights are just arbitrary, or expressions of power struggles, that is crazy. |
23263 | Politics is driven by power cliques [Grayling] |
Full Idea: What drives political history is power cliques. | |
From: A.C. Grayling (The Good State [2020], Conc) | |
A reaction: A simple ideas which strikes me as accurate. Alternative views are that power is universally distributed (Foucault), or that power resides in a social class (Marx). Grayling's idea strikes me as more accurate. Each class has its cliques. |
23255 | It is essential for democracy that voting is free and well informed [Grayling] |
Full Idea: A necessary condition for democracy to be realised is that the act of voting should be free and informed. | |
From: A.C. Grayling (The Good State [2020], p.25) | |
A reaction: The requirement that voters should be well informed has become an increasing modern problem, because the media are owned by the wealthy, and false rumours can spread at lightning speed. |
23254 | Democracies should require a supermajority for major questions [Grayling] |
Full Idea: A threshhold or supermajority bar (such as 60%) is the appropriate way to deal with highly consequential questions. | |
From: A.C. Grayling (The Good State [2020], p.23) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a very conservative view, because rejection of a major change is a decision in favour of the status quo. Would this rule apply equally to abolishing capital punishment and to reintroducing it? |
23260 | A cap on time of service would restrict party control and career ambitions [Grayling] |
Full Idea: A method by which legislators can be rendered independent of both party control and career ambitions is a cap on the amount of time they can serve as legislators. | |
From: A.C. Grayling (The Good State [2020], 4) | |
A reaction: The time of service must allow for learning the job, and then using the wisdom of experience. Presumably some career ambitions are needed if we are to have leaders. Not all party discipline is bad; great achievements are hard without it. |
23253 | Majority decisions are only acceptable if the minority interests are not vital [Grayling] |
Full Idea: A majority being in favour of some course of action is the acceptable means of reaching decisions when no vital interest of a minority is endangered. | |
From: A.C. Grayling (The Good State [2020], 1) | |
A reaction: This is generally accepted in extreme cases, such as the majority voting to exterminate the minority. The difficulty is to decide what is a 'vital' interest, and to get the majority to care about it. |
23256 | Liberty and equality cannot be reconciled [Grayling] |
Full Idea: Liberty and equality appear to be irresolvable contradictions. | |
From: A.C. Grayling (The Good State [2020], 2) | |
A reaction: [He particularly cites Isaiah Berlin for this view] Hm. The liberty of one is the liberty of all. I don't think I would feel that my liberty was unreasonably infringed if I lived in a society of imposed equality. The greedy hate equality the most. |
23258 | The very concept of democracy entails a need for justice [Grayling] |
Full Idea: The concept of democracy - embodying the principles of participation and equal concern - entails that social justice is a mandatory aim. | |
From: A.C. Grayling (The Good State [2020], 2) | |
A reaction: The idea that democracy entails participation in any direct way is what the right wing reject. Sustained participation would presumably entail various sorts of justice. |
23259 | There should be separate legislative, executive and judicial institutions [Grayling] |
Full Idea: The obvious solution is where the legislative, executive and judicial powers are exercised by different institutions, distinguished by function. The executive is answerable to the legislative, and the judicial is controlled by neither. | |
From: A.C. Grayling (The Good State [2020], 3) | |
A reaction: Separation by institution, rather than merely by separate individuals exercising the powers. I agree (with Popper etc) that institutions are the way to secure long-term success and justice. Grayling says the judiciary must not paralyse government. |