32 ideas
6979 | Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Serious metaphysics is committed to views about which sentences entail which other sentences. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This does not say that metaphysics is only about entailment, or (even worse) only about sentences. Put another way: if we wish to be wise, we must study the implications of our beliefs. Yes. |
6980 | Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Conceptual analysis is the very business of addressing when and whether a story told in one vocabulary is made true by one told in some allegedly more fundamental vocabulary. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This is a view of linguistic analysis as focusing on entailments rather than on usage or truth conditions. If philosophy is the attempt to acquire a totally consistent set of beliefs (a plausible view), then Jackson is right. |
6983 | Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Intuitions about possibilities are the bread and butter of conceptual analysis. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Hence the centrality of the debate over conceivability and possibility. Which seems to reduce to the relationship between 'intuition' and 'imagination'. Imagination is a very weak guide to what is possible, and intuition is very uncertain.... |
14707 | Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter] |
Full Idea: On the empiricist view of meaning, the relevance of conceptual analysis to metaphysics is that it establishes that a putative reduction respects the original meaning of the target expression. | |
From: report of Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], p.28) by Laura Schroeter - Two-Dimensional Semantics 2.2.4 |
7005 | Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson] |
Full Idea: The one and only way of having a place in an account told in some set of preferred terms is by being entailed by that account - a view I will refer to as the entry by entailment thesis. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: How do we distinguish between the original account, which seems to be just accepted, and the additions which accrue because they are entailed by it? Why does this club distinguish members from guests? |
6994 | Truth supervenes on being [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Truth supervenes on being. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: A nice slogan for those of us who find the word 'truth' to be meaningful. |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
6984 | Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson] |
Full Idea: In a 'smooth' reduction the laws of the reduced theory (thermodynamics of gases) are pretty much preserved in (and isomorphic with) the corresponding laws in the reducing theory (molecular or kinetic theory of gases). | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Are the 'laws' of weather (e.g. linking humidity, temperature and pressure to rainfall) preserved at the level of physics? One might say that they are not preserved, but they are not lost either (they just fade away). Contradictions would be worrying. |
6978 | Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Baldness is a much more indeterminate matter than is hair distribution, nevetheless baldness is nothing over and above hair distribution. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], p.22) | |
A reaction: This seems to support Williamson's view that there is no vagueness in nature, and that 'vague' is an entirely epistemological concept. |
6993 | Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson] |
Full Idea: We typically count things as red just if they have a property that interacts with normal human beings to make the object look red in such a way that their so looking counts as a presentation of the property to normal humans. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is Jackson's careful statement of the 'Australian' primary property view of colours. He is trying to make red a real property of objects, but personally I take the mention of 'normal' humans as a huge danger sign. Nice try, but no. See Idea 5456. |
6987 | We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson] |
Full Idea: We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: It would be nice if there was just one sense of necessity, with the multiplication arising from the different ways in which necessities arise. In chess, checkmate is a necessity which rests on contingencies. Absolute necessities seem different. |
6988 | Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson] |
Full Idea: There is notoriously a problem about what to say concerning mathematical sentences within the possible-worlds framework. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3 n25) | |
A reaction: Presumably this concerns possible axioms and their combinations. |
6975 | Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Possible worlds might be concrete (Lewis), or abstract (Stalnaker), or structured universals (Forrest), or collections of sentences (Jeffrey), or mere combinations of properties and relations (Armstrong). | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: A helpful summary. I don't like concrete, or collections of sentences. Whatever they are, they had better be 'possible', so not any old collection or idea will do. |
6982 | Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson] |
Full Idea: We know that being fallible and being a priori can co-exist - the results of long numerical additions are well-known examples. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: I see this realisation as a good example of progress in philosophy. Russell, who says self-evidence comes in degrees, deserves major credit. It is the key idea that once again makes rationalism respectable. |
6991 | We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson] |
Full Idea: We examine objects to determine their colour; we do not introspect. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Interesting, but the theory of secondary qualities did not arise from experience, but from a theory about what is actually going on. Compare pain appearing to be in your foot. |
6901 | Understanding is needed for imagination, just as much as the other way around [Betteridge] |
Full Idea: Although it might be right to say that imagination is required in order to make reasoning and understanding possible, this also works the other way, as imagination cannot occur without some prior understanding. | |
From: Alex Betteridge (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a very illuminating remark, particularly for anyone who aspires to draw a simplified flowdiagram of the mind showing logical priority between its various parts. In fact, the parts are interdependent. Maybe imagination is understanding. |
6976 | In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Physicalism is associated with various asymmetry doctrines, most famously with the idea that the psychological depends in some sense on the physical, and not the other way around. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Sounds okay to me. Shadows depend on objects, and not the other way round. It might suggest properties depending on substances (or bare particulars), but I prefer the dependence of processes on mechanisms (waterfalls on liquid water). |
6986 | Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Should the necessary passage from the physical account of the world to the psychological one that physicalists are committed to, be placed in the a posteriori or the a priori basket? | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: That is, is 'the physical entails the mental' empirical or a priori? See Idea 3989. If we can at least dream of substance dualism, it is hard to see how it could be fully a priori. I think I prefer to see it as an inductive explanation. |
6992 | If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson] |
Full Idea: It would be strange if having learnt the lesson of multiple realisability that the same role may be filled by different states, we turned around and insisted that the converse - different roles filled by the same state - is impossible. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.4 n3) | |
A reaction: Good. The world is full of creatures who seem to enjoy the smell of decay etc. Some people (not me) like horror films. The separation of qualia and role leaves type-type physicalism as a possibility. Survival needs similar roles, not similar qualia. |
6996 | Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Folk psychology has a tripartite nature, with input clauses, internal role clauses, and output clauses. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Interesting, particularly that folk psychology refers to internal roles, or attempts to explain what is going on inside the 'black box'. The folk have collectively worked out a standard flow diagram for human thought. |
6977 | Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson] |
Full Idea: I have been convinced by arguments (e.g. of Perry, Castaņeda and Lewis) that egocentric or de se content is irreducibly so. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This is associated with the use of indexicals (like 'I' and 'now') in language. Quine disagrees, and should not be written off. Any theory of content, concepts, meaning etc. must clearly taken account of such subjective language. |
6990 | Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson] |
Full Idea: My guess is that objectors to the deflationary account of the Twin Earth parable are confusing the essential properties of water with the question of what is essential for being water. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: That is, we must distinguish between the actual ontology of water's properties and the conditions under which we (in our society) apply the word 'water'. Interesting. The latter issue, though, might push us back towards internalism... |
6985 | Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Conceptual analysis is sometimes understood as the business of finding necessary and sufficient conditions by the method of possible cases. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Some (e.g. Stich) reject this, but it seems to me undeniable that the procedure can be very illuminating, even if it is never totally successful. Jackson prefers to see analysis as the study of entailments between stories about the world. |
6995 | Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Successful predication supervenes on nature. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: A nice slogan, but it is in danger of being a tautology. If I say x and y 'are my favourites/are interesting', is that 'successful' predication? Is 'Juliet is the sun' unsuccessful? |
6989 | I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson] |
Full Idea: If I hear someone say "He has a beard", and I don't know whether it is Jackson, Jones, or someone else, I don't know which proposition is being expressed in the sense of not knowing the conditions under which what is said is true. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This is the neatest and simplest problem I have encountered for Davidson's truth-conditions account of meaning. However, we probably just say that we understand the sense but not the reference. The strict-and-literal but not contextual meaning. |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
6998 | Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson] |
Full Idea: We have, it seems to me, currently no clear sense of the place and rationale of the distinction between doing and allowing in folk morality. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Does this mean that philosophers should endeavour to appear on television in order to improve folk morality, so that Jackson, back at the ranch, can then infer the meanings of moral terms from the new improved version? |
6997 | Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson] |
Full Idea: Moral functionalism is the view that the meanings of moral terms are given by their place in the network of input, internal clauses, and output that makes up folk psychology. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Jackson considers this enough to support a cognitivist view of morality. In assuming that there is something stable called 'folk morality' he seems to be ignoring questions about cultural relativism. |
7000 | Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson] |
Full Idea: 'Centralists' (e.g. Bernard Williams) say thin ethical concepts (right, good, ought) are conceptually fundamental; 'non-centralists' (e.g. Susan Hurley) say that such concepts are not conceptually prior to kindness, equity and the like. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: My immediate intuition is to side with Susan Hurley, since morality grows out of immediate relationships, not out of intellectual principles and theoretical generalisations. This would go with particularist views of virtue theory. |
6999 | It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson] |
Full Idea: We allow that abortion is permissible in many circumstances, but infanticide is hardly ever permissible, and yet it is hard to justify this disparity in moral judgement in the sense of finding the relevant difference. | |
From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: The implications of this are tough to face. A foetus is (maybe) just not as important as a new-born babe - and so a new-born babe is of less importance than a five-year old. Birth is (or was) a hugely dangerous hurdle to be cleared. |