66 ideas
18559 | Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact [Machery] |
Full Idea: Save, maybe, for purely formal (e.g. logical) theories, philosophical claims whose correctness does not depend, however indirectly, on matters of fact are empty: they are neither true nor false. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: I subscribe to this view. I'd even say that logic is empty if it is not answerable to the facts. The facts are nature, so this is a naturalistic manifesto. |
13838 | A decent modern definition should always imply a semantics [Hacking] |
Full Idea: Today we expect that anything worth calling a definition should imply a semantics. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §10) | |
A reaction: He compares this with Gentzen 1935, who was attempting purely syntactic definitions of the logical connectives. |
13833 | 'Thinning' ('dilution') is the key difference between deduction (which allows it) and induction [Hacking] |
Full Idea: 'Dilution' (or 'Thinning') provides an essential contrast between deductive and inductive reasoning; for the introduction of new premises may spoil an inductive inference. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §06.2) | |
A reaction: That is, inductive logic (if there is such a thing) is clearly non-monotonic, whereas classical inductive logic is monotonic. |
13834 | Gentzen's Cut Rule (or transitivity of deduction) is 'If A |- B and B |- C, then A |- C' [Hacking] |
Full Idea: If A |- B and B |- C, then A |- C. This generalises to: If Γ|-A,Θ and Γ,A |- Θ, then Γ |- Θ. Gentzen called this 'cut'. It is the transitivity of a deduction. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §06.3) | |
A reaction: I read the generalisation as 'If A can be either a premise or a conclusion, you can bypass it'. The first version is just transitivity (which by-passes the middle step). |
13835 | Only Cut reduces complexity, so logic is constructive without it, and it can be dispensed with [Hacking] |
Full Idea: Only the cut rule can have a conclusion that is less complex than its premises. Hence when cut is not used, a derivation is quite literally constructive, building up from components. Any theorem obtained by cut can be obtained without it. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §08) |
13845 | The various logics are abstractions made from terms like 'if...then' in English [Hacking] |
Full Idea: I don't believe English is by nature classical or intuitionistic etc. These are abstractions made by logicians. Logicians attend to numerous different objects that might be served by 'If...then', like material conditional, strict or relevant implication. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §15) | |
A reaction: The idea that they are 'abstractions' is close to my heart. Abstractions from what? Surely 'if...then' has a standard character when employed in normal conversation? |
13840 | First-order logic is the strongest complete compact theory with Löwenheim-Skolem [Hacking] |
Full Idea: First-order logic is the strongest complete compact theory with a Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13) |
13844 | A limitation of first-order logic is that it cannot handle branching quantifiers [Hacking] |
Full Idea: Henkin proved that there is no first-order treatment of branching quantifiers, which do not seem to involve any idea that is fundamentally different from ordinary quantification. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13) | |
A reaction: See Hacking for an example of branching quantifiers. Hacking is impressed by this as a real limitation of the first-order logic which he generally favours. |
13842 | Second-order completeness seems to need intensional entities and possible worlds [Hacking] |
Full Idea: Second-order logic has no chance of a completeness theorem unless one ventures into intensional entities and possible worlds. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13) |
13837 | With a pure notion of truth and consequence, the meanings of connectives are fixed syntactically [Hacking] |
Full Idea: My doctrine is that the peculiarity of the logical constants resides precisely in that given a certain pure notion of truth and consequence, all the desirable semantic properties of the constants are determined by their syntactic properties. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §09) | |
A reaction: He opposes this to Peacocke 1976, who claims that the logical connectives are essentially semantic in character, concerned with the preservation of truth. |
13839 | Perhaps variables could be dispensed with, by arrows joining places in the scope of quantifiers [Hacking] |
Full Idea: For some purposes the variables of first-order logic can be regarded as prepositions and place-holders that could in principle be dispensed with, say by a system of arrows indicating what places fall in the scope of which quantifier. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §11) | |
A reaction: I tend to think of variables as either pronouns, or as definite descriptions, or as temporary names, but not as prepositions. Must address this new idea... |
13843 | If it is a logic, the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem holds for it [Hacking] |
Full Idea: A Löwenheim-Skolem theorem holds for anything which, on my delineation, is a logic. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13) | |
A reaction: I take this to be an unusually conservative view. Shapiro is the chap who can give you an alternative view of these things, or Boolos. |
18564 | Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals? [Machery] |
Full Idea: Psychologists have attempted to determine whether a concept of a category stores some causal knowledge about the members, some knowledge about their typical properties, or some knowledge about specific members. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.3.2) | |
A reaction: I take there to be a psychological process of 'generalisation', so that knowledge of individuals is not and need not be retained. I am dubious about entities called 'properties', so I will vote for causal (including perceptual) knowledge. |
18604 | Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different? [Machery] |
Full Idea: Are categorisation under time pressure and categorisation without time pressure ...two different cognitive competences? | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 5.1.1) | |
A reaction: This is a psychologist's question. Introspectively, they do seem to be rather different, as there is no time for theorising and explaining when you are just casting your eyes over the landscape. |
18573 | For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts [Machery] |
Full Idea: I contend that the best available evidence suggests that for each category of objects an individual typically has several concepts. For instance, instead of having a single concept of dog, an individual has in fact several concepts of dog. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 3) | |
A reaction: Machery's book is a sustained defence of this hypothesis, with lots of examples from psychology. Any attempt by philosophers to give a neat and tidy account of categorisation looks doomed. |
18602 | A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws [Machery] |
Full Idea: A to-be-classified object is considered a category member to the extent that its features were likely to have been generated by the category's causal laws. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.4.4) | |
A reaction: [from Bob Rehder, psychologist, 2003] This is an account of categorisation which arises from the Theory Theory view of concepts, of which I am a fan. I love this idea, which slots neatly into the account I have been defending. Locke would like this. |
18565 | There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip [Machery] |
Full Idea: There may be ad hoc categories, as when people think about the things to pack in a small suitcase for a trip abroad. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.4.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to be obviously correct, though critics might say that 'category' is too grand a term for such a grouping. |
18570 | There may be several ways to individuate things like concepts [Machery] |
Full Idea: Philosophers have rarely explained why they believe that there is a single correct way of individuating concepts. Many entities can be legitimately individuated in several ways. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 2.1.3) | |
A reaction: I cite this under 'individuation' because I think that is a very garbled concept. I agree with this point, even though I don't really know exactly what individuation is supposed to be. |
22049 | Transcendental idealism aims to explain objectivity through subjectivity [Bowie] |
Full Idea: The aim of transcendental idealism is to give a basis for objectivity in terms of subjectivity. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (German Philosophy: a very short introduction [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: Hume used subjectivity to undermine the findings of objectivity. There was then no return to naive objectivity. Kant's aim then was to thwart global scepticism. Post-Kantians feared that he had failed. |
22055 | The Idealists saw the same unexplained spontaneity in Kant's judgements and choices [Bowie] |
Full Idea: The Idealist saw in Kant that knowledge, which depends on the spontaneity of judgement, and self-determined spontaneous action, can be seen as sharing the same source, which is not accessible to scientific investigation. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (German Philosophy: a very short introduction [2010]) | |
A reaction: This is the 'spontaneity' of judgements and choices which was seen as the main idea in Kant. It inspired romantic individualism. The judgements are the rule-based application of concepts. |
22054 | German Idealism tried to stop oppositions of appearances/things and receptivity/spontaneity [Bowie] |
Full Idea: A central aim of German Idealism is to overcome Kant's oppositions between appearances and thing in themselves, and between receptivity and spontaneity. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (German Philosophy: a very short introduction [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: I have the impression that there were two strategies: break down the opposition within the self (Fichte), or break down the opposition in the world (Spinozism). |
22056 | Crucial to Idealism is the idea of continuity between receptivity and spontaneous judgement [Bowie] |
Full Idea: A crucial idea for German Idealism (from Hamann) is that apparently passive receptivity and active spontaneity are in fact different degrees of the same 'activity, and the gap between subject and world can be closed. | |
From: Andrew Bowie (German Philosophy: a very short introduction [2010], 3) | |
A reaction: The 'passive' bit seems to be Hume's 'impressions', which are Kant's 'intuitions', which need 'spontaneous' interpretation to become experiences. Critics of Kant said this implied a dualism. |
18616 | If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification [Machery] |
Full Idea: If a hypothesised natural kind term fails to pick out a natural kind, keeping this theoretical term is likely to prevent the development of a new classification system that would identify the relevant kinds. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 8.2.3) | |
A reaction: I'm persuaded. This is why metaphysicians should stop talking about 'properties'. |
18614 | Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories [Machery] |
Full Idea: Vertical arguments for eliminativism of theoretical terms note that distinct types of generalisation do not line up with each other. ...It is argued that the theoretical term picks out more than one natural kind. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 8.2.3) | |
A reaction: He mentions 'depression', as behavioural and cognitive; the former includes apes, and the latter doesn't. It is a nice principle for tidying up theories. |
18615 | Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind [Machery] |
Full Idea: Horizontal arguments for eliminativism of theoretical terms say that some terms should be eliminated if they do not pick out a natural kind. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 8.2.3) | |
A reaction: This is the one Machery likes, but I would say that it is less obvious than the 'vertical' version, since picking out a natural kind may not be the only job of a theoretical term. (p.238: Machery agrees!) |
18609 | Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another [Machery] |
Full Idea: Typically, psychologists use 'induction' to refer to the capacity to generalise a property from a category (the source) to another category (the target). | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 7.1.1) | |
A reaction: This is because psychologists are interested in the ongoing activities of thought. Philosophers step back a bit, to ask how the whole thing could get started. Philosophical induction has to start with individuals and single observations. |
18610 | 'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them [Machery] |
Full Idea: Induction is 'ampliative' when it infers that all or most members of a category possess a property from the fact that some of its members have this property. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 7.1.1) | |
A reaction: This sounds like a simple step in reasoning, but actually it is more like explanation, and will involve overall coherence and probability, rather than a direct conclusion. This invites sceptical questions. The last one observed may be the exception. |
18562 | Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes [Machery] |
Full Idea: Connectionists typically do not distinguish between processes and memory stores, and, more importantly, it is unclear whether connectionists can draw a distinction between the knowledge stored in a concept and the background. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: In other words connectionism fails to capture the structured nature of our thinking. There is an innate structure (which, say I, should mainly be seen as 'mental files'). |
18561 | We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order' [Machery] |
Full Idea: Categorization, deduction, induction, analogy-making, linguistic understanding, and planning - all of these are higher cognitive capacities. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: His 'lower' competences are perceptual and motor. I say the entry to the higher competences are abstraction, idealisation and generalisation. If you can't do these (chimpanzees!) you will not be admitted. |
18574 | Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery] |
Full Idea: In general, concepts that are used when we categorise and concepts that are used when we reason inductively could have little in common. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 3.2.1) | |
A reaction: In the end he is going to reject concepts altogether, so he would say this. Friends of concepts would be very surprised if the mind were so uneconomical in its activities, given that induction seems to be up to its neck in categorisation. |
18588 | Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery] |
Full Idea: A theory of concepts should determine the knowledge stored in them, and the cognitive processes that use concepts. Ideally it should also characterise their format, their acquisition, and (increasingly) localise them in the brain. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: Machery reveals his dubious scientism in the requirement to localise them in the brain. That strikes me as entirely irrelevant to both philosophy and psychology. I want the format, acquisition and knowledge. |
18611 | We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery] |
Full Idea: The notion of 'concept' ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology, and replaced by the notions of prototype, exemplar, and theory. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 8) | |
A reaction: Machery's main thesis. I think similarly about 'property' in metaphysics. It embraces different ideas, and if we eliminated 'property' (and used predicate, class, fundamental power, complex power) we would do better. Psychologists have dropped 'memory'. |
18567 | In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery] |
Full Idea: In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents, components, or parts of thoughts. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.4.3) | |
A reaction: My instincts are against this. I take the fundamentals of concepts to be mental responses to distinct individual items in the world. Thought builds up from that. He says psychologists themselves don't see it this way. Influence of Frege. |
18569 | In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery] |
Full Idea: A philosophical theory of concepts is a semantic theory for our propositional attitudes: it explains how our thoughts can have the content they have. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 2.1.2) | |
A reaction: I suppose this is what I am interested in. I want to know in what way concepts form a bridge between content and world. I am more interested in the propositions, and less interested in our attitudes towards them. |
18563 | By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure [Machery] |
Full Idea: Psychologists use 'concept' interchangeably with 'mental representation', 'category representation', 'knowledge representation', 'knowledge structure', 'semantic representation', and 'conceptual structures'. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: [Machery gives references for each of these] Machery is moving in to attack these, but we look to psychologists to give some sort of account of what a concept might consist of, such that it could be implemented by neurons. |
18558 | Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location [Machery] |
Full Idea: Psychological theories of concepts try to describe the knowledge stored in concepts, the format of concepts, the cognitive processes that use the concepts, the acquisition of concepts, and the localization of concepts in the brain. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: I suppose it would the first two that are of central interest. What individuates a concept (its 'format') and what are the contents of a concept. The word 'stored' seems to imply a mental files view. |
18557 | Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements [Machery] |
Full Idea: In psychology, concepts are characterized as those bodies of knowledge that are stored in long-term memory and used most higher cognitive competences when these processes result in judgements. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], Intro) | |
A reaction: Machery mounts an attack on this idea. I like the 'mental files' idea, where a concept starts as a label, and then acquires core knowledge, and then further information. The 'concept' is probably no more than a label, and minimal starter information. |
18560 | Psychologist treat concepts as categories [Machery] |
Full Idea: Psychologists often use 'concept' and 'category' interchangeably. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.1) | |
A reaction: Well they shouldn't. Some concepts are no more than words, and don't categorise anything. Some things may be categorised by a complex set of concepts. |
18592 | The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate [Machery] |
Full Idea: Several concepts, such as OBJECT or AGENT, may be innate. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.1.4) | |
A reaction: It is one thing to say that we respond to objects and agents, and another to say that we have those 'concepts'. Presumably birds, and even bees, have to relate to similar features. Add PROCESS? |
18566 | Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery] |
Full Idea: We ought to reserve the term 'concept' for the bodies of knowledge in working memory, and not for our knowledge of long-term memory, because the former, and not the latter, 'control behaviour'. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.4.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites the psychologist Barsalou 1993] Some more theoretical concepts can only be recalled with difficulty, and control our theorising rather than our behaviour. But we act on some theories, so there is no clear borderline. |
18584 | One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery] |
Full Idea: One hybrid theory of concepts says they have both a core and an identification procedure. The core is a definition (necessary and sufficient conditions), while the identification procedure consists of a prototype (the properties typical of a category). | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 3.3.1) | |
A reaction: This combines the classical and prototype theories of concepts. I like it because it fits the idea of 'mental files' nicely (see Recanati). If concepts are files (as in a database) they will have aspects like labels, basic info, and further details. |
18585 | Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery] |
Full Idea: The Heterogeneity Hypothesis, but not the hybrid theory of concepts, predicts that the coreferential bodies of knowledge it posits will occasionally lead to conflicting outcomes, such as inconsistent judgements. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 3.3.2) | |
A reaction: Machery's book champions the Heterogeneous Hypothesis. Hybrid views say the aspects of a concept are integrated, but Heterogeneity says there are separate processes. My preferred 'file' approach would favour integration. |
18578 | Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery] |
Full Idea: Since the rejection of the classical theory of concepts (that they are definitions), three paradigms have successively emerged in the psychology of concepts: the prototype paradigm, the exemplar paradigm, and the theory paradigm. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: I am becoming a fan of the 'theory theory' proposal, because the concepts centre around what explains the phenomenon, which fits my explanatory account of essentialism. Not that it's right because it agrees with me, of course..... |
18575 | The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery] |
Full Idea: Across domains (such as biology and psychology) classes of physical objects, substances and events are typically represented by a prototype, by a set of exemplars, and by a theory. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 3.2.3) | |
A reaction: In other words he thinks that all of the major psychological theories of concepts are partially correct, and he argues for extensive pluralism in the true picture. Bad news for neat philosophy, but real life is a right old mess. |
18591 | Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery] |
Full Idea: The nail in the coffin of the classical theory is its lack of explanatory power. For example it doesn't explain the fact that typical x's are categorised more quickly and more reliably than atypical x's. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.1.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites Rosch and Mervis: 1975:ch 5] This research launched the 'prototype' theory, which has since been challenged by the 'exemplar' and 'theory theory' rivals (and neo-empiricism, and idealisation). |
18583 | Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery] |
Full Idea: For many categories there is simply no definition to learn (such as Wittgenstein's example of a 'game'). | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.1.4) |
18590 | Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery] |
Full Idea: If a concept is defined by means of another, such as MURDER by means of KILL, then processing the former concept should take longer in the classical theory, but several experiments show that this is not the case. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.1.3) | |
A reaction: For the philosopher there is no escaping the findings of neuroscience when it comes to the study of concepts. This invites the question of the role, if any, of philosophy. I take philosophy to concern the big picture, or it is nothing. |
18594 | Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction [Machery] |
Full Idea: Knowing which properties are typical of a class is particularly useful when you have to draw inductions about the members of a class. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.2.1) |
18593 | The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation [Machery] |
Full Idea: The term 'prototype' is used ambiguously to designate the most typical members of a category, and the representation of a category. (I use the term in the second sense). | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.2.1 n25) |
18595 | Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype [Machery] |
Full Idea: The most important property of prototype theories is that cognitive processes are assumed to involve the computation of the similarity between prototypes and other representations. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.2.3) | |
A reaction: [He cites J.A.Hampton 1998, 2006] This presumably suits theories of the mind as largely computational (e.g. Fodor's account, based on the Turing machine). |
18596 | Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype [Machery] |
Full Idea: We are typically not told how prototypes are selected, that is, what determines whether a specific prototype is retrieved from memory in order to be involved in the categorisation process. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.2.4) | |
A reaction: One of the aims of this database is to make people aware of ideas that people have already thought of. This one was spotted 2,400 years ago. It's the Third Man problem. How do you even start to think about a particular thing? |
18603 | Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties [Machery] |
Full Idea: Barsalou (1983,1985) introduced the idea of ideals instead of prototypes. An ideal is a body of knowledge about the properties a thing should possess (rather than its typical actual properties). ... A 'bully' might be perfect, rather than typical. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.5.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Machery offers this as an interesting minor variant, with little experimental support. I take idealisation to be one of the three key mental operations that enable us to think about the world (along with abstraction and generalisation). |
18605 | It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars [Machery] |
Full Idea: Instead of regularly producing a prototype out of the exemplars stored in long-term memory, it seems more efficient to extract a prototype from category members during concept learning and to use this prototype when needed. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 6.3.2) | |
A reaction: [This is a critique of Barsalou's on-the-fly proposal for prototypes] If the exemplar theory is right, then some sort of summary must occur when faced with a new instance. So this thought favours prototypes against exemplars. |
18606 | The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise [Machery] |
Full Idea: The prototype paradigm of concepts makes the strong prediction that typical members should be easier to categorise than atypical members. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 6.4.1) | |
A reaction: This is why philosophers should approach the topic of concepts with caution. Clearly empirical testing is going to settle this matter, not abstract theorising. |
18597 | Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular [Machery] |
Full Idea: The exemplar paradigm of concepts is built around the idea that concepts are sets of exemplars. In turn, an exemplar is a body of knowledge about the properties believed to be possessed by a particular member of a class. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.3.1) | |
A reaction: I like the fact that this theory is rooted in particulars, where the prototype theory doesn't seem to say much about how prototypes are derived. But you have to do more than just contemplate a bunch of exemplars. |
18598 | Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them [Machery] |
Full Idea: Exemplar theories have a selection problem. Given that individuals have an infinite number of properties, they need to explain why exemplars represent such and such properties, instead of others. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.3.1) | |
A reaction: I have the impression that this idea rests on the 'abundant' view of properties - that every true predicate embodies a property. A sparse view of properties might give a particular quite a restricted set of properties. |
18599 | In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars [Machery] |
Full Idea: An object that is extremely similar to a specific known category member, but only moderately similar to others, is more likely to be categorised as a category member than an object that is moderately similar to most known category members. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.3.3) | |
A reaction: This research finding is a problem for the Exemplar Theory, in which all the exemplars have equal status. It is even a problem for the Prototype Theory, since the known member may not be like the prototype. |
18600 | Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership [Machery] |
Full Idea: According to theory theorists, a concept of a category stores some knowledge that can explain the properties of the category members. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.4.1) | |
A reaction: This is the account of essentialism which I defended in my PhD thesis. So naturally I embrace a theory of the nature of concepts which precisely dovetails with my view. I take explanation to be the central concept in metaphysics. |
18601 | Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains [Machery] |
Full Idea: The two core ideas of the Theory Theory are that concepts are bodies of knowledge that underlie explanation, where explanation rests on folk examples, and concepts are organised in domains which use similar knowledge. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.4.1) | |
A reaction: Folk explanation is opposed to scientific explanation, as expounded by Hempel etc. This sounds better and better, since the domains reflect the structure of reality. Machery defends Theory Theory as part of the right answer, but it's my favourite bit. |
18607 | Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities [Machery] |
Full Idea: Theory theorists deny that categorisation depends on similarity; they often propose that categorisation involves some kind of inference to the best explanation. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 6.5.1) | |
A reaction: Love it. Any theory of concepts should, in my view, be continuous with a plausible account of animal minds, and best explanations are not their strong suit. Maybe its explanations for slow categorising, and something else when it's quick. |
18608 | If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have [Machery] |
Full Idea: It seems that when subjects are not categorising by similarity, they are relying on what properties objects can and cannot have - that is, on some modal knowledge. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 6.5.1) | |
A reaction: I would call this essentialist categorisation, based on the inner causal powers which generate the modal profile of the thing. We categorise bullets and nails very differently, because of their modal profiles. |
18587 | The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach [Machery] |
Full Idea: The theory paradigm is sometimes called 'the knowledge approach' (Murphy 2002) or 'explanation-based views' (Komatsu 1992). | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4) | |
A reaction: The word 'explanation' is music to my ears, so I am immediately sympathetic to the theory theory of concepts, even if it falls at the final hurdle. |
18577 | The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition [Machery] |
Full Idea: If a prototype of grandmothers represents them as grey-haired old women, and a definition of grandmothers represents them as being necessarily the mother of a parent ....we may fail to recognise that 'grandmother' represents two distinct concepts. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 3.3.4) | |
A reaction: He is referring to two distinct theories about what a concept is. He argues that both theories apply, so words do indeed represent several different concepts. Nice example. |
18589 | For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names [Machery] |
Full Idea: Behaviourists identified concepts with a mere disposition to associate category members with a given name. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 4.1.1) | |
A reaction: This is one reason why the word 'disposition' triggers alarm bells in the immediately post-behaviourist generation of philosophers. The proposal is far too linguistic in character. |
18612 | Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery] |
Full Idea: Tests suggest that American subjects were significantly more likely than Chinese subjects to have intuitions in line with causal-historical theories of reference. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 8.1.3) | |
A reaction: This is an example of 'experimental philosophy' in action (of which Machery is a champion). The underlying idea is that Americans are generally more disposed to think causally than the Chinese are. So more scientific? What do the Hopi do? |
18613 | Artifacts can be natural kinds, when they are the object of historical enquiry [Machery] |
Full Idea: Some artifacts are the objects of inquiry in the social sciences ...such as prehistoric tools ...and hence, artifacts are bona fide natural kinds. | |
From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 8.2.1) | |
A reaction: Presumably if a bird's nest can be a natural kind, then so can a flint axe, but then so can a mobile phone, for an urban anthropologist. 'Natural' is, to put it mildly, a tricky word. |