14 ideas
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
| A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
| A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
| A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
| 8511 | Stout first explicitly proposed that properties and relations are particulars [Stout,GF, by Campbell,K] |
| Full Idea: In modern times, it was G.F. Stout who first explicitly made the proposal that properties and relations are as particular as the substances that they qualify. | |
| From: report of G.F. Stout (The Nature of Universals and Propositions [1923]) by Keith Campbell - The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars §1 | |
| A reaction: Note that relations will have to be tropes, as well as properties. Williams wants tropes to be parts of objects, but that will be tricky with relations. If you place two objects on a table, how does the 'to the left of' trope come into existence? |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
| 23429 | The environment needs localised politics, with its care for the land [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: More localised politics helps to generate the disposition of care for the land which is a core feature of environmental politics. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 4) | |
| A reaction: I currently live in a time when localised politics is hugely devalued, because centralisation and privatisation are cheaper. It seems obvious that many human needs require a commitment to a particular locality. |
| 23424 | An ideology judges things now, and offers an ideal, with a strategy for reaching it [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: An ideology generally has three components: a judgement (usually critical) of how things are, a picture of the ideology's ideal society, and a strategy for progressing towards the ideal. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: Conservatives tend to think we are already living in the ideal, and they reject most ideologies for being 'idealistic' (which presumably means delusional). I'm a fan of ideals, but combined with cool judgement. |
| 23426 | Ecologism is often non-liberal, by claiming to know other people's best interests [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: Liberals say that their preferences are their interests, and resist the idea that anyone could know their interests better than they can. …To this degree, ecologism might be regarded as 'non-liberal'. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: There are lots of other cases where liberal citizens may not realise their best interests, such as in the control of traffic, or of drugs. |
| 23427 | Socialism can be productive and centralised, or less productive and decentralised [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: Marx and his heirs promote a productivist socialism, but utopian socialists such as William Morris offer a less productivist and more decentralised form of socialism. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: Modern history teaches us to be very cautious about the centralised version. Presumably you could be decentralised but still value production highly, even if it is a bit less efficient. |
| 23428 | Difference feminists say women differ fundamentally from men [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: Difference feminists argue that men and women are fundamentally different. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: You can be significantly different without being 'fundamentally' different. Personally I don't see a huge difference, even though history may have greatly exaggerated and dramatised what differences there are. |
| 23422 | For the environment, affluence and technology matter as much as population size [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: Although bare population figures are important for environmental impact, the level of affluence and the technology are also crucial factors. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: It is worth noting that the technology can also have a good impact, though affluence is nearly always bad. |
| 23425 | Ecologism says growth must be reduced, and efficiency is not enough [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: A central belief of the ideology of ecologism is that aggregate growth must be reduced, and that this is very unlikely to be achieved by efficiency gains alone. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: He argues that efficiency gains invariably lead to increased production. Trickle down economics needs huge growth to deliver a good life for the poorest sector. Ecologism has to be fairly egalitarian about wealth. |
| 23430 | A million years is a proper unit of political time [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: We must acknowledge that a million years is a proper unit of political time. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 5) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Colin Tudge] Such thinking is almost impossible, but owners of large aristocratic estates seem to have thought in centuries, because they were confident of continuity. The more we identify with all of humanity, the more this is possible. |
| 23423 | We currently value the present fourteen times more highly than the future [Dobson] |
| Full Idea: At current rates we seem to value present concerns as fourteen times more valuable than future concerns. | |
| From: Andrew Dobson (Environmental Politics: very short intro [2016], 2) | |
| A reaction: A sobering figure, which sounds about right. This directly influences how much we spend on future concerns. One thought is that future generations may be much more affluent than us! |