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All the ideas for '', 'fragments/reports' and 'Problems in the Explanation of Action'

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9 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II)
     A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000])
     A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge.
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III)
     A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value.
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV)
     A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role).
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R]
     Full Idea: Davidson's original account of intentions might still stand if we could accept that prior intentions are different in kind from intentions with which one acts.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (Problems in the Explanation of Action [1987]) by Rowland Stout - Action 8 'Davidson's'
     A reaction: Davidson says prior intention is all-out judgement of desirability. Prior intentions are more deliberate, with the other intentions as a presumed background to action. Compare Sartre's dual account of the self.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
We should follow the law in public, and nature in private [Antiphon]
     Full Idea: A man can best conduct himself in harmony with justice, if when in company of witnesses he upholds the laws, and when alone without witnesses he upholds the edicts of nature.
     From: Antiphon (fragments/reports [c.439 BCE], B44), quoted by Anon (Oxy) - Oxyrhynchus Papyrus XI.1364
     A reaction: I'm not sure how you identify the 'edicts of nature', without guidance from other people or the law. Natural behaviour can be pretty grim.
To gain the greatest advantage only treat law as important when other people are present [Antiphon]
     Full Idea: The way to get maximum advantage to yourself from justice is to treat the laws as important when other people are present, but when there is nobody else with you to value the demands of nature.
     From: Antiphon (fragments/reports [c.439 BCE], B44A), quoted by Anon (Oxy) - Oxyrhynchus Papyrus 1364A
     A reaction: This looks like a pretty good description of the majority of people active in politics.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
The way you spend your time will form your character [Antiphon]
     Full Idea: One's character must necessarily grow like that with which one spends the greater part of the day.
     From: Antiphon (fragments/reports [c.439 BCE], B62), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.31.41
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Nothing is worse for mankind than anarchy [Antiphon]
     Full Idea: Nothing is worse for mankind than anarchy.
     From: Antiphon (fragments/reports [c.439 BCE], B61), quoted by (who?) - where?