17 ideas
19740 | A very hungry man cannot choose between equidistant piles of food [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The man who, though exceedingly hungry and thirsty, and both equally, yet being equidistant from food and drink, is therefore bound to stay where he is. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 296b33) | |
A reaction: This is, of course, Buridan's famous Ass, but this quotation has the advantage of precedence, and also of being expressed in an original quotation (which does not exist for Buridan). |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
12155 | Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry] |
Full Idea: Statements of 'relative' identity are not identity statements at all, but what I would prefer to call 'statements of resemblance' or 'common property staztements'. | |
From: John Perry (The Same F [1970], n12) | |
A reaction: This seems like a neat way to sweep the problem from our sight. There remains a nervous metaphysical problem, though, because something seems to be identical when we spot a resemblance. Even two shades of red have something identical in them. |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
398 | Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 286a08) | |
A reaction: This is the central idea of Aristotle's Ethics. Did it originate with Plato, or Socrates, the young pupil Aristotle? I suspect the strong influence of Aristotle on later Plato. A major idea. Functions link the facts to life. |
394 | An unworn sandal is in vain, but nothing in nature is in vain [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We say of a sandal which is not worn that it is in vain; God and nature, however, do nothing in vain. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 271a33) |
396 | There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 277a26) |
16102 | Aether moves in circles and is imperishable; the four elements perish, and move in straight lines [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, aether and the four sublunary elements obey different physical laws. Aether moves naturally in a circle and, unlike its lower counterparts, is not a source of perishability. The four sublunary elements move naturally in straight lines. | |
From: report of Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Ch.2 | |
A reaction: I think it is anachronistic for Gill to talk of 'obeying' and 'laws'. She should have said that they have different 'natures'. We can be amused by Greek errors, until we stare hard at the problems they were trying to solve. |
17463 | An element is what bodies are analysed into, and won't itself divide into something else [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: An element is a body into which other bodies may be analyzed, present in them potentially or in actuality (which of these is still disputable), and not itself divisible into bodies different in form. That is what all men mean by element. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 302a05), quoted by Weisberg/Needham/Hendry - Philosophy of Chemistry 1.1 | |
A reaction: This is the classic definition of an element, which endured for a long time, and has been replaced by an 'actual components' view. Obviously analysis nowadays goes well beyond the atoms. |
399 | If the more you raise some earth the faster it moves, why does the whole earth not move? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If you raise some earth and release it, it moves and won't stay put, and the more you raise it the faster it moves, so why does the whole earth not move? | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 294a12) |
20918 | Void is a kind of place, so it can't explain place [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is absurd to explain place by the void, as though this latter were not itself some kind of place. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 309b24) | |
A reaction: Presumably this is aimed at Democritus. |
403 | The earth must be round and of limited size, because moving north or south makes different stars visible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Clearly the earth is round and not of great size, because when we move north or south we find that very different stars are visible. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 297b30) |
402 | The Earth must be spherical, because it casts a convex shadow on the moon [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A lunar eclipse always has a convex dividing line, so, if it is eclipsed by the interposition of the earth, the circumference of the earth, being spherical, is responsible for the shape. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 297b29) |
1498 | Everyone agrees that the world had a beginning, but thinkers disagree over whether it will end [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: All thinkers agree that the world had a beginning, but some claim that, having come into existence, it is everlasting. | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 279b12) |
395 | It seems possible that there exists a limited number of other worlds apart from this one [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One might indeed be puzzled whether, just as the world about us exists, nothing prevents there being others as well, certainly more than one, though not an unlimited number | |
From: Aristotle (On the Heavens [c.336 BCE], 274a26) |