27 ideas
17070 | Coherence is consilience, simplicity, analogy, and fitting into a web of belief [Smart] |
Full Idea: I shall make use of the admittedly imprecise notions of consilience, simplicity, analogy and fitting into a web of belief, or in short of 'coherence'. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.06) | |
A reaction: Coherence sounds like a family of tests, rather than a single unified concept. I still like coherence, though. |
17072 | We need comprehensiveness, as well as self-coherence [Smart] |
Full Idea: Not mere self-coherence, but comprehensiveness belongs to the notion of coherence. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.07) |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
17073 | I simply reject evidence, if it is totally contrary to my web of belief [Smart] |
Full Idea: The simplest way of fitting the putative observed phenomena of telepathy or clairvoyance into my web of belief is to refuse to take them at face value. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.07-8) | |
A reaction: Love it. It is very disconcerting for the sceptical naturalist to be faced with adamant claims that the paranormal has occurred, but my response is exactly the same as Smart's. I reject the reports, no matter how passionately they are asserted. |
17077 | The height of a flagpole could be fixed by its angle of shadow, but that would be very unusual [Smart] |
Full Idea: You could imagine a person using the angle from a theodolite to decide a suitable spot to cut the height of the flagpole, …but since such circumstances would be very unusual we naturally say the flagpole subtends the angle because of its height. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.14) | |
A reaction: [compressed; he mentions Van Fraassen 1980:132-3 for a similar point] As a response this seems a bit lame, if the direction is fixed by what is 'usual'. I think the key point is that the direction of explanation is one way or the other, not both. |
17078 | Universe expansion explains the red shift, but not vice versa [Smart] |
Full Idea: The theory of the expansion of the universe renders the red shift no longer puzzling, whereas he expansion of the universe is hardly rendered less puzzling by facts about the red shift. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.15) | |
A reaction: The direction of explanation is, I take it, made obvious by the direction of causation, with questions about what is 'puzzling' as mere side-effects. |
17061 | Explanation of a fact is fitting it into a system of beliefs [Smart] |
Full Idea: I want to characterise explanation of some fact as a matter of fitting belief in this fact into a system of beliefs. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.02) | |
A reaction: Sounds good to me. Simple facts slot straight into daily beliefs, and deep obscure facts are explained when we hook them up to things we have already grasped. Quark theory fits into prior physics of forces, properties etc. |
17074 | Explanations are bad by fitting badly with a web of beliefs, or fitting well into a bad web [Smart] |
Full Idea: An explanation may be bad if it fits only into a bad web of belief. It can also be bad if it fits into a (possibly good) web of belief in a bad sort of way. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.09) | |
A reaction: Nice. If you think someone has an absurd web of beliefs, then it counts against some belief (for you) if it fits beautifully into the other person's belief system. Judgement of coherence comes in at different levels. |
17076 | Deducing from laws is one possible way to achieve a coherent explanation [Smart] |
Full Idea: The Hempelian deductive-nomological model of explanation clearly fits in well with the notion of explanation in terms of coherence. One way of fitting a belief into a system is to show that it is deducible from other beliefs. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.13) | |
A reaction: Smart goes on to reject the law-based deductive approach, for familiar reasons, but at least it has something in common with the Smart view of explanation, which is the one I like. |
17071 | An explanation is better if it also explains phenomena from a different field [Smart] |
Full Idea: One explanation will be a better explanation that another if it also explains a set of phenomena from a different field ('consilience'). | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.07) | |
A reaction: This would count as 'unexpected accommodation', rather than prediction. It is a nice addition to Lipton's comparison of mere accommodation versus prediction as criteria. It sounds like a strong criterion for a persuasive explanation. |
12790 | Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: A generalisation is explanatory if and only if it is invariant. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §4) | |
A reaction: [He cites Jim Woodward 2003] I dislike the idea that generalisations and regularities explain anything at all, but this rule sounds like a bare minimum for being taken seriously in the space of explanations. |
17062 | If scientific explanation is causal, that rules out mathematical explanation [Smart] |
Full Idea: I class mathematical explanation with scientific explanation. This would be resisted by those who, unlike me, regard the notion of causation as essential to scientific explanation. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.02-3) | |
A reaction: I aim to champion mathematical explanation, in terms of axioms etc., so I am realising that my instinctive attraction to exclusively causal explanation won't do. What explanation needs is a direction of dependence. |
12789 | Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: The main alternative to the dispositional theory of biological functions (which confer a survival-enhancing propensity) is the etiological theory (effects are functions if they play a role in the causal history of that very component). | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: [Bigelow/Pargetter 1987 for the first, Mitchell 2003 for the second] The second one sounds a bit circular, but on the whole a I prefer causal explanations to dispositional explanations. |
14388 | Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: Nothing can count as a mechanism unless it produces some macro-level regular behaviour. To produce macro-level regular behaviour, it has to rely on micro-level regularities. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §5) | |
A reaction: This is the core of Leuridan's argument that regularities are more basic than mechanisms. It doesn't follow, though, that the more basic a thing is the more explanatory work it can do. I say mechanisms explain more than low-level regularities do. |
14386 | Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on the existence of regularities. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the Humean rearguard action in favour of the regularity account of laws. Wrong, but a nice paper. This point shows why only powers (despite their vagueness!) are the only candidate for the bottom level of explanation. |
12787 | Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: To model a mechanism one must incorporate pragmatic laws. ...As valuable as the concept of mechanism and mechanistic explanation are, they cannot replace regularities nor undermine their relevance for scientific explanation. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: [See Idea 12786 for 'pragmatic laws'] I just don't see how the observation of a regularity is any sort of explanation. I just take a regularity to be something interesting which needs to be explained. |
14384 | We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: Summary: mechanisms depend on regularities, there may be regularities without mechanisms, models of mechanisms must incorporate pragmatic laws, and pragmatic laws do not depend epistemologically on mechanistic models. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: See Idea 14382 for 'pragmatic' laws. I'm quite keen on mechanisms, so this is an arrow close to the heart, but at this point I say that my ultimate allegiance is to powers, not to mechanisms. |
17075 | Scientific explanation tends to reduce things to the unfamiliar (not the familiar) [Smart] |
Full Idea: The history of science suggests that most often explanation is reduction to the unfamiliar. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.11) | |
A reaction: Boyle was keen to reduce things to the familiar, but that was early days for science, and some nasty shocks were coming our way. What would Boyle make of quantum non-locality? |
14389 | There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: I see nothing metaphysically wrong in an infinite ontological regress of mechanisms and regularities. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §5) | |
A reaction: This is a pretty unusual view, and I can't accept it. My revulsion at this regress is precisely the reason why I believe in powers, as the bottom level of explanation. |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
14387 | Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: The dispositional theory of biological functions is not unquestioned. The main alternative is the etiological theory: a component's effect is a function of that component if it has played an essential role in the causal history of its existence. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: [He cites S.D. Mitchell 2003] Presumably this account is meant to fit into a theory of evolution in biology. The obvious problem is where something comes into existence for one reason, and then acquires a new function (such as piano-playing). |
14382 | Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: A generalization is a 'pragmatic law' if it allows of prediction, explanation and manipulation, even if it fails to satisfy the traditional criteria. To this end, it should describe a stable regularity, but not necessarily a universal and necessary one. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: I am tempted to say of this that all laws are pragmatic, given that it is rather hard to know whether reality is stable. The universal laws consist of saying that IF reality stays stable in certain ways, certain outcomes will ensue necessarily. |
14385 | Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: Strict regularities are rarely if ever discovered in the life sciences. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §2) | |
A reaction: This is elementary once it is pointed out, but too much philosophy have science has aimed at the model provided by the equations of fundamental physics. Science is a broad church, to employ an entertaining metaphor. |
14383 | A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity [Leuridan] |
Full Idea: By 'law of nature' or 'natural law' I mean a generalization describing a regularity, not some metaphysical entity that produces or is responsible for that regularity. | |
From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §1 n1) | |
A reaction: I take the second version to be a relic of a religious world view, and having no place in a naturalistic metaphysic. The regularity view is then the only player in the field, and the question is, can we do more? Can't we explain regularities? |
17063 | Unlike Newton, Einstein's general theory explains the perihelion of Mercury [Smart] |
Full Idea: Newtonian celestial mechanics does not explain the advance of the perihelion of Mercury, while Einstein's general theory of relativity does. | |
From: J.J.C. Smart (Explanation - Opening Address [1990], p.03) | |
A reaction: A perfect example of why explanation is the central concept in science, and probably in all epistemological activity. The desire to know is the desire for an explanation. Once the explanation is obvious, we know. |