10 ideas
| 21054 | Reason enables the unbounded extension of our rules and intentions [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Reason, in a creature, is a faculty which enables that creature to extend far beyond the limits of natural instinct the rules and intentions it follows in using its various powers, and the range of its project is unbounded. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], 2nd) | |
| A reaction: I'm inclined to identify the mind's creation of universals as the source of this power, rather than reason. Generalisations are infinitely extensible. Cantor's infinities are a nice example. Can't ideas be extended irrationally? |
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
| A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
| A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
| A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
| 10632 | The real numbers may be introduced by abstraction as ratios of quantities [Hale, by Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: The real numbers may be introduced by abstraction as ratios of quantities. ..They are not defined by Dedekind cuts; rather, the cuts constitute a domain with the properties that are a necessary precondition. | |
| From: report of Bob Hale (Reals by Abstraction [1998]) by B Hale / C Wright - Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' 3.3 | |
| A reaction: This is Hale's neo-logicist attempt to derive the real numbers from Hume's Principle. |
| 21053 | The manifest will in the world of phenomena has to conform to the laws of nature [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Whatever conception of the freedom of the will one may form in terms of metaphysics, the will's manifestations in the world of phenomena, i.e. human actions, are determined in accordance with natural laws, as is every other natural event. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], Intro) | |
| A reaction: So free will either requires total substance dualism, or it is best described as transcendental fictionalism. This seems to imply the Leibnizian idea that metaphysics contains facts which having nothing to do with the physical world. |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
| 21055 | Our aim is a constitution which combines maximum freedom with strong restraint [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The highest task which nature has set mankind is to establish a society in which freedom under external laws would be combined to the greatest possible extent with irresistible force, in other words of establishing a perfectly just constitution. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], 5th) | |
| A reaction: The 'force' is to restrict the harms that may result from individual freedom. This seems to equate justice with liberal freedom. Force can prevent direct harm to others, but what to do about indirect harm? Many lack freedom, but whose fault is it? |
| 21056 | The vitality of business needs maximum freedom (while avoiding harm to others) [Kant] |
| Full Idea: If the citizen is deterred from seeking his personal welfare in any way he chooses which is consistent with the freedom of others, the vitality of business in general and hence also the strength of the whole are held in check. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], 8th) | |
| A reaction: This is a rather American view of liberalism. Kant has been praising the virtues of aggressive competition. |
| 21057 | The highest ideal of social progress is a universal cosmopolitan existence [Kant] |
| Full Idea: There is hope that the highest purpose of nature, a universal cosmopolitan existence, will at last be realised as the matrix within which all the original capacities of the human race may develop. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], 8th) | |
| A reaction: Apart from Diogenes of Sinope, Kant seems to have been the first great champion of the cosmopolitan ideal. As I write (2018) the western world is putting up growing barriers against immigrants. I think my response may be to adopt Kantian cosmopolitanism. |