22 ideas
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
7096 | We may still admire a person's character even if the traits are involuntary [Statman] |
Full Idea: If we focus on the evaluation of character traits, voluntariness becomes less important. We would not withdraw our admiration for a person only because we found out that his or her being such a person was not a result of voluntary choice. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §3) | |
A reaction: The need for voluntariness does not disappear. I would not admire the only generous deed you had ever performed if it was the result of hypnotism. I might admire the hypnotist. Nevertheless, I regard this idea as a crucial truth in moral theory. |
7098 | There is a new sort of moral scepticism, about the possibility of moral theories [Statman] |
Full Idea: Since the 1980s, ethics has witnessed a new sort of moral scepticism, this time about the possibility of moral theories. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §4) | |
A reaction: He cites McDowell, Williams, Nussbaum and Baier as the culprits. 'Particularism' (every situation is different, so there can't be rules) seems an essential part of virtue theory, but total absence of principles sounds to me like moral drift. |
7099 | With a broad concept of flourishing, it might be possible without the virtues [Statman] |
Full Idea: In a rich conception of human flourishing, both individuals and societies seem to be able to flourish without the virtues. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5) | |
A reaction: I can see Aristotle clutching his head in despair at this thought. It might look like flourishing, but it couldn't be the real thing. It is Aristotle's fault, though, for including external goods. Money and pleasure offer a kind of flourishing. |
7100 | Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman] |
Full Idea: It can be claimed that universality is a necessary property of any ethical theory and therefore virtue theory, which fails in this respect, is not a theory, and hence poses no alternative to genuine ethical theories. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5) | |
A reaction: Replies: a) totally universal morality is an idle dream (part of the 'Enlightenment Project' to prove everything) and we must settle for something more relative; b) virtues aren't totally universal, but they are truths about humanity. I prefer b). |
7102 | Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman] |
Full Idea: That duties are created irrespective of facts about character is obvious from the case of promises, which bind their makers irrespective of their motives or personality. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5) | |
A reaction: Just occasionally a promise can be broken, by a sensitive and wise person. I promise to give your son some money; I then discover he is a drug dealer. Promises arise out of character, and cannot be made by robots. |
7095 | Moral education is better by concrete example than abstract principle [Statman] |
Full Idea: According to virtue theory, education through moral exemplars is more effective than education focused on principles and obligations, because it is far more concrete. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §3) | |
A reaction: Aristotle's view is that virtues must be developed from childhood, when principles don't mean much. The problem is that young people may witness highly virtuous behaviour in their exemplars, but totally fail to appreciate it without mention of principles. |
7094 | Friends express friendship even when no utility is involved [Statman] |
Full Idea: Being a good friend means acting in ways that express the friendship even when those ways do not promote overall utility. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §3) | |
A reaction: This implies that friendship is a true virtue of character, rather than having friends just being an 'external' good. Having friends is good; being friends is a virtue. There are duties of friendship. |
7093 | Behaviour may be disgusting or inhumane, but violate no duty [Statman] |
Full Idea: It is surely possible, and indeed often the case, that people who violate no duty nevertheless behave in an inhumane and a disgusting manner. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §1) | |
A reaction: This seems right, though it is easier to be disgusting than to be inhumane if no duty is to be violated. Social duties may not require a high degree of humanity, pure Kantian duties might. |
7104 | The ancients recognised imperfect duties, but we have added perfect duties like justice [Statman] |
Full Idea: The advantage of modern thinkers over the ancient virtue ethicists is that in addition to imperfect duties (i.e. virtues) they also recognise the existence of perfect duties, or duties of justice, which are essential for the existence of society. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §7) | |
A reaction: Even the Greeks had laws (e.g. Idea 422), so they understood that a society needs rules, but many laws don't seem to be moral rules (e.g. car parking), and the Greeks thought morality was about human excellence, not avoiding traffic jams. |
22809 | The social contract sees society as constituted by and for individuals [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: The social contract theory …has a vision of society as in some sense constituted by individuals for the fulfilment of ends which are primarily individual. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.29) | |
A reaction: It seems to be initiated by individuals who are only motivated by what is in it for them. This presumes self-sufficient adults, rather than children, or parents with children, or dependent people. The epitome of liberalism, perhaps. |
22811 | Assigning a right based on a human capacity implies that the capacity should be developed [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: It would be incomprehensible and incoherent to ascribe rights to human beings in respect of the specifically human capacities (such as the right to beliefs or life-style) while at the same time denying that those capacities ought to be developed. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.33) | |
A reaction: Developed by whom? The agent, their family, or the state? At what point has someone got a capacity, with no further requirement to develop it? Taylor pulls rather large rabbits out of small hats. |
22815 | If freedom depends on society and culture, the greatest freedom is in shaping them [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: If realising our freedom partly depends on the society and culture in which we live, then we exercise a fuller freedom if we can help determine the shape of this society and culture. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.47) | |
A reaction: This is clearly in response to the critics of communitarianism who say that it is too conservative, because your values are created for you, by your community. |
22814 | Our reliance on other people close to us does not imply any political obligations [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: We must all be nurtures by others as children, and we only flourish as adults in relationship with friends, mates, children and so on. But this has nothing to do with any obligation to belong to political society. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.42) | |
A reaction: He is defending community, but not at that minimal human level. Political obligations follows from our need for a wider society, to achieve justice, education, travel, health etc. There are no rights without a society |
22812 | For most people the primacy of rights mainly concerns freedom [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Most of those who want to affirm the primacy of rights are more interested in asserting the right of freedom, and in a sense which can only be attributed to humans. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.40) | |
A reaction: This is probably more pronounced in North America than in Europe. It may be that without freedom a lot of the other rights are impossible. |
22810 | A right is not just a rule, but also asserts certain ideas of moral worth [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: Asserting a right is more than issuing an injunction. It has an essential conceptual background, in some notion of the moral worth of certain properties or capacities, without which it would not make. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.33) | |
A reaction: A simple right may arise from a contract, which could be quite trivial, and of no moral importance. The winner of the egg and spoon race has a right to the prize, which is an ice cream. I think he means legal rights in a state. |
22813 | Property is not essential for life, but it may be essential for independence [Taylor,C] |
Full Idea: It is standardly said that we need the right to property as an essential underpinning of life, but this is patently not true. …In reality it is actually seen as an essential part of a life of independence. | |
From: Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979], p.41) | |
A reaction: Hence it has a high value for liberals, for whom an independent life is the prime social aspiration. The law of trespass will define the degree of independence provided by property. |
23417 | If the state is neutral, there won't be sufficient community to support a welfare state [Taylor,C, by Kymlicka] |
Full Idea: Charles Taylor says the neutral [liberal] state undermines the sense of community which is required for citizens to accept the sacrifices demanded by the welfare state. | |
From: report of Charles Taylor (Atomism [1979]) by Will Kymlicka - Community 'legitimacy' | |
A reaction: As someone who believes in the welfare state, I think this is correct. Extreme individualistic liberalism is incompatible with a welfare state. A liberal society needs institutions which draw free individuals into the community. |
7103 | Abortion issues focus on the mother's right over her body, and the status of the foetus [Statman] |
Full Idea: Most of the debate on abortion focuses on two issues, the mother's assumed right over her body, and the status of the foetus. | |
From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §6) | |
A reaction: Personally I think society as a whole might have a say (if, perhaps, we are over- or under-populated, or we have a widely accepted state religion, or we are just very shocked). Mother's have virtues and duties as well as rights. |