32 ideas
3798 | An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one [Dennett] |
Full Idea: The unexamined life may not be worth living, but the overexamined life is nothing to write home about either. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §4.2) | |
A reaction: Presumably he means a life which is all theory and no practice. Compare Idea 343. |
3801 | Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse [Dennett] |
Full Idea: We must assume that something matters - that some things are for better and some things are for worse, for without that our assumed rationality would have nothing on which to get a purchase. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §7.1) | |
A reaction: It does seem that rationality wouldn't exist as an activity without some value to motivate it. |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
15590 | It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Once Frege had provided a clear syntactic account of variables and once Tarski had supplemented this with a rigorous semantic account, it would appear that there was nothing more of significance to be said. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1) | |
A reaction: He later remarks that there are now three semantic accounts: the Tarskian, the instantial, and the algebraic [see xref ideas]. He offers a fourth account in his Semantic Relationism. This grows from his puzzles about variables. |
15591 | In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: When we consider the semantic role of 'x' and 'y' in two distinct expressions x>0 and y>0, their semantic roles seems the same. But in the same expression, such as x>y, their roles seem to be different. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.A) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This new puzzle about variables leads Fine to say that the semantics of variables, and other expressions, is not intrinsic to them, but depends on their external relations. Variables denote any term - unless another variable got there first. |
15595 | The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: In the 'algebraic' approach to variables, we move from a quantified sentence to the term specifying a property (the λ-term), and then reducing to the algebraic operations for atomic formulas. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.C) | |
A reaction: [Bealer is a source for this view] Fine describes it as an 'algebra of operations'. I presume this is a thoroughly formalist approach to the matter, which doesn't seem to get to the heart of the semantic question. |
15594 | 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: According to the 'instantial' approach to variables, a closed quantified sentence is to be understood on the basis of one of its instances; from an understanding of an instance we understand satisfaction by an arbitrary individual. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.D) | |
A reaction: Fine comments that this is intuitively plausible, but not very precise, because it depends on 'abstraction' of the individual from the expression. |
15592 | The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The usual Tarskian way of indicating how a variable is to be interpreted is to simply specify its range of values. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.B) |
15593 | Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The alternative Tarskian way of indicating how a variable is to be interpreted is that a variable x will be a special case of the semantic value of the term; it will be a function which takes each assignment into the individual which it assigns to x. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.B) |
15599 | Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: There may be a semantic relationship between 'Cicero' and 'Cicero' that does not hold between 'Cicero' and 'Tully', despite the lack of an intrinsic semantic difference between the names themselves. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.E) | |
A reaction: This is the key idea of Fine's book, and a most original and promising approach to a rather intractable problem in reference. He goes on to distinguish names which are 'strictly' coreferential (the first pair) from those that are 'accidentally' so. |
15603 | I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: I can only represent two individuals as being the same if I do not already represent them as the same. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 3.A) | |
A reaction: A very nice simple point. If I say 'Hesperus is Hesperus' I am unable to comment on the object, but 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' has a different expressive power. Start from contexts where it is necessary to say that two things are actually one. |
15604 | If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: 'Cicero=Cicero' and 'Cicero=Tully' are both dyadic predications. It is unnatural to suppose that the use of the same name converts a dyadic predicate into a reflexive predicate, or that there is one reference to Cicero in the first and two in the second. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 3.A) | |
A reaction: I am deeply suspicious of the supposed 'property' of being self-identical, but that may not deny that it could be a genuine truth (shorthand for 'the C you saw is the same as the C I saw'). Having an identity makes equality with self possible. |
3802 | Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine? [Dennett] |
Full Idea: You say you cannot imagine that p, and therefore declare that p is impossible. Mightn't that be hubris? | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §7.3) |
3795 | Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett] |
Full Idea: In causal theories of knowledge and reference, the causal chain between object and thought must be of the "right" sort - the nature of rightness to be specified later, typically. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §3.3 n14) | |
A reaction: This is now the standard objection to a purely causal account of reference. Which of the many causal chains causes the meaning? Knowledge of maths is a further problem for it. |
3797 | I am the sum total of what I directly control [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Control is the ultimate criterion of the self: I am the sum total of the parts I control directly. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §4.2) | |
A reaction: This looks awfully like a flagrant self-contradiction, and I think it is. It seems pretty obvious that there is at least a distinction between the bit or bits that do the controlling, and the bits that get controlled. |
3800 | You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [Dennett, by PG] |
Full Idea: If a brain implant would compel you to perform an action which you in fact freely choose, then you are free, but couldn't have done otherwise. | |
From: report of Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §6.1) by PG - Db (ideas) |
3803 | Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own? [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Can I even conceive of beings whose wills are freer than our own? | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §7.3) |
3791 | Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world [Dennett] |
Full Idea: The creature who is not only sensitive to patterns in its environment, but also sensitive to patterns in its own reactions to patterns in its environment, has taken a major step. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §2.2) |
3794 | Foreknowledge permits control [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Foreknowledge is what permits control. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §3.2) |
3796 | The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations [Dennett] |
Full Idea: Faced with our inability to 'see' where the centre or source of our free actions is,…we exploit the gaps in our self-knowledge by filling it with a mysterious entity, the unmoved mover, the active self. | |
From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §4.1) | |
A reaction: I am convinced that there is no such things as free will; its origins are to be found in religion, where it is a necessary feature of a very supreme God. I don't believe for a moment that we need to believe in free will. |
15602 | Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Mental files should be seen as a device for keeping track of when objects are coordinated (represented as-the-same) and, rather than understand coordination in terms of mental files, we should understand mental files in terms of coordination. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 3.A) | |
A reaction: Personally I think that the metaphor of a 'label' is much closer to the situation than that of a 'file'. Thus my concept of Cicero is labelled 'Tully', 'Roman', 'orator', 'philosophical example'... My problem is to distinguish the concept from its labels. |
15588 | You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: There is no determining the full content of what someone thinks or believes from the individual things that he thinks or believes; we must also look at the threads that tie the contents of these thoughts or beliefs together. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Intro) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure what 'full' content could possibly mean. Does that include all our background beliefs which we hardly ever articulate. Content comes in degrees, or needs an arbitrary boundary? |
15596 | The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The aim of semantics, as standardly conceived, is to assign a semantic value to each (meaningful) expression of the language under consideration. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.G) | |
A reaction: Fine is raising the difficulty that these values can get entangled with one another. He proposes 'semantic connections' as a better aim. |
15587 | That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: In my 'Semantic Relationism' the fact that two utterances say the same thing is not entirely a matter of their intrinsic semantic features; it may also turn on semantic relationships among the utterances of their parts not reducible to those features. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Intro) | |
A reaction: You'll need to read the book slowly several times to get the hang of this, but at least it allows that two different utterances might say the same thing (express the same proposition, I would say). |
15589 | The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: For holists a proper theory will be broadly inferential, while for their opponents it will be representational in character, describing relations between expressions and reality. Representational semantics is atomist, holist semantics inferential. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Intro) | |
A reaction: Fine presents these as the two main schools in semantics. His own theory then proposes a more holistic version of the Representational view. He seeks the advantages of Frege's position, but without 'sense'. |
15598 | We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: A 'semantics' is a body of semantic facts, and a 'semantic theory' is a body of semantic truths. The natural order is a theory being understood as truths, which state facts. Davidson, alas, reversed this order, with facts understood through theories. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.C) | |
A reaction: [compressed; he cites Davidson 1967, and calls it 'one of the most unfortunate tendencies in modern philosophy of language, ..as if chemistry were understood in terms of formulae rather than chemical facts']. |
15600 | Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: The standard referentialist semantics for a language with names is that the semantic value of the name is the object, the content of a predicate is a property, and the content of a logical connective is an operation on propositions. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.F) | |
A reaction: My particular bęte noire is the idea that every predicate names a property. It is the tyranny of having to have a comprehensive semantic theory that drives this implausible picture. And I don't see how an object can be a semantic value… |
15601 | Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Fregeans emphasise an orientation towards the speaker: possession of sense makes language meaningful, and language relates to the world through sense. For the Referentialist its representational relationships make it meaningful, and relate it to the world | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.G) | |
A reaction: The Referentialist approach is for Kripkean fans of direct reference, rather than the Fregean reference through descriptions. I am inclined to favour the old-fashioned, deeply discredited, much mocked Fregean approach. |
15605 | I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Demonstrative uses of an indexical such as 'this' or 'that' should be taken to be anaphoric on an associated demonstration. It is a semantic requirement on the use of the indexical that it be coreferential with the demonstration. | |
From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Post 'Indexicals') | |
A reaction: Similarly 'now' must connect to looking at a clock, and 'I' to pointing at some person. The demonstration could be of a verbal event, as much as a physical one. |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |