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All the ideas for '', 'That Politics may be reduced to a Science' and 'Morality and the emotions'

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12 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
11211 If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II)
     A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
11210 Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000])
     A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge.
11212 The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III)
     A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
24008 Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: The reference to a man's emotions has a significance for our understanding of his moral sincerity, not as a substitute for or addition to how he acts, but as, on occasion, underlying our understanding of how he acts.
     From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.223)
     A reaction: Williams aims to rescue emotion from the emotivists, and replace it at the centre of traditional modes of moral judgement. I suppose we could assess one rogue robot as behaving 'badly' in a community of robots.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
24009 Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: If moral education does not revolve around what to fear, to be angry about, to despise, and where to draw the line between kindness and a stupid sentimentality - I do not know what it is. (Though there are principles, of truth-telling and justice).
     From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.225)
     A reaction: He cites Aristotle as the obvious source of this correct idea. The examples of principle both require us to place a high value on truth and justice, and not just follow rules in the style of arithmetic.
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
11214 We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV)
     A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role).
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
24007 Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: Emotivism held that there were two purposes of moral judgements: to express the emotions of the speaker, and to influence the emotions of his hearers.
     From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.209)
     A reaction: I take Ayer to be typical of the first project, and Hare of the second. The theory is much more plausible when the second aim is added. Would we ever utter a moral opinion if we didn't hope to influence someone?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
24010 An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: One's conception of an admirable human being implies that he should be disposed to certain kinds of emotional response, and not to others.
     From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.225)
     A reaction: So are the good emotions an indicator of being a good person, or is that what their goodness consists of? The goodness must be cashed out in actions, and presumably good emotions both promise good actions, and motivate them.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
21093 Friendship without community spirit misses out on the main part of virtue [Hume]
     Full Idea: A man who is only susceptible of friendship, without public spirit or a regard to the community, is deficient in the most material part of virtue.
     From: David Hume (That Politics may be reduced to a Science [1750], p.21)
     A reaction: I think this is aimed at the epicureans. If the highest virtues are focused on one's friends that can easily lead to injustice, because it can tolerate prejudice against people who are very unlike one's friends.
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
24012 Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: There is a certain moral woodenness or even insolence in Kant's blank regard for consistency. It smacks of Keynes's Principle of Unfairness - that if you can't do a good turn to everybody, you shouldn't do it to anybody.
     From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.226)
     A reaction: He says it also turns each of us into a Supreme Legislator, which deifies man. It is clearly not the case that morality consists entirely of rules and principles, but Williams recognises their role, in truth-telling for example.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
21091 It would be absurd if even a free constitution did not impose restraints, for the public good [Hume]
     Full Idea: A republican and free form of government would be an obvious absurdity, if the particular checks and controls, provided by the constitution, had really no influence, and made it not the interest, even of bad men, to act for the public good.
     From: David Hume (That Politics may be reduced to a Science [1750], p.14)
     A reaction: Presumably if you attain absolute power you can write any old constitution you like (Clause 1: the presidency is for life). But there does seem much point in doing it - unless it is to facilitate the use of the law for persecutions.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
21092 Nobility either share in the power of the whole, or they compose the power of the whole [Hume]
     Full Idea: A nobility may possess power in two different ways. Either every nobleman shares the power as part of the whole body, or the whole body enjoys the power as composed of parts, which each have a distinct power and authority.
     From: David Hume (That Politics may be reduced to a Science [1750], p.15)
     A reaction: He says the first type is found in Venice, and is preferable to the second type, which is found in Poland. Presumably in the shared version there is some restraint on depraved nobles. The danger is each noble being an autocrat.