19 ideas
19115 | You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli] |
Full Idea: A 'rebut' of an argument establishes that its conclusion is not the case. An 'undercut' of the argument shows that the premises do not support that conclusion. | |
From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 3.2) |
19119 | We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli] |
Full Idea: The exceptional status of an object with respect to some default is more likely to spread to other objects if they share properties with that object that may play a role in explaining the exceptional status. | |
From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 4) | |
A reaction: This is an example of the sort of rational behaviour we exhibit, and which a 'real life' logic would somehow need to capture. I would suggest the essentialist logic designed by Kit Fine as a first port of call. |
19111 | Reasoning may be defeated by new premises, or by finding out more about the given ones [Antonelli] |
Full Idea: Most defeasible reasoning is externally dynamic, affected by the addition of further premises. But there is also an internal (or 'diachronic') dynamic, when further analysis reveals more about the given premises. | |
From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 1) |
19114 | Should we accept Floating Conclusions, derived from two arguments in conflict? [Antonelli] |
Full Idea: There is much discussion of whether Floating Conclusions should be derived, given that they were derived from two arguments which conflict with one another. | |
From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 2.3) |
19113 | Weakest Link Principle: prefer the argument whose weakest link is the stronger [Antonelli] |
Full Idea: In the Weakest Link Principle, an argument is preferred to another conflicting argument if its weakest defeasible link is stronger than the weakest defeasible link in the conflicting argument. | |
From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 2.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites John Pollock 1991] This sounds like the elementary principle applied when choosing a rope by which to hang a large weight above your head. It gets non-monotonic logic off the ground - if you know how to evaluate 'weakest'. |
19116 | Non-monotonic core: Reflexivity, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening [Antonelli] |
Full Idea: Conservative core of non-monotonic logic:Reflexivity (p proves p), Cut (if p proves q, it proves their joint implications), Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence (equivalences have same consequences), Right Weakening (non-m preserves classical). | |
From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 3.5.1) | |
A reaction: [Highly compressed, and without symbols] |
19117 | We can rank a formula by the level of surprise if it were to hold [Antonelli] |
Full Idea: We can think of an 'ordinal ranking function' κ([φ)] as the level of surprise we would face were φ to hold, up to maximal surprise. | |
From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 3.5.2) | |
A reaction: This suggests that Bayes's Theorem might be relevant to non-monotonic logic. This suggests that registering surprise would need to be an important feature of robot behaviour. |
19118 | People don't actually use classical logic, but may actually use non-monotonic logic [Antonelli] |
Full Idea: Test subjects seem to perform very poorly in various reasoning tests (Wason Selection, Suppression Task), suggesting logic has a subordinate role, but this may be using classical logic, where non-monotonic logics would be more appropriate. | |
From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 4) | |
A reaction: Fred Sommers presents his Term Logic (based on Aristotle) as closer to how people actually reason. It is certainly crazy to infer that most people's everyday reasoning is irrational. Induction is highly rational; it's just not deductive. |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
19110 | In classical logic the relation |= has Monotony built into its definition [Antonelli] |
Full Idea: In classical logic, Monotony follows immediately from the nature of the relation |=, for Γ |= φ holds precisely when φ is true on every interpretation on which all sentences in Γ are true. | |
From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 1) | |
A reaction: That is, semantic consequence (|=) is defined in terms of a sentence (φ) always being true if some other bunch of sentences (Γ) are true. Hence the addition of further sentences to Γ will make no difference - which is Monotony. |
19112 | Cautious Monotony ignores proved additions; Rational Monotony fails if the addition's negation is proved [Antonelli] |
Full Idea: Basic Monotony: something stays proved if further premises are added. Cautious Monotony: the addition of something which has been proved makes no difference. Rational Monotony: it stays proved as long as the addition's negation hasn't been proved. | |
From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 1) | |
A reaction: [A compressed and non-symbolic summary] |
14330 | To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: It is only to the extent that we relate disposition to 'categorical basis', and difference of disposition to difference of 'categorical basis', that we can speak of dispositions. We must be Realists, not Phenomenalists, about dispositions. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968], 6.VI) | |
A reaction: It is Armstrong's realism which motivates this claim, because he thinks only categorical properties are real. But categorical properties seem to be passive, and the world is active. |
6498 | Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H] |
Full Idea: According to D.M. Armstrong and others, when we perceive secondary qualities we are in fact perceiving primary qualities in a confused, indistinct or blurred way. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968], 270-90) by Howard Robinson - Perception III.1 | |
A reaction: This is obviously an attempt to fit secondary qualities into a reductive physicalist account of the mind. Personally I favour Armstrong's project, but doubt whether this strategy is necessary. I just don't think there is anything 'primary' about redness. |
5690 | A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker] |
Full Idea: For Armstrong, introspection involves a belief, and mental states and their accompanying beliefs are 'distinct existences', so a state without belief shows states are not self-intimating, and the belief without the state shows beliefs aren't infallible. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968]) by Sydney Shoemaker - Introspection | |
A reaction: I agree with Armstrong. Introspection is a two-level activity, which animals probably can't do, and there is always the possibility of a mismatch between the two levels, so introspection is neither self-intimating nor infallibe (though incorrigible). |
5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
Full Idea: Armstrong and Lewis said that mental items were defined in terms of typical causes and effects; if, as seems likely, research reveals that a particular causal niche is occupied by a physical state, it follows that pain is a physical state. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.5 | |
A reaction: I am not fully convinced of the first step in the argument. It sounds like the epistemology and the ontology have got muddled (as usual). We define mental states as we define electrons, in terms of observed behaviour, but what are they? |
4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
Full Idea: The Armstrong/Lewis version of functionalism takes mental properties to be functional properties, but identifies these with what other functionalists would regard as their realisers. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968]) by John Heil - Philosophy of Mind Ch.4 | |
A reaction: Heil rejects this, but I am beginning to think that this is the answer. If functions do not have an ontological life of their own (the 'ringing' of the bell), then functionalist mental states can't either. Function is not an ontological category. |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |