109 ideas
| 20910 | Everything happens necessarily, and for a reason [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: Nothing happens at random, but everything for a reason and as the effect of necessity. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B002), quoted by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 1.25.4 | |
| A reaction: [In Aetius 'Stob'] This remark reminds us of the link between necessity and sufficient reason. Do all reasons arise for a reason? |
| 23917 | Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Contrary things can be reasonably held …because the contrary positions will stand if what is said is true in one way, but not true in another. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1235b17) | |
| A reaction: My strategy here is to clarify the unambiguous underlying propositions which are being expressed. There will then be either agreement, or flat contradiction. |
| 13838 | A decent modern definition should always imply a semantics [Hacking] |
| Full Idea: Today we expect that anything worth calling a definition should imply a semantics. | |
| From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §10) | |
| A reaction: He compares this with Gentzen 1935, who was attempting purely syntactic definitions of the logical connectives. |
| 13833 | 'Thinning' ('dilution') is the key difference between deduction (which allows it) and induction [Hacking] |
| Full Idea: 'Dilution' (or 'Thinning') provides an essential contrast between deductive and inductive reasoning; for the introduction of new premises may spoil an inductive inference. | |
| From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §06.2) | |
| A reaction: That is, inductive logic (if there is such a thing) is clearly non-monotonic, whereas classical inductive logic is monotonic. |
| 13834 | Gentzen's Cut Rule (or transitivity of deduction) is 'If A |- B and B |- C, then A |- C' [Hacking] |
| Full Idea: If A |- B and B |- C, then A |- C. This generalises to: If Γ|-A,Θ and Γ,A |- Θ, then Γ |- Θ. Gentzen called this 'cut'. It is the transitivity of a deduction. | |
| From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §06.3) | |
| A reaction: I read the generalisation as 'If A can be either a premise or a conclusion, you can bypass it'. The first version is just transitivity (which by-passes the middle step). |
| 13835 | Only Cut reduces complexity, so logic is constructive without it, and it can be dispensed with [Hacking] |
| Full Idea: Only the cut rule can have a conclusion that is less complex than its premises. Hence when cut is not used, a derivation is quite literally constructive, building up from components. Any theorem obtained by cut can be obtained without it. | |
| From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §08) |
| 13845 | The various logics are abstractions made from terms like 'if...then' in English [Hacking] |
| Full Idea: I don't believe English is by nature classical or intuitionistic etc. These are abstractions made by logicians. Logicians attend to numerous different objects that might be served by 'If...then', like material conditional, strict or relevant implication. | |
| From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §15) | |
| A reaction: The idea that they are 'abstractions' is close to my heart. Abstractions from what? Surely 'if...then' has a standard character when employed in normal conversation? |
| 13840 | First-order logic is the strongest complete compact theory with Löwenheim-Skolem [Hacking] |
| Full Idea: First-order logic is the strongest complete compact theory with a Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. | |
| From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13) |
| 13844 | A limitation of first-order logic is that it cannot handle branching quantifiers [Hacking] |
| Full Idea: Henkin proved that there is no first-order treatment of branching quantifiers, which do not seem to involve any idea that is fundamentally different from ordinary quantification. | |
| From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13) | |
| A reaction: See Hacking for an example of branching quantifiers. Hacking is impressed by this as a real limitation of the first-order logic which he generally favours. |
| 13842 | Second-order completeness seems to need intensional entities and possible worlds [Hacking] |
| Full Idea: Second-order logic has no chance of a completeness theorem unless one ventures into intensional entities and possible worlds. | |
| From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13) |
| 13837 | With a pure notion of truth and consequence, the meanings of connectives are fixed syntactically [Hacking] |
| Full Idea: My doctrine is that the peculiarity of the logical constants resides precisely in that given a certain pure notion of truth and consequence, all the desirable semantic properties of the constants are determined by their syntactic properties. | |
| From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §09) | |
| A reaction: He opposes this to Peacocke 1976, who claims that the logical connectives are essentially semantic in character, concerned with the preservation of truth. |
| 13839 | Perhaps variables could be dispensed with, by arrows joining places in the scope of quantifiers [Hacking] |
| Full Idea: For some purposes the variables of first-order logic can be regarded as prepositions and place-holders that could in principle be dispensed with, say by a system of arrows indicating what places fall in the scope of which quantifier. | |
| From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §11) | |
| A reaction: I tend to think of variables as either pronouns, or as definite descriptions, or as temporary names, but not as prepositions. Must address this new idea... |
| 13843 | If it is a logic, the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem holds for it [Hacking] |
| Full Idea: A Löwenheim-Skolem theorem holds for anything which, on my delineation, is a logic. | |
| From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be an unusually conservative view. Shapiro is the chap who can give you an alternative view of these things, or Boolos. |
| 16146 | Two can't be a self-contained unit, because it would need to be one to do that [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Democritus claimed that one substance could not be composed from two nor two from one. …The same will clearly go for number, on the popular assumption that number is a combination of units. Unless two is one, it cannot contain a unit in actuality. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1039a15 | |
| A reaction: Chrysippus followed this up the first part with the memorable example of Dion and Theon. The problem with the second part is that 2, 3 and 4 are three numbers, so they can count as meta-units. |
| 20901 | True Being only occurs when it is completely full, with atoms and no void [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In response to defenders of the One, Democritus says that what is, in the proper sense, is being that is completely full, but that such a being is not one, but that they are unlimited in number and invisible because of the smallness of their masses. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A007) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 325a28 | |
| A reaction: Democritus is in a tangle here. He says proper being has no void, having apparently conceded that motion needs void (which he admits is non-existent). So true being only occurs when everything grinds to a halt, which is not now. But Idea 20902. |
| 20902 | Being does not exist more than non-being [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: They say that being does not exist more than non-being, because neither does the void exist more than the body. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A006) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 0985b09 | |
| A reaction: The claim that Being and Non-Being are the same thing is pretty startling. It seems to be an expedient to get Void into the picture, even though it is taken to be wholly devoid of qualities. |
| 20904 | The non-existent exists as much as the existent, because it has causal powers [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: What exists does not exist at all more than what does not exist, and both are causes in a similar way for the things that come about. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A008), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' p.28.4-27 | |
| A reaction: [Simplicius actually attributes this to the shadowy Leucippus] You can see the point. If you drive into a pothole, that has considerable causal powers. |
| 20903 | The only distinctions are Configuration (shape), Disposition (order) and Turning (position) [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: They say that what is differs only by Configuration ([rhusmos], which is the shape), by Disposition ([diathege], which is the order), and by Turning ([tropê], which is the position. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A006) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 0985b16 | |
| A reaction: If you give the shape, structure and position of an object, there is no much more to say. Perhaps mention time. |
| 20893 | Nothing comes from non-existence, or passes into it [Democritus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Nothing comes into being from what does not exist, nor is it destroyed into what does not exist. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A001) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.44 | |
| A reaction: [part of a concise summary of Democritus by DL] Probably an intuition about conservation laws, rather than a speculation about the Big Bang. |
| 20896 | It is not possible to know what sort each thing is [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: In reality [eteé] to recognise what sort each thing is, belongs to what is impracticable [aporos]. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B008), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.137 | |
| A reaction: On the whole modern scientists (and the rest of us) shoehorn virtually everything into a specific category. It strikes me as wildly bad metaphysics to say that everything necessarily has its category. |
| 5869 | The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The thesis that there is a Form either of good or indeed of anything else is verbal and vacuous. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1217b20) | |
| A reaction: This is clear evidence for suggesting that Aristotle is a nominalist. Elsewhere his essentialism suggests otherwise, but clearly on grumpy days he thought that universals were mere verbal conventions. |
| 3357 | Democritus denies reality to large objects, because atomic entities can't combine to produce new ones [Benardete,JA on Democritus] |
| Full Idea: Democritus appears to rule out from his austere ontology all so-called emergent entities - even mountains and rivers - on the ground that two or more entities can never combine to produce a new one. | |
| From: comment on Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.24 |
| 598 | Democritus said that substances could never be mixed, so atoms are the substances [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Democritus claimed that one substance could not be composed from two nor two from one; for him it is the atoms that are the substances. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1039a10 |
| 22505 | The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If it is necessary that, if a triangle contains two right angles, that a quadrilateral has four, it is clear that the cause of this is that a triangle has two. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1222b31) | |
| A reaction: We would not normally use the word 'cause' for this, but 'necessitates' seems to fit, and I like the word 'determines' (because it can be both physical and abstract). An example of what I think of as an Aristotelian necessity maker. |
| 22513 | Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Knowing and understanding is of two kinds, one having and the other using knowledge. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1225b11) | |
| A reaction: This corresponds to potential and actual. We wouldn't say that understanding must be used, but we have some sort of distinction between knowledge as pure and theoretical, and understanding enabling good application. |
| 1532 | Sensible qualities can't be real if they appear different to different creatures [Democritus, by Theophrastus] |
| Full Idea: As proof of the fact that sensible qualities have no real existence he points to the fact that they do not appear the same to all creatures. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A135) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 63 |
| 20894 | Man is separated from reality [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary to recognise that man by virtue of this criterion is separated from reality. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B006), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.137 | |
| A reaction: I don't know what 'this criterion' is, but it strikes me as quite a good slogan for fans (like myself) of the representative theory of perception. Critics say it is the big objection to the representative theory, but I say 'get over it'. |
| 20897 | Obscure knowledge belongs to the five senses, and genuine knowledge is the other type [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: There are two forms of knowledge [gnomé], the one genuine, the other obscure. And to the obscure one belongs all of these: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The other is genuine, and is separated from this one. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B011), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.139 | |
| A reaction: [Sextus goes on to make it clear that the 'genuine' one is knowledge acquired by thought]. I take Parmenides to be the first rationalist. It is interesting that Democritus, who devoted his life to finding causal explanations, seems to be a rationalist. |
| 517 | All evidence comes from senses, so they are indispensable to the mind [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: Mind must never reject the senses, because that is where it gets its evidence, and it would be the mind's downfall. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B125), quoted by Galen - On Medical Experience 15.8 |
| 20895 | We actually know nothing, and opinions are mere flux [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: Certainly this argument too makes it clear that in reality [eteé] we know nothing about anything, but for each person opinion is a rhythmic afflux [epirhusmié]. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B007), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.137 | |
| A reaction: This seems to pick 'all is flux' up from Heraclitus, and make Democritus (along with aspects of Socrates) the true source of ancient scepticism. |
| 1528 | We in fact know nothing, but we each restructure our reality with beliefs [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: In reality we know nothing about anything, but belief restructures things for each of us. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B007), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.136 |
| 492 | It is obviously impossible to understand the reality of each thing [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: It will be obvious that it is impossible to understand how in reality each thing is. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B008), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 7.137 |
| 515 | We know nothing in reality; for truth lies in an abyss [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: We know nothing in reality; for truth lies in an abyss. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B117), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.72.10 |
| 577 | Democritus says there is either no truth, or it is concealed from us [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Democritus concludes that either there is no truth or it is concealed from us. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A112) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1009b12 |
| 20892 | Democritus was devoted to discovering causal explanations [Democritus, by Eusebius] |
| Full Idea: Democritus himself, as they say, stated that he would rather discover a single causal explanation [aitiologia] than become the King of the Persians. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B118) by Eusebius - Preparation for the Gospel 14.27.4 | |
| A reaction: Democritus seems to be clearly the father of the physical sciences, because he focused single-mindedly on physical and causal explanations. David Lewis says all explanations are causal. |
| 5882 | Democritus says soul consists of smooth round bodies brought together in accidental collision [Democritus, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: Since Democritus makes the soul consist of minute smooth round bodies brought together in some sort of accidental collision, let us pass him over. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Tusculan Disputations I.xi.23 | |
| A reaction: If we accept that Democritus thought the collision of atoms 'accidental', then it doesn't sound like a very good theory. What would Cicero say if we replaced 'accidental' with 'naturally selected'? |
| 6034 | Atomists say soul has a rational part in the chest, and a diffused non-rational part [Democritus, by Aetius] |
| Full Idea: Democritus and Epicurus say the soul has two parts, one which is rational and is situated in the chest area, and the other which is non-rational and is spread throughout the entire compound of the body. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aetius - fragments/reports 4.4.6 | |
| A reaction: The spread part corresponds to such things as feeling fear in the stomach, or excitement throughout the limbs. I can't think what grounds there would be for choosing the chest as the home of reason. I suppose you can hear reason thumping in there.. |
| 20912 | The soul is the same as the mind [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Democritus says the soul is the same thing as the mind. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A101) by Aristotle - De Anima 405a10 | |
| A reaction: This is not in contrast to the Christian concept of the soul, but in contrast to the normal view of psuché, which is more like the life that permeates the whole body. Democritus was more in tune than Aristotle with modern thought on this. |
| 20916 | Animals have a share of reason [Democritus, by Porphyry] |
| Full Idea: Democritus recognised that animals have a share of reason. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Porphyry - On Abstinence 3.6.7 | |
| A reaction: Since he considers thinking to be the interaction of atoms in the body, which animals evidently possess, this seems consistent. No one seems to observed animals closely before the 20th century, other than to exploit them. |
| 20914 | The directive centre is located in the whole head [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Democritus says [the directive centre is located] in the whole head. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A105) by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 4.5.1 | |
| A reaction: The whole head is not quite the brain, but he is getting very warm indeed, and long before anyone else got so close. |
| 23906 | Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The courage of spirit is the most natural kind; for spirit is unconquerable, which is why the young are the best fighters. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1229a27) | |
| A reaction: [thumos, presumably, as in Plato] I suppose Aristotle knows better than me, but I suspect the young are just the quickest and strongest. I'd rather be led by someone with experience than by someone who is young. |
| 20204 | Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It makes no difference if the soul is divided into parts or lacks parts, as it certainly has distinct capacities. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1219b32), quoted by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - Virtues of the Mind II 3.1 | |
| A reaction: I take this to endorse my view that the mind-body problem is of limited interest to philosophers. The focus should be on what the mind does, not how it is constructed. But then I presume the latter issue is revealed by neuroscience. |
| 22506 | A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: All those things that are in man's power either to do or not to do he himself is the cause of, and all those things that he is the cause of are in his own power. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1223a08) | |
| A reaction: This is the step which allows us to abandon free will, and replace it with the question of whether a person is the 'cause' of an action. Aristotle carefully delineates the criteria for when an action is within a person's power. Includes failures to act? |
| 22504 | Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A human being is a starting point of some actions, and he alone of animals; for of nothing else should we say that it acted. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1222b19) | |
| A reaction: It is a standard dogma that the idea of free will does not occur in Plato or Aristotle, but this looks awfully like it. I don't agree about animals. You watch them judging whether they can make a leap, and then doing it. |
| 6033 | Democritus said everything happens of necessity, by natural motion of atoms [Democritus, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: Democritus, the founder of atomism, preferred to accept that all things happened by necessity than to tear from the atomic bodies their natural motions. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') §22 | |
| A reaction: This is in opposition to Epicurus, who said that atoms can have a 'swerve', making free will possible. It is suggested that Epicurus was the first to really grasp the problem of free will. Democritus was just stating the (to him) obvious. |
| 5088 | Some say there is a determinate cause for every apparently spontaneous event [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Some people (Democritus?) say there is no such thing as a chance event; they claim that there is always a determinate cause for everything which is said to be a chance or a spontaneous event. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 195b37 | |
| A reaction: This is the mutual implication of physicalism and determinism, which strikes me as unavoidable. I say: don't panic about morality because determinism is true. Embrace determinism - it is harmless and true. Its opposite is a nonsense. |
| 21670 | Democritus said atoms only move by their natural motions, which are therefore necessary [Democritus, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: The author of the atomic theory, Democritus, preferred to accept the view that all events are caused by necessity, rather than to deprive the atoms of their natural motions. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 10.23 | |
| A reaction: The 'deprivation' would have to be caused by mind, or by the later 'swerve' of Epicurus. |
| 20913 | Democritus says the soul is the body, and thinking is thus the mixture of the body [Democritus, by Theophrastus] |
| Full Idea: Democritus explains thinking by the mixture of the body, which is surely in accordance with his reasoning, since he makes the soul the body. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A135) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 58 | |
| A reaction: I agree with Democritus. |
| 24041 | Democritus says spherical atoms are fire, and constitute the soul [psuche] [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Democritus says the soul is a sort of fire. For the shapes and atoms are unlimitied and those that are spherical he says are fire and soul - which are like the motes in the air when sunbeams come through the window. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], DK 67-68) by Aristotle - De Anima 403b31 | |
| A reaction: It's hard to see why the spherical atoms should be fire. Maybe because they move together quickly and easily. …At 404a5 Aristotle agrees with me! |
| 22510 | Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Many classify even love as involuntary, and certain cases of anger and certain natural states as being too strong for human nature; and we regard them as being pardonable, as being of such a nature as to be constrained by nature. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1225b20) | |
| A reaction: Blind terror would presumably count as another such state. An interesting aspect of Aristotle's picture - that human nature contains ingredients that are not part of a natural harmonious whole. |
| 23913 | Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Pretty much all of the praiseworthy or blameworthy states concerned with character are either excesses, deficiencies, or medial conditions in feelings. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1233b16) | |
| A reaction: Suggests that the ideal state of character is the result of long and careful tuning of the feelings - insofar as we can control them. Presumably we can train feelings of hatred or compassion, by appropriate exposures. These states are NOT virtues. |
| 23918 | Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The discord between the good and the pleasant in one's feelings is lack of self-control. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1237a08) | |
| A reaction: A nice clear statement of his view, which opposes the view of Socrates that akrasia is a failure of reason or judgement. Goodness seems to be treated here as a feeling, which is unusual. |
| 1540 | Pleasure and pain guide our choices of good and bad [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: The guides to what is good and bad for people are pleasure and pain. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B188), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.46 |
| 22515 | Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Choice is neither simply wish nor opinion, but opinion together with inclination, whenever as a result of deliberation they are brought to a conclusion. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1227a04) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the earliest appearance of the belief-plus-desire theory of action, which is often associated with Hume. A choice does not necessarily result from having the inclination and the appropriate opinion. Laziness! |
| 22508 | Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In inanimate things the starting-point is single, in animate things there is more than one; for inclination and reason are not always in harmony. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224a24) | |
| A reaction: It is important that this seems to include non-human animals. We see animals avoid something which they desire, presumably because they detect a danger. They may be conflicting desires, but it is rational to prioritise dangers. |
| 22514 | The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: That part of the soul is deliberative which is capable of discerning a cause: the reason for the sake of which - which is one of the causes - 'cause' being something because-of-which. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1226b26) | |
| A reaction: I take because-of-which to be the correct explanation. Since my model of practical reasoning is partly forensic detection, this seems right. Sherlock Holmes spots causes. |
| 22507 | An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The voluntary consists in action accompanied by thought of some kind. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224a06) | |
| A reaction: This is thought as opposed to inclination or choice. The controlled person [enkrateia] voluntarily acts against inclinations. The appropriate thought receives carefull analysis in NE 1109b30-1111b4. |
| 23319 | We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: For Aristotle, for us to be responsible for what we do, our action has to somehow reflect our motivation. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224a07) by Michael Frede - A Free Will 2 | |
| A reaction: This sounds like 'mens rea' in law - meaning to do the thing you did. But we can obviously be responsible for things through neglect, for example. |
| 22512 | Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Whatever a man does - not in ignorance, and through his own agency - when it is in his power not to do it, must be voluntary, and that is what voluntary is. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1225b08) | |
| A reaction: This is the conclusion of the Eudemian discussion of responsibility. This is a definition by necessary and sufficient conditions. How can you be sure that something is in your power not to do? |
| 22509 | What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: By these marks we distinguish what comes naturally: everything that is there straightaway as soon as something comes to be, and all that occurs to us if growth is allowed to proceed normally - such as greying hair, ageing, and the like. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224b32) | |
| A reaction: The word 'normal' has to do a lot of work here. Presumably jaundice in a neonate is not included. Or later hereditary diseases. |
| 18230 | No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If we put together all the things that are ....not done or undergone for their own sake ...no one would choose, in order to have them, to be alive rather than not. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1215), quoted by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Finality' | |
| A reaction: Debatable. Roughly his question is whether you would rather be dead than be a slave, since slaves work for means, but have no ends. Aristotle would rather die, but those who surrendered in ancient battles preferred slavery. |
| 23909 | Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There is intrinsic use of a possession, such as of a shoe or a cloak, and its coincidental use - not of course when using a shoe as a weight, but as, for example, selling it or hiring it out (for then a shoe is used as a shoe). | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1231b37) | |
| A reaction: This seems to need a third label, for using the shoe as a weight. 'Inessential use' perhaps, since the intrinsic use points towards the essential nature or function of the shoe. |
| 5870 | Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is not true that everything that there is seeks some single good: each thing has an inclination for its own good, the eye for sight, the body for health, and so on. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1218a30) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle's pluralism. Elsewhere this pluralism arises from his function argument - that the good of each thing is the successful fulfilment of its function, which is different for each thing. This is basic to virtue theory, and has my approval. |
| 495 | Wisdom creates a healthy passion-free soul [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: Medicine heals diseases of the body, wisdom frees the soul from passions. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B031), quoted by Clement - Pedagogue 1.6.2.1 | |
| A reaction: The interesting concept of a healthy mind seems to have got lost in modern moral philosophy. |
| 1537 | Happiness is identifying and separating the pleasures [Democritus, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Democritus thinks that happiness consists in the determination and separation of pleasures, and that this is what is both finest and most beneficial for people. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A167) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.07.3 | |
| A reaction: A great deal of the strategy and ethics of living consists (if you are lucky) of discriminating among possible pleasures. Philosophers should produce criteria. |
| 5877 | We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is because it is not easy to discern what sort of choice it is that we are forced to judge from the deeds what sort of person someone is; the activity is more worth having, but the choice is commended more. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1228a15) | |
| A reaction: This shows why Aristotle is the most important opponent of consequentialism. It is hard to see how one could praise a self-interested deed simply because it benefited others. Greed is never good. |
| 5868 | Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: No horse or bird or fish is happy, nor any other thing that there is which does not have a share by its nature in the divine. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1217a26) | |
| A reaction: Pet owners will all feel their beloved companions have been insulted, but I agree with this. 'Happy' does not here mean 'in a state of pleasure'. A fully successful bird does little more than the four f's (feed, fornicate, flee, fight). |
| 5865 | Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: To be happy, and to live the fine and divinely-happy life, would seem to reside in three things above all, ..for some say that wisdom is the greatest good, others virtue, others pleasure. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1214a30) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle is well-known for his pluralist answer to this question: virtue is crucial, wisdom is perhaps the greatest of the virtues, and pleasure improves everything in life. |
| 5876 | Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is different from continence. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1227b17) | |
| A reaction: Basic to Aristotle - in that continence leads to right action, but that is not enough for virtue, which requires inner harmony, reason, and pleasure in doing what is right. Hence Aristotle is quite distinct from deontological or consequentialist views. |
| 5872 | Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Excellence is the best disposition, state or capacity of anything that has some employment or function; this is evident from induction. For example, a cloak has an excellence - and a certain function and employment also; its best state is its excellence. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1219a02) | |
| A reaction: 'Employment' will be an assigned function, and 'function' will be a natural or intrinsic function, I presume. This is a nice clear illustration of the fact that for Aristotle virtue runs continuously from people to cloaks. See Idea 1663, though. |
| 5875 | Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Character (éthos), as the word itself indicates, is developed from habit (ethos). | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1220a36) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle goes in for dubious etymologies, but this one sounds quite significant, and supports his view that habit is central to virtue. We would lose nothing in English if we said 'what are her habits?' instead of 'what is her character?'. |
| 5874 | Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The virtues of character belong to the part that is non-rational, but whose nature is to follow the rational part; we do not say what a man's character is like when we say that he is wise or clever, but when we say that he is gentle or daring. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1220a11) | |
| A reaction: In the Nichomachean Ethics it appears that good character is the 'harmony' between the two parts; here it sounds more like obedience. It seems to me that our rational part is a failure if it is not sensitive to the needs of the irrational part. |
| 22516 | Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is that state of character which chooses the mean, relative to us, in things pleasant and unpleasant, all those in respect of which a man is said to have a certain sort of character according as he enjoys or suffers pain from them. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1227b08) | |
| A reaction: The 'mean' should be understood as what is appropriate, rather than the mere average. Strong anger, for example, is sometimes appropriate. Does Aristotle rule out wild laughter, or frenetic dancing? Is a state of ecstasy wicked? |
| 22517 | We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is from his choosing that we judge what sort of person someone is; that is, what that for whose sake he does something is, not what he does. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1228a03) | |
| A reaction: Not entirely true. It can be sufficient to reveal their character that a person does some particular thing, as novelists know. When Hud parks his car in her flowerbed, we don't need to enquire about his reason. But see 1228a16! |
| 20917 | Contentment comes from moderation and proportion in life [Democritus, by Stobaeus] |
| Full Idea: Contentment [euthumia] comes about for human beings from the moderation of enjoyment and proportion [summetria] in life. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B191) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.1.210 | |
| A reaction: This is close to Aristotle's doctrine of the Mean. The majority of ethical ideas attributed to Democritus (presumably by the Epicureans) are thought to be spurious. This idea actually sounds rather stoic. |
| 23914 | People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The mean is more contrary to the extremes than the extremes are to each other, because it does not occur with either of them, whereas the extremes often occur with each other. People can be rash cowards, or wasteful in some things and generous in others. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1234a33) | |
| A reaction: This rather undermines the neat visual metaphor of a sliding scale, but gives a more accurate account of the mean. The diagram needs three dimensions, instead of two. |
| 23911 | Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Each virtue makes its possessor tend to despise great things that are contrary to reason - for example, courage does this of dangers, …a temperate person of many pleasures, and a generous one of many sorts of wealth. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1232a37) | |
| A reaction: I like the observation that the generous tend to despise wealth, implying that those who love wealth tend to lack generosity. Christianity has encouraged us to reject the idea of despising anything - but that seems to iron out common sense values. |
| 23910 | Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: All the virtues will follow along with greatness of soul, or it will follow along with all of them | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1232a36) | |
| A reaction: This is obviously similar in some respects to Nietzsche's 'higher' man, though that suggests greater independence, rather than being an ideal citizen. |
| 23908 | If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If someone looks at a beautiful statue, or horse, or human being, or listens to someone singing …just to look at or listen to beautiful things, he would not be thought to be intemperate, any more than those beguiled by the Sirens would. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1230b31) | |
| A reaction: He says that intemperance mainly concerns taste and touch, rather than mere looking or listening. I think obsessive collectors of beautiful objects might drift into intemperance. |
| 23905 | Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Courage is a following of reason, and reason orders us to choose what is noble. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1229a01) | |
| A reaction: This sounds right to me. Courage, in all sorts of contexts, seems to arise in people who sustain their focus on what is the right thing to do. |
| 23912 | Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It makes a difference whether the honour comes from many random people or from those worthy of note, and again so does by whom and for what the honor is conferred. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1232b18) | |
| A reaction: He tends to play down honour because of its relativism, but this quotation implies that if an honour was bestowed by the worthy, for something of agreed high value, then it would be at quite a different level from mere popular esteem. Celebrity v peerage? |
| 5871 | Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: All goods are either in the soul or outside it, and it is those in the soul that are more worthy of choice; for wisdom, virtue and pleasure are in the soul, and some or all of these seem to be an end for everyone. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1218b34) | |
| A reaction: An interesting reason for this assertion - that it is true because everybody agrees on it. See Idea 95. I would think that he might claim that our soul is our essence, whereas external goods pander to the non-essential in us. |
| 13551 | Democritus says wealth is a burden to the virtuous mind [Democritus, by Seneca] |
| Full Idea: Democritus rejected wealth, regarding it as a burden to the virtuous mind. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Seneca the Younger - On Providence §6 | |
| A reaction: The rival view is that wealth empowers a virtuous person to perform more fine deeds. Democritus seems to have a rather solitary view of virtue. |
| 23919 | Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Just as if people wish to be healthy they do not become healthy, so if they wish to be friends they are not immediately in fact friends. …[1237b40] For a friend is not to be had without a test or in a single day, but needs time. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1237b21) | |
| A reaction: The voice of experience, I think. Obviously trust is basic, and it would be unwise to trust a possible friend on the first day. Since politics aims at friendship, I presume the support of the rule of law helps to achieve trust. |
| 23920 | Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is possible for a decent person to be friends with a base one. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1238b01) | |
| A reaction: This is on the basis of being useful, or of having something in common. Presumably friendship can come in degrees, as well as being of different kinds. Even the finest people can differ a lot, and only have a limited friendship. |
| 23915 | The main function of politics is to produce friendship [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It seems to be most of all the function of politics to produce friendship. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1245b22) | |
| A reaction: Lovely! Most people would probably cite wealth and security as the main aims. This function seems to require quite a high degree of equality, though Aristotle doesn't think it essential. |
| 23916 | The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If one wishes to make it so that people do not commit injustices to each other, it is enough to make them friends; for true friends do not commit injustice. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1245b28) | |
| A reaction: This, along with Idea 23915, offers a beautiful vision of what a society should try to achieve. There can be duplicitous apparent friends, but on the whole the best way to cure unjust relations is friendship. Imagine Jews and Arabs being friends (2023). |
| 5866 | It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Not to have ordered one's life in relation to some end is a mark of extreme folly. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1214b10) | |
| A reaction: A most interesting claim, not found in the Nichomachean Ethics. There the teleology is descriptive, but here it is prescriptive. It is tempting to rebel against Aristotle's injuncture. He was a driven workaholic. Why not float through life like gossamer? |
| 5878 | Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One might wonder if it is possible to use each thing both for its natural purpose and otherwise - and that as itself or incidentally. E.g. twisting an eye so that one thing appears two, but also using an eye as something to sell or eat. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1246a26) | |
| A reaction: The important idea here is the core notion that there is a 'natural' purpose. Sceptics might say that all purposes derive from how a mind wishes to use something; otherwise there would be processes, but no 'functions' or 'purposes'. |
| 5873 | Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Each thing's function is its end. | |
| From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1219a08) | |
| A reaction: Function and end are not the same, but this confirms how closely related they are for Aristotle. Can an inanimate object have an end, without having any apparent function? Could I construct a set of cogwheels which each had a function, but no end? |
| 1525 | Atomists say there are only three differences - in shape, arrangement and position [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Democritus and Leucippus say that there are only three differences - in shape, arrangement and position. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A006) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 0985b15 |
| 493 | Experiences are merely convention; only atoms and the void are real [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: Sweet exists by convention, bitter by convention, colour by convention; atoms and void alone exist in reality. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B009), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.135 |
| 17542 | 'Full' and 'Void' secularised Parmenides's Being and Not-being [Democritus, by Heisenberg] |
| Full Idea: In atomism, the antithesis of Being and Not-being of Parmenides is secularised into the antithesis of the 'Full' and the 'Void'. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Werner Heisenberg - Physics and Philosophy 04 |
| 5947 | If only atoms are real and the rest is convention, we wouldn't bother to avoid pain [Democritus, by Diogenes of Oen.] |
| Full Idea: Democritus erred when he said that the atoms alone exist in truth among realities, but everything else is convention; for then, far from discovering the truth, we shall not even be able to live, since we shall avoid neither fire nor wounds. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Diogenes (Oen) - fragments/reports F2 7 | |
| A reaction: The point is that we have to treat pain as a reality, not just as a convention. I suspect that Diogenes is making the same mistake made by modern attackers of 'eliminativism'. It is all about identity and reduction and levels of reality… |
| 13219 | When atoms touch, why don't they coalesce, like water drops? [Aristotle on Democritus] |
| Full Idea: Why, when they come into contact, do they [atoms] not coalesce into one, as drops of water run together when drop touches drop? | |
| From: comment on Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 326a33 | |
| A reaction: Presumably we must think of atoms as having basic ontological unity, rather than as being little globules of 'stuff'. They are more like monads than they are like mud. |
| 1533 | Because appearance is infinitely varied, atomists assume infinitely many shapes of atom [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: They thought that truth lay in appearances, which they appreciated are contradictory and infinite, so they made the shapes of atoms infinite. Thus the infinite changes in compounds create the infinitely varies appearances. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A009) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 315b9 |
| 20899 | Atoms cling together, until a stronger necessity disperses them [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Democritus thinks that the substances hold on to one another and remain together for a length of time until some stronger necessity arising from their surroundings shakes and disperses them. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A037) by Aristotle - On Democritus (frag) | |
| A reaction: [quoted in Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens] He's not wrong. This seems to provide a mechanism for the Heracltean flux. Ancient critics wanted to know where the 'stronger necessity' came from. |
| 20898 | Atoms are irregular, hooked, concave, convex, and many other shapes [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Some substances are irregular, others hook-shaped, other concave, other convex, others provided with innumerable other differences. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A037) by Aristotle - On Democritus (frag) | |
| A reaction: [quoted in Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens] 'Substance' here means a fundamental object, which for Democritus is an undividable atom. |
| 20908 | There could be an atom the size of the world [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Democritus say that it is possible that there exists an atom of the size of the world. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A047) by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 1.12.6 | |
| A reaction: The editor says this may have been a criticism of Democritus - presumably a reductio ad absurdum. But Democritus has no upper limit on the size of an atom. It challenges the imagination to treat such a huge thing as indivisible. |
| 1527 | There must be atoms, to avoid the absurdity of infinite division down to nothing [Democritus, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If everything is infinitely divided, what survives the divisions? Alternatively, division would end at points with no magnitude, in which case bodies are composed of nothing. This is the argument claiming there are atoms of some magnitude. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A048b) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 316a14- |
| 20909 | The basic atoms are without qualities - which only arise from encounters between atoms [Democritus, by Galen] |
| Full Idea: Democritus and the Epicureans posit that the first element is without quality, possessing by nature neither whiteness, blackness, sweetness or bitterness, warmth or cold. ...It is from the encounter of the atoms that all the sensible qualities come about. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A049) by Galen - On Hippocrates and Plato 1.2 | |
| A reaction: Idea 493 comes in the middle of this summary by Galen. Hence atoms play the role that substrates play in object-based metaphysics. So atoms have the same problem. Is the shape of an atom a quality of an atom. Or are qualities what atoms DO? |
| 1536 | If a cone is horizontally sliced the surfaces can't be equal, so it goes up in steps [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: If a cone is cut parallel to the base are the two new surfaces equal or unequal? If they are unequal, the cone must have gone up in steps. If they are equal then the cone must have been a cylinder, which is absurd. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B155), quoted by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1079e1 |
| 23314 | Greeks explained regularity by intellectual design, not by laws [Democritus, by Frede,M] |
| Full Idea: It is clear that Democritus had no idea of laws of nature …for in Greek thought regularity of behaviour is associated with design by an intellect. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Michael Frede - A Free Will Intro | |
| A reaction: Ah. A simple realisation…! Seventeenth century laws of nature offered an explanation of natural order which didn't rely on God. Even though those scientists were all theists. |
| 24059 | Democritus is wrong: in a void we wouldn't see a distant ant in exact detail [Aristotle on Democritus] |
| Full Idea: Democritus did not speak correctly in supposing that if the intermediate space became a void, we would see an ant in exact detail if it were up in the heaven. …If the intermediate space became a void, rather nothing would be seen at all. | |
| From: comment on Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - De Anima 419a15 | |
| A reaction: Depends what you mean by void, but Aristotle is nearer the truth. Is vision clearer in outer space than in our higher atmosphere? |
| 5101 | Movement is impossible in a void, because nothing can decide the direction of movement [Aristotle on Democritus] |
| Full Idea: Void makes it impossible for anything to move, since in a void there is nowhere for a thing to move to more or less than anywhere else, because the void by definition contains no differentiation. | |
| From: comment on Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 214b32 | |
| A reaction: A lovely application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. However this assumes that the cause of the movement is going to be in the void (telos?), rather than in the body which will move (modern causation?). |
| 20905 | Growth and movement would not exist if there were no void to receive them [Democritus] |
| Full Idea: They say that one argument for void is that otherwise local motion (that is, locomotion and growth) would not exist: for there would not seem to be motion if there were no void, for what is full is incapable of receiving anything. | |
| From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A019), quoted by Aristotle - Physics 213b03 | |
| A reaction: The modern concept of a 'field' seems to have removed the possibility of a genuine 'void'. |
| 20911 | There are unlimited worlds of varying sizes, some without life or water [Democritus, by Hippolytus] |
| Full Idea: Democritus says that there exist unlimited worlds and that they are different in magnitude. ...Some worlds are devoid of animals and plants and of all humidity. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A010, A040) by Hippolytus - Refutation of All Heresies 1.12,13.2-4 | |
| A reaction: I'm not clear why Democritus came up with the idea of the Multicosmos. I don't suppose he meant the moon or planets, but another Cosmos. |
| 1535 | Democritus said people imagined gods as the source of what awed or frightened them [Democritus, by Sext.Empiricus] |
| Full Idea: Democritus thought that people imagined gods as responsible for the frightening and awesome things that happen in this world. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A075) by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Professors (six books) 9.24 |
| 20915 | The soul is destroyed with the body [Democritus, by Ps-Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Democritus says the soul is destructible, and is destroyed together with the whole body. | |
| From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A109) by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 4.7.4 | |
| A reaction: This is the only belief possible for Democritus, since everything, including life and soul, is just the confluence of atoms, and they are regularly dispersed. This is the epitome of materialist philosophy. |