8 ideas
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
468 | Musical performance can reveal a range of virtues [Damon of Ath.] |
Full Idea: In singing and playing the lyre, a boy will be likely to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice. | |
From: Damon (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
6000 | The goal is rationality in the selection of things according to nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined the goal to be rationality in the selection and rejection of the things according to nature. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon | |
A reaction: This captures the central Stoic idea quite nicely. 'Live according to nature', but this always meant 'live according to reason', because that is (as Aristotle had taught) the essence of our nature. This only makes sense if reason and nature coincide. |
5999 | The good is what is perfect by nature [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined the good as what is perfect by nature. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon | |
A reaction: This might come close to G.E. Moore's Ideal Utilitarianism, but its dependence on the rather uneasy of concept of 'perfection' makes it questionable. Personally I find it appealing. I wish we had Diogenes' explanation. |
6001 | Justice is a disposition to distribute according to desert [Diogenes of Babylon, by Blank] |
Full Idea: Diogenes of Babylon defined justice as the disposition which distributes to everyone what he deserves. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Bab) (fragments/reports [c.180 BCE]) by D.L. Blank - Diogenes of Babylon | |
A reaction: The questions that arise would be 'what does a new-born baby deserve?', and 'what do animals deserve?', and 'does the lowest and worst of criminals deserve anything at all?' |