Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Problem about Substitutional Quantification?st1=Saul A. Kripke', 'Intending' and 'Conditionals and Possibilia'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
10792 The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)]
     Full Idea: Kripke proposes that the substitutional quantifier is not a replacement for, or in competition with, the standard interpretation.
     From: report of Saul A. Kripke (A Problem about Substitutional Quantification? [1976]) by Ruth Barcan Marcus - Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers p.165
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
13858 The truth-functional account of conditionals is right, if the antecedent is really acceptable [Jackson, by Edgington]
     Full Idea: Jackson defends the truth-functional account by saying that for a conditional to be assertable, it must not only be believed that its truth-conditions are satisfied, but the belief must be robust or resilient with respect to the antecedent.
     From: report of Frank Jackson (Conditionals and Possibilia [1981]) by Dorothy Edgington - Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? 4
     A reaction: ..That is, one would not abandon the conditional if one believed the antecedent to be true.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20076 An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson]
     Full Idea: We can identify an intentional action ...with an all-out conditional judgement that the action is desirable. ...In the case of pure intending, I now suggest that the intention simply is an all-out judgement.
     From: Donald Davidson (Intending [1978], p.99), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 8 'Davidson's'
     A reaction: 'Pure' intending seems to be what Stout calls 'prior' intending, which is clearer. This still strikes me as obviously false. I judge that it is desirable that I make a cup of coffee, but secretly I'm hoping someone else will make it for me.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20024 Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: Later Davidson dropped his reductive treatment of intentions (in terms of 'pro-attitudes' and other beliefs), and accepted that intentions are irreducible, and distinct from pro-attitudes.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (Intending [1978]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 2
     A reaction: Only a philosopher would say that intentions cannot be reduced to something else. Since I have a very physicalist view of the mind, I incline to reduce them to powers and dispositions of physical matter.