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All the ideas for '', 'The Handbook [Encheiridion]' and 'Letter to Bramhall'

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10 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
11211 If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II)
     A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
11210 Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000])
     A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge.
11212 The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III)
     A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
16620 A chair is wood, and its shape is the form; it isn't 'compounded' of the matter and form [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: Nothing can be compounded of matter and form. The matter of a chair is wood; the form is the figure it has, apt for the intended use. Does his Lordship think the chair compounded of the wood and the figure?
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Letter to Bramhall [1650], 4:302), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.1
     A reaction: Aristotle does use the word 'shape' [morphe] when he is discussing hylomorphism, and the statue example seems to support it, but elsewhere the form is a much deeper principle of individuation.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
16622 Essence is just an artificial word from logic, giving a way of thinking about substances [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: Essence and all other abstract names are words artificial belonging to the art of logic, and signify only the manner how we consider the substance itself.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Letter to Bramhall [1650], 4:308), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671
     A reaction: I sympathise quite a lot with this view, but not with its dismissive tone. The key question I take to be: if you reject essences entirely (having read too much physics), how are we going to think about entities in the world in future?
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
11214 We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV)
     A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role).
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
23366 We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: The will of nature may be learned from those things in which we do not differ from one another.
     From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 26)
     A reaction: There you go! This is the rule for anthropologists on field trips. And it guides us towards a core of essential human nature. But it neglects the way that nature is expressed in different cultures, which is also important.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
4022 Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: The injunction of Epictetus is well known, that in commiserating with another for his misfortune, we ought to talk consolingly, but not be moved by pity.
     From: report of Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], §16) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §15.1
     A reaction: This goes strongly against the grain of the Christian tradition, but strikes me as an appealing attitude (even if I am the sufferer).
23365 If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: When you see someone weeping is sorrow …do not shrink from sympathising with him, and even groaning with him, but be careful not to groan inwardly too.
     From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 16)
     A reaction: The point is that the person's suffering is an 'indifferent' because nothing can be done about it, and we should only really care about what we are able to choose. He is not opposed to the man's suffering, or his need for support.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
23368 Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: The governor Agrippinus would try to persuade those whom he sentenced that it was proper for them to be sentenced, …just as the physician persuades a patient to accept their treatment.
     From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 22)
     A reaction: This resembles the Contractualism of T.H. Scanlon (that actions are good if you can justify them to those involved). It may be possible to persuade people by the use of sophistry and lies. Nevertheless, a fairly civilise proposal.