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All the ideas for '', 'The Raft and the Pyramid' and 'Mind, Brain and the Quantum'

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
There is nothing so obvious that a philosopher cannot be found to deny it [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: There is nothing so obvious that a philosopher cannot be found to deny it.
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.73)
     A reaction: [Idea of Varro] Just as unreliable witnesses are the bane of a murder enquiry, so bad philosophers throw a cloud of obscurity roundphilosophy. If 9999 people thought 2+2=4, but there is always one who thinks something different.
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
There may only be necessary and sufficient conditions (and counterfactuals) because we intervene in the world [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: Perhaps notions of necessary and sufficient conditions, and counterfactual considerations, are in some way grounded in awareness of ourselves as active interveners and experimenters in the world, not passive spectators.
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.155)
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
No one has ever succeeded in producing an acceptable non-trivial analysis of anything [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: I cannot think of a single philosophically interesting concept that has been successfully and nontrivially analysed to most people's satisfaction.
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.121)
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa]
     Full Idea: If I have a headache, I could have a set of beliefs that I do not have a headache, that I am not in pain, that no one is in pain, and so on. The resulting system of beliefs would cohere as fully as does my actual system of beliefs.
     From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §9)
     A reaction: I think this is a misunderstanding of coherentism. Beliefs are not to be formulated through a process of coherence, but are evaluated that way. A belief that I have headache just arrives; I then see that its denial is incoherent, so I accept it.
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
If something is described in two different ways, is that two facts, or one fact presented in two ways? [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: Do the statements 'Sir Percy Blakeney is in Paris' and 'The Scarlet Pimpernel is in Paris' express different facts, or the same fact under different modes of presentation?
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.129)
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II)
     A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000])
     A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge.
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III)
     A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
How does a direct realist distinguish a building from Buckingham Palace? [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: It is one thing to see a building, and another to see it as a building, and yet another to see it as Buckingham Palace. How does the commonsense realist think that this is accomplished?
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.302)
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
Dogs seem to have beliefs, and beliefs require concepts [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: Dogs surely have beliefs, and beliefs call for some concepts or other.
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.312)
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricism is a theory of meaning as well as of knowledge [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: Empiricism is not just a theory of knowledge; it is also a theory meaning.
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.149)
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
Commonsense realism must account for the similarity of genuine perceptions and known illusions [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: Commonsense realism has to account for the subjective similarity of the genuine perception of a green surface and the experience of, say, an after-image.
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.142)
There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa]
     Full Idea: Radical foundationalism suffers from two weaknesses: there are not so many perfectly obvious truths as Descartes thought; and if we restrict ourselves to what it truly obvious, very little supposed common sense knowledge can be proved.
     From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §3)
     A reaction: It is striking how few examples can ever be found of self-evident a priori truths. However, if there are self-evident truths about direct experience (pace Descartes), that would give us more than enough.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa]
     Full Idea: A single belief can trail at once regresses of both sorts: one terminating and one not.
     From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §6)
     A reaction: This makes foundationalism possible, while admitting the existence of regresses. It is a good point, and triumphalist anti-foundationalists can't just point out a regress and then smugly troop off to the pub.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa]
     Full Idea: If a mental state is not propositional, then how can it possibly serve as a foundation for belief? How can one infer or justify anything on the basis of a state that, having no propositional content, must be logically dumb?
     From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §11)
     A reaction: This may be the best objection to foundationalism. McDowell tries to argue that conceptual content is inherent in perception, thus giving the beginnings of inbuilt propositional content. But an organism awash with bare experiences knows nothing.
Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa]
     Full Idea: If a mental state provides no guarantee against error, then it cannot serve as a foundation for knowledge.
     From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §4)
     A reaction: That assumes that knowledge entails certainty, which I am sure it should not. On a fallibilist account, a foundation could be incredibly secure, despite a barely imaginable scenario in which it turned out to be false.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa]
     Full Idea: Visual experience is recognized as both the cause and the justification of our visual beliefs. But these are not wholly independent. Presumably the justification that something is red derives partly from the fact that it originates in visual experience.
     From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §10)
     A reaction: Yes, but the fact that certain visual experiences originate in dreams is taken as grounds for denying their truth, not affirming it. So why do we distinguish them? I am thinking that only in the 'space of reasons' can a cause become a justification.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
A 1988 estimate gave the brain 3 x 10-to-the-14 synaptic junctions [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: It is estimated by Gierer (1988) that the human cerebral cortex alone contains about 300,000,000,000,000 synaptic junctions.
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.46)
     A reaction: As we grasp the vastness of this number, and the fact that the junctions are all active, the idea that a brain does something astonishing is not quite so surprising.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
How come unconscious states also cause behaviour? [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: Anyone who thinks phenomenal qualities are inseparable from our awareness of them, must think subconscious mental states are totally devoid of phenomenal qualities! So how can these states cause behaviour in the way conscious states do?
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.166)
     A reaction: I agree with this thought, though it is beautifully unprovable. We would need to respond to a red traffic light, without having consciously registered its presence. It is is just increasingly clear that we register information pre-consciously.
Could there be unconscious beliefs and desires? [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: I cannot make intuitive sense of there existing a being who possessed genuine beliefs and desires, but who, or which, lacked the capacity for consciousness altogether.
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.44)
     A reaction: This is part of the recent move (which strikes me as correct) to see qualia and intentionality as inseparable. We might well, though, need to adopt the 'intentional stance' to a sophisticated robot. But am I aware of all of my beliefs?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
Fish may operate by blindsight [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: If one asks 'what does the world look like to a fish?' the answer may be 'it doesn't look like anything; fish find their way about by blindsight.'
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.56)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a real possibility, not just a wild speculation. It seems pretty obvious to me that I operate by blindsight in many aspects of my behaviour. Piano-playing would be impossible if all qualia had to be processed.
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: I am suggesting that introspective psychology might have a contribution to make to fundamental physics.
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.176)
     A reaction: I'm a fan of introspection, as a source of genuine information.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Can phenomenal qualities exist unsensed? [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: Halting the slide into panpsychism is the major advantage of holding that phenomenal qualities can exist unsensed.
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.170)
     A reaction: Presumably unsensed phenomenal qualities would explain the discovery that we seem to make decisions before we are conscious of what we intend to do. That result certainly implied that consciousness had no real function.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
If mental events occur in time, then relativity says they are in space [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: If we assume that mental events are located in time, then it follows immediately, given special relativity, that they are also in space.
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.73)
     A reaction: A powerful point. Of course, there might (you never know) be something which exists in time but not space (and thoughts clearly exist in time), but (as in Hume's argument against miracles), dualism will overthrow your other basic beliefs about nature.
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Only logical positivists ever believed behaviourism [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: Philosophical behaviourism is an absurd theory. Practically the only philosophers who ever held it, at any rate in its crude form, were certain logical positivists.
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.25)
     A reaction: I presume Lockwood's target here is eliminativist behaviourism, as opposed to methodological behaviourism (which is a reasonable practice to adopt), and 'black box' behaviourism (which has been superseded by functionalism).
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Identity theory likes the identity of lightning and electrical discharges [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: A favourite example of identity theorists is the identification of flashes of lightning with electrical discharges.
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.71)
     A reaction: Personally I prefer the analogy of the mind being like a waterfall - a non-mysterious physical process which has dramatic properties of its own. If minds must keep busy in order to be minds, they must be processes.
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Perhaps logical positivism showed that there is no dividing line between science and metaphysics [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: If the logical positivists established anything it is that there is no way of demarcating science from metaphysics.
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.313)
     A reaction: So many problems arise for philosophers because of the passion for 'demarcating' things. Close study, experiments, statistics and measurements occur in every walk of life.
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV)
     A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role).
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Maybe causation is a form of rational explanation, not an observation or a state of mind [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: It is tempting to see the concept of causation as a product of reason rather than of perception or introspection; something that reason brings to bear on the data of sense, by way of imposing an explanatory order on them.
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.154)
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
We have the confused idea that time is a process of change [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: Somehow we have got it into our heads that time itself is a process of change.
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.12)