10 ideas
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
| A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
| A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
| A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
| 7453 | Galen's medicine followed the mean; each illness was balanced by opposite treatment [Galen, by Hacking] |
| Full Idea: Galen ran medicine on the principle of the mean; afflictions must be treated by contraries; hot diseases deserve cold medicine and moist illnesses want drying agents. (Paracelsus rebelled, treating through similarity). | |
| From: report of Galen (On Medical Experience [c.169]) by Ian Hacking - The Emergence of Probability Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: This must be inherited from Aristotle, with the aim of virtue for the body, as Aristotle wanted virtue for the psuché. In some areas Galen is probably right, that natural balance is the aim, as in bodily temperature control. |
| 23857 | People in power always try to increase their power [Weil] |
| Full Idea: Every human group that exercises power does so …in such a way as to increase that power. | |
| From: Simone Weil (Prospects: Proletarian Revolution? [1933], p.15) | |
| A reaction: Not so true in smaller institutions, but at the centre of power you can control how power is distributed, so the temptation is too much. |
| 23856 | Spontaneous movements are powerless against organised repression [Weil] |
| Full Idea: A spontaneous movement is fundamentally impotent when it comes to fighting against organised forces of repression. | |
| From: Simone Weil (Prospects: Proletarian Revolution? [1933], p.2) | |
| A reaction: Her example is the Paris Commune of 1870. Hence revolution requires prior penetration of the corridors of power. Hence the phenomenon of 'entryism' of more radical people into reformist parties. |
| 23859 | True democracy is the subordination of society to the individual [Weil] |
| Full Idea: In the subordination of society to the individual lies the definition of true democracy, and that of socialism as well. | |
| From: Simone Weil (Prospects: Proletarian Revolution? [1933], p.19) | |
| A reaction: This is the simplest definition of the liberal view. The big difference is whether this subordination is the starting point of political thinking, or the end result at which it aims. |
| 23858 | War is perpetuated by its continual preparations [Weil] |
| Full Idea: War perpetuates itself under the form of preparation for war. | |
| From: Simone Weil (Prospects: Proletarian Revolution? [1933], p.16) | |
| A reaction: There are periods when military preparations are scaled down, but a reason is always found to scale them back up again. |
| 23860 | Even if a drowning man is doomed, he should keep swimming to the last [Weil] |
| Full Idea: A man who is thrown overboard in the middle of the ocean ought not to let himself drown, even though there is very litte chance of his reaching safety, but to go on swimming till exhausted. | |
| From: Simone Weil (Prospects: Proletarian Revolution? [1933], p.21) | |
| A reaction: You might survive a little longer if you don't exhaust yourself! Not clear where her authority for 'ought' comes from, but it expresses an interesting attitude. |