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All the ideas for '', 'Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed)' and 'Philippa Foot's Moral Thought'

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32 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic is one of the few first-order non-classical logics [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: Free logic is an unusual example of a non-classical logic which is first-order.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], Pref)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / a. Symbols of ST
X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets, the set of all the n-tuples with its first member in X1, its second in X2, and so on.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.0)
<a,b&62; is a set whose members occur in the order shown [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: <a,b> is a set whose members occur in the order shown; <x1,x2,x3, ..xn> is an 'n-tuple' ordered set.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10)
a ∈ X says a is an object in set X; a ∉ X says a is not in X [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: a ∈ X means that a is a member of the set X, that is, a is one of the objects in X. a ∉ X indicates that a is not in X.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2)
{x; A(x)} is a set of objects satisfying the condition A(x) [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: {x; A(x)} indicates a set of objects which satisfy the condition A(x).
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2)
{a1, a2, ...an} indicates that a set comprising just those objects [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: {a1, a2, ...an} indicates that the set comprises of just those objects.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2)
Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4)
{a} is the 'singleton' set of a (not the object a itself) [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: {a} is the 'singleton' set of a, not to be confused with the object a itself.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4)
X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y (if and only if all of its members are members of Y, but some things in Y are not in X)
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6)
X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y (if and only if all of its members are members of Y).
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6)
X = Y means the set X equals the set Y [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: X = Y means the set X equals the set Y, which means they have the same members (i.e. X⊆Y and Y⊆X).
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6)
X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, the objects which are in both sets [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, which is a set containing just those things that are in both X and Y.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8)
X∪Y indicates the 'union' of all the things in sets X and Y [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: X ∪ Y indicates the 'union' of sets X and Y, which is a set containing just those things that are in X or Y (or both).
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8)
Y - X is the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y; the things in Y that are not in X [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: Y - X indicates the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y, that is, all the things in Y that are not in X.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
The 'relative complement' is things in the second set not in the first [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: The 'relative complement' of one set with respect to another is the things in the second set that aren't in the first.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8)
The 'intersection' of two sets is a set of the things that are in both sets [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: The 'intersection' of two sets is a set containing the things that are in both sets.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8)
The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8)
The 'induction clause' says complex formulas retain the properties of their basic formulas [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: The 'induction clause' says that whenever one constructs more complex formulas out of formulas that have the property P, the resulting formulas will also have that property.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.2)
A 'singleton' is a set with only one member [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: A 'singleton' is a set with only one member.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4)
A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2)
An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10)
A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10)
A 'set' is a collection of objects [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: A 'set' is a collection of objects.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2)
The 'empty set' or 'null set' has no members [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: The 'empty set' or 'null set' is a set with no members.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4)
A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set.
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6)
A 'proper subset' is smaller than the containing set [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: A set is a 'proper subset' of another set if some things in the large set are not in the smaller set
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / c. Basic theorems of ST
The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself) [Priest,G]
     Full Idea: The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself).
     From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6)
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II)
     A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000])
     A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge.
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III)
     A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value.
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV)
     A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role).
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Noncognitivism tries to avoid both naturalism and mysterious morality [Hacker-Wright]
     Full Idea: Noncognitivism is an attempt to avoid the alleged problems of naturalism without the mysteries of Moore's non-naturalism.
     From: John Hacker-Wright (Philippa Foot's Moral Thought [2013], 1)
     A reaction: R.M. Hare is the best example of this approach. Moore's Open Question argument was said to prove the Naturalistic Fallacy, which imagined that morality could be a feature of nature. It led Moore to platonism. I prefer Philippa Foot.