20 ideas
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
| A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
| A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
| A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
| 23146 | Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver] |
| Full Idea: Motives will cause persons for form intentions; it is intentions which more directly guide actions. | |
| From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3) | |
| A reaction: This is invites the question of whether there is a sharp distinction between the motive and the action. Detectives look for motives, but law courts look for intentions. |
| 23529 | Conduct is not isolated from its effect on the moral code [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: We must not view conduct in isolation from its effect on the moral code. | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Moderate') | |
| A reaction: The moral code may be excessively conservative, but there is no denying this point. Extreme individualistic libertarians must recognise that 'no man is an island'. |
| 23147 | Good intentions are not necessary for virtue [Driver] |
| Full Idea: I deny the claim that good intentions are necessary for virtue. | |
| From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3) | |
| A reaction: Presumably one could continually do the right thing, because it was your duty or your job, without actually being well motivated for it. |
| 23144 | Virtue should be defined by consequences, not by states of mind [Driver] |
| Full Idea: The behavioural aspects of virtue are more important than its phenomenology, because virtue is best defined along consequentialist lines. | |
| From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is the thesis of her paper. Quite persuasive. Consequences are, of course, important in all moral theories (even Kant's). She doesn't rely on human nature. The social virtues vary according to the circumstances, such as gossiping in wartime. |
| 23148 | Virtues are character traits or dispositions which produce good consequences for others [Driver] |
| Full Idea: A moral virtue is a character trait (a disposition or cluster of dispositions) which, generally speaking, produces good consequences for others. | |
| From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3) | |
| A reaction: There are self-directed virtues, such as keeping fit and healthy. There are virtues for ways to receive the kindness of others. That said, I like this idea. |
| 23150 | Control of pregnancy and knowledge of paternity have downgraded chastity [Driver] |
| Full Idea: Women now have more control over becoming pregnant. Men can now be more certain of paternity, without the constraint of female chastity. Hence chastity is no longer considered a moral virtue. | |
| From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 5) | |
| A reaction: A persuasive argument that virtues are defined by their consequences (to which I add my example of gossiping in wartime). Different social situations and crises promote or relegate the status of certain virtues (such as food hoarding). |
| 23149 | If generosity systematically turned recipients into parasites, it wouldn't be a virtue [Driver] |
| Full Idea: If generosity towards the needy in the long run produced [social] parasites, and if generosity did this systematically, then it would not be a moral virtue. | |
| From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 5) | |
| A reaction: A very persuasive example. Hume has similar views - that we encourage those emotions which have good social outcomes. |
| 23530 | The great danger of democracy is that the oppression of the minority becomes unobjectionable [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: For Mill and De Tocqueville the greatest of the dangers was not that in fact the majority might use their power to oppress a minority, but that, with the spread of democratic ideas, it might come to be thought unobjectionable that they should do so. | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], III 'Populism') | |
| A reaction: This was vivid in the 2016 Brexit referendum, which was 52-48 in favour of leaving. There were lots voices saying 'you lost, get over it'. It should be a basic (if neglected) principle that the winners of elections now represent the whole population. |
| 23522 | In an organised society all actions have some effect on other people [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: In an organised society it is impossible to identify classes of actions which harm no one, or no one but the individual who does them. | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Enforcement') | |
| A reaction: This is attributed to 'some critics' of Mill. I agree with this. The idea that actions performed behind close doors never come to influence social life is an illusion, held by people whose quest for freedom is selfish. |
| 23528 | The value of liberty allows freedom of action, even if that distresses other people [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: Recognition of individual liberty as a value involves, as a minimum, acceptance of the principle that the individual may do what he wants, even if others are distressed when the learn what it is that he does. | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Private') | |
| A reaction: He notes that there could be other reasons to block the freedom, such as harm done. This idea seems to identify a key component of liberalism - that we must all tolerate actions which we dislike. |
| 23523 | The principle of legality requires crimes to be precisely defined in advance of any action [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: The principle of legality requires criminal offences to be as precisely defined as possible, so that it can be known with reasonable certainty beforehand what acts are criminal and what are not. | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Conspiracy') | |
| A reaction: Hart is discussing a breach of this, where moral judgements are used to condemn something which was not obviously illegal. Families and schools don't have such precise rules, but it seems needed in a vast and pluralistic society. |
| 23524 | Some private moral issues are no concern of the law [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: An official report [of 1957] on homosexuality declared that 'there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's business'. | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Conspiracy') | |
| A reaction: We might wonder whether these issues are actually moral, if the law is not interested in them. Are they just a matter of taste? The law doesn't enforce a preference for Mozart over Salieri. |
| 23521 | Do morals influence law? Is morality an aspect of law? Can law be morally criticised? [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: Four questions: 1) Has the development of law been influenced by morals? 2) Must reference to morality enter into an adequate definition of law or legal system? 3) Is law open to moral criticism? 4) Does immorality justify legal punishment? | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Enforcement') | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Three nice questions, which are his agenda for the book. It is obvious that immoral laws can be created, and that laws can be criticised for being too concerned with morality, so there is no clear general answer to these dilemmas. |
| 23525 | Is the enforcement of morality morally justifiable? [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: The question about morality and the law is also a question of morality - of whether the enforcement of morality is morally justified. | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], I 'Positive') | |
| A reaction: This is a very nice meta-moral question. What moral standards are used to justify the enforcement of moral standards? Presumably there should be no contradiction between the levels, to brutally enforce softness, or softly recommend brutality? |
| 23526 | Modern law still suppresses practices seen as immoral, and yet harmless [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: English and American law still [in1963] contain rules which suppress practices condemned as immoral by positive morality though they involve nothing that would be ordinarily thought of as harm to other persons. | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Use') | |
| A reaction: He says most of the examples of this concern sexual practices. In the UK we have moved away from such laws, but many states of the USA still maintain them (or are reintroducing them, in 2023). |
| 23527 | Moral wickedness of an offence is always relevant to the degree of punishment [Hart,HLA] |
| Full Idea: Leslie Stephen argued that when the question is how severely an offender should be punished, an estimate of the degree of moral wickedness involved in the crime is always relevant. | |
| From: H.L.A. Hart (Law,Liberty and Morality [1963], II 'Moral') | |
| A reaction: [Stephen 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' 1873] The degree of responsibility (after excuses etc.) is obviously also highly relevant. If vicious murder is punished more harshly, that seems to be an assessment of the character of the murderer. |