22235
|
Feelings are not unchanging, but have a history (especially if they are noble) [Foucault]
|
|
Full Idea:
We believe that feelings are immutable, but every sentiment, particularly the most noble and disinterested, has a history.
|
|
From:
Michel Foucault (Nietzsche, Genealogy, History [1971], p.86), quoted by Johanna Oksala - How to Read Foucault 5
|
|
A reaction:
This is the sort of remark that makes me think Foucault is worth reading. Aristotle thought you could teach correct feelings. That implies that you can also teach incorrect feelings.
|
11214
|
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
|
|
Full Idea:
The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A.
|
|
From:
Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV)
|
|
A reaction:
[compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role).
|
6004
|
The cardinal virtues are theoretical (based on knowledge), and others are 'non-theoretical' [Hecato, by Dorandi]
|
|
Full Idea:
Hecato defined the cardinal virtues as 'theoretical', that is, based on knowledge, and to these he opposed those that are 'non-theoretical', for example, health, beauty, strength of spirit, and courage.
|
|
From:
report of Hecato (fragments/reports [c.70 BCE]) by Tiziano Dorandi - Hecato of Rhodes
|
|
A reaction:
Mostly these are Aristotle's external and non-external virtues, except that courage is here included among the former, implying, presumably, that it is more of a natural gift than an intellectual achievement.
|