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All the ideas for '', 'A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd)' and 'Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton)'

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38 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both [Lewis]
     Full Idea: All circles of interdefinition are useless by themselves. But if we reach one of the interdefined pair, then we have them both.
     From: David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998], IV)
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Until the 1960s the only semantics was truth-tables [Enderton]
     Full Idea: Until the 1960s standard truth-table semantics were the only ones that there were.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.10.1)
     A reaction: The 1960s presumably marked the advent of possible worlds.
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / a. Symbols of ST
'dom R' indicates the 'domain' of objects having a relation [Enderton]
     Full Idea: 'dom R' indicates the 'domain' of a relation, that is, the set of all objects that are members of ordered pairs and that have that relation.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
'fld R' indicates the 'field' of all objects in the relation [Enderton]
     Full Idea: 'fld R' indicates the 'field' of a relation, that is, the set of all objects that are members of ordered pairs on either side of the relation.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
'ran R' indicates the 'range' of objects being related to [Enderton]
     Full Idea: 'ran R' indicates the 'range' of a relation, that is, the set of all objects that are members of ordered pairs and that are related to by the first objects.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
We write F:A→B to indicate that A maps into B (the output of F on A is in B) [Enderton]
     Full Idea: We write F : A → B to indicate that A maps into B, that is, the domain of relating things is set A, and the things related to are all in B. If we add that F = B, then A maps 'onto' B.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
'F(x)' is the unique value which F assumes for a value of x [Enderton]
     Full Idea: F(x) is a 'function', which indicates the unique value which y takes in ∈ F. That is, F(x) is the value y which F assumes at x.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
A relation is 'symmetric' on a set if every ordered pair has the relation in both directions [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A relation is 'symmetric' on a set if every ordered pair in the set has the relation in both directions.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
A relation is 'transitive' if it can be carried over from two ordered pairs to a third [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A relation is 'transitive' on a set if the relation can be carried over from two ordered pairs to a third.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
The 'powerset' of a set is all the subsets of a given set [Enderton]
     Full Idea: The 'powerset' of a set is all the subsets of a given set. Thus: PA = {x : x ⊆ A}.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
Two sets are 'disjoint' iff their intersection is empty [Enderton]
     Full Idea: Two sets are 'disjoint' iff their intersection is empty (i.e. they have no members in common).
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
A 'domain' of a relation is the set of members of ordered pairs in the relation [Enderton]
     Full Idea: The 'domain' of a relation is the set of all objects that are members of ordered pairs that are members of the relation.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
A 'relation' is a set of ordered pairs [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A 'relation' is a set of ordered pairs. The ordering relation on the numbers 0-3 is captured by - in fact it is - the set of ordered pairs {<0,1>,<0,2>,<0,3>,<1,2>,<1,3>,<2,3>}.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
     A reaction: This can't quite be a definition of order among numbers, since it relies on the notion of a 'ordered' pair.
A 'function' is a relation in which each object is related to just one other object [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A 'function' is a relation which is single-valued. That is, for each object, there is only one object in the function set to which that object is related.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
A function 'maps A into B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are all in B [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A function 'maps A into B' if the domain of relating things is set A, and the things related to are all in B.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
A function 'maps A onto B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are set B [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A function 'maps A onto B' if the domain of relating things is set A, and the things related to are set B.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
A relation is 'reflexive' on a set if every member bears the relation to itself [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A relation is 'reflexive' on a set if every member of the set bears the relation to itself.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
A relation satisfies 'trichotomy' if all pairs are either relations, or contain identical objects [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A relation satisfies 'trichotomy' on a set if every ordered pair is related (in either direction), or the objects are identical.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
A set is 'dominated' by another if a one-to-one function maps the first set into a subset of the second [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A set is 'dominated' by another if a one-to-one function maps the first set into a subset of the second.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / e. Equivalence classes
An 'equivalence relation' is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive binary relation [Enderton]
     Full Idea: An 'equivalence relation' is a binary relation which is reflexive, and symmetric, and transitive.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
We 'partition' a set into distinct subsets, according to each relation on its objects [Enderton]
     Full Idea: Equivalence classes will 'partition' a set. That is, it will divide it into distinct subsets, according to each relation on the set.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], Ch.0)
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Inference not from content, but from the fact that it was said, is 'conversational implicature' [Enderton]
     Full Idea: The process is dubbed 'conversational implicature' when the inference is not from the content of what has been said, but from the fact that it has been said.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.7.3)
If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II)
     A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts.
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
Validity is either semantic (what preserves truth), or proof-theoretic (following procedures) [Enderton]
     Full Idea: The point of logic is to give an account of the notion of validity,..in two standard ways: the semantic way says that a valid inference preserves truth (symbol |=), and the proof-theoretic way is defined in terms of purely formal procedures (symbol |-).
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.1.3..)
     A reaction: This division can be mirrored in mathematics, where it is either to do with counting or theorising about things in the physical world, or following sets of rules from axioms. Language can discuss reality, or play word-games.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000])
     A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge.
The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III)
     A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value.
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
A logical truth or tautology is a logical consequence of the empty set [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A is a logical truth (tautology) (|= A) iff it is a semantic consequence of the empty set of premises (φ |= A), that is, every interpretation makes A true.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.3.4)
     A reaction: So the final column of every line of the truth table will be T.
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
A truth assignment to the components of a wff 'satisfy' it if the wff is then True [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A truth assignment 'satisfies' a formula, or set of formulae, if it evaluates as True when all of its components have been assigned truth values.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.2)
     A reaction: [very roughly what Enderton says!] The concept becomes most significant when a large set of wff's is pronounced 'satisfied' after a truth assignment leads to them all being true.
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
A proof theory is 'sound' if its valid inferences entail semantic validity [Enderton]
     Full Idea: If every proof-theoretically valid inference is semantically valid (so that |- entails |=), the proof theory is said to be 'sound'.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.1.7)
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
A proof theory is 'complete' if semantically valid inferences entail proof-theoretic validity [Enderton]
     Full Idea: If every semantically valid inference is proof-theoretically valid (so that |= entails |-), the proof-theory is said to be 'complete'.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.1.7)
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Proof in finite subsets is sufficient for proof in an infinite set [Enderton]
     Full Idea: If a wff is tautologically implied by a set of wff's, it is implied by a finite subset of them; and if every finite subset is satisfiable, then so is the whole set of wff's.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 2.5)
     A reaction: [Enderton's account is more symbolic] He adds that this also applies to models. It is a 'theorem' because it can be proved. It is a major theorem in logic, because it brings the infinite under control, and who doesn't want that?
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 7. Decidability
Expressions are 'decidable' if inclusion in them (or not) can be proved [Enderton]
     Full Idea: A set of expressions is 'decidable' iff there exists an effective procedure (qv) that, given some expression, will decide whether or not the expression is included in the set (i.e. doesn't contradict it).
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.7)
     A reaction: This is obviously a highly desirable feature for a really reliable system of expressions to possess. All finite sets are decidable, but some infinite sets are not.
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
For a reasonable language, the set of valid wff's can always be enumerated [Enderton]
     Full Idea: The Enumerability Theorem says that for a reasonable language, the set of valid wff's can be effectively enumerated.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 2.5)
     A reaction: There are criteria for what makes a 'reasonable' language (probably specified to ensure enumerability!). Predicates and functions must be decidable, and the language must be finite.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Lewis, by Cameron]
     Full Idea: Lewis revised his analysis of duplication because he had assumed that as a matter of necessity perfectly natural properties are intrinsic, and that necessarily how a thing is intrinsically is determined completely by the natural properties it has.
     From: report of David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998]) by Ross P. Cameron - Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties 'Analysis'
     A reaction: [This compares Lewis 1986:61 with Langton and Lewis 1998] I am keen on both intrinsic and on natural properties, but I have not yet confronted this little problem. Time for a displacement activity, I think....
A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates [Lewis]
     Full Idea: A property is 'intrinsic' iff it never can differ between duplicates; iff whenever two things (actual or possible) are duplicates, either both of them have the property or both of them lack it.
     From: David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998], IV)
     A reaction: This leaves me wondering how one could arrive at a precise definition of 'duplicates'. Can it be done without mentioning that they have the same intrinsic properties?
Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The property of being an ellipsoidal star would seem offhand to be a basic intrinsic property, but it is incompatible (nomologically) with being an isolated object.
     From: David Lewis (Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton) [1998], V)
     A reaction: Another nice example from Lewis. It makes you wonder whether the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction should go. Modern physics, with its 'entanglements', doesn't seem to suit the distinction.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
Sentences with 'if' are only conditionals if they can read as A-implies-B [Enderton]
     Full Idea: Not all sentences using 'if' are conditionals. Consider 'if you want a banana, there is one in the kitchen'. The rough test is that a conditional can be rewritten as 'that A implies that B'.
     From: Herbert B. Enderton (A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd) [2001], 1.6.4)
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A.
     From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV)
     A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role).