18 ideas
1765 | Diogenes said avoidance of philosophy is the lack of a desire to live properly [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: When a man said that he was not suited to philosophy, Diogenes said to him, 'Why then do you live, if you have no desire to live properly.' | |
From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6 | |
A reaction: Meaning philosophy is already more practice than theory. |
21054 | Reason enables the unbounded extension of our rules and intentions [Kant] |
Full Idea: Reason, in a creature, is a faculty which enables that creature to extend far beyond the limits of natural instinct the rules and intentions it follows in using its various powers, and the range of its project is unbounded. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], 2nd) | |
A reaction: I'm inclined to identify the mind's creation of universals as the source of this power, rather than reason. Generalisations are infinitely extensible. Cantor's infinities are a nice example. Can't ideas be extended irrationally? |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
1762 | When someone denied motion, Diogenes got up and walked away [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Diogenes replied to one who asserted that there was no such thing as motion by getting up and walking away. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6 |
21053 | The manifest will in the world of phenomena has to conform to the laws of nature [Kant] |
Full Idea: Whatever conception of the freedom of the will one may form in terms of metaphysics, the will's manifestations in the world of phenomena, i.e. human actions, are determined in accordance with natural laws, as is every other natural event. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], Intro) | |
A reaction: So free will either requires total substance dualism, or it is best described as transcendental fictionalism. This seems to imply the Leibnizian idea that metaphysics contains facts which having nothing to do with the physical world. |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
7813 | Cynicism was open to anyone, and needed neither education nor sophistication [Diogenes of Sin., by Grayling] |
Full Idea: An advantage of Cynicism was that it was open to anyone who could grasp its simple teachings. Understanding it required neither education nor sophistication. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.3 | |
A reaction: This was the source of the well-known opposition of Diogenes to Plato's Academy, and it makes him a key predecessor of the teachings of Jesus. Personally I think the really good life is difficult, and it needs education and careful rational thought. |
1763 | Diogenes said a plucked chicken fits Plato's definition of man [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Plato defined man as a two-footed featherless animal, so Diogenes plucked a cock and brought it into the school, and said, 'This is Plato's man'. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6 | |
A reaction: You have to be very serious about your philosophy to enact your counterexamples, rather than just suggest them. Which university will actually reconstruct the Trolley Problem? |
5071 | The Cynics rejected what is conventional as irrational, and aimed to live by nature [Taylor,R on Diogenes of Sin.] |
Full Idea: The Cynics were convinced of the purely conventional foundation of Athenian values, which meant they had no rational foundation at all. They therefore rejected them in favour of what is correct and worthwhile by nature. | |
From: comment on Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Richard Taylor - Virtue Ethics: an Introduction Ch.8 | |
A reaction: This shows how the Cynics are key players in the progress of the nomos-physis debate, which keeps resurfacing as relativism vs absolutism, cognitivism vs non-cognitivism, and even romanticism vs classicism. The trouble is, convention is natural! |
7812 | For peace of mind, you need self-government, indifference and independence [Diogenes of Sin.] |
Full Idea: There are three essential conditions for peace of mind: autarchy, apathy and freedom. Autarchy is self-government and self-sufficiency; apathy is indifference to what the world can do to you; the freedom is from dependence and possessions. | |
From: Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]), quoted by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.3 | |
A reaction: Quite good advice, but I don't see 'peace of mind' as the highest human ideal. The basic suggestion here is live alone and do nothing. Certainly don't get married, or have children, or try to achieve anything. |
1764 | Diogenes said he was a citizen of the world [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Diogenes said he was a citizen of no country, but of the world. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6 |
5968 | Diogenes masturbated in public, wishing he could get rid of hunger so easily [Diogenes of Sin., by Plutarch] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus praises Diogenes for saying to bystanders as he masturbated in public, "Would that I could thus rub the hunger too out of my belly". | |
From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1044b | |
A reaction: So it is not quite true that people only need corn and water. Diogenes' remark doesn't explain why he did it in public. Was it to defy local convention (as befits a citizen of the world), or was it to teach? |
21055 | Our aim is a constitution which combines maximum freedom with strong restraint [Kant] |
Full Idea: The highest task which nature has set mankind is to establish a society in which freedom under external laws would be combined to the greatest possible extent with irresistible force, in other words of establishing a perfectly just constitution. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], 5th) | |
A reaction: The 'force' is to restrict the harms that may result from individual freedom. This seems to equate justice with liberal freedom. Force can prevent direct harm to others, but what to do about indirect harm? Many lack freedom, but whose fault is it? |
21056 | The vitality of business needs maximum freedom (while avoiding harm to others) [Kant] |
Full Idea: If the citizen is deterred from seeking his personal welfare in any way he chooses which is consistent with the freedom of others, the vitality of business in general and hence also the strength of the whole are held in check. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], 8th) | |
A reaction: This is a rather American view of liberalism. Kant has been praising the virtues of aggressive competition. |
1766 | Diogenes said that the most excellent thing among men was freedom of speech [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Diogenes said that the most excellent thing among men was freedom of speech. | |
From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6 |
21057 | The highest ideal of social progress is a universal cosmopolitan existence [Kant] |
Full Idea: There is hope that the highest purpose of nature, a universal cosmopolitan existence, will at last be realised as the matrix within which all the original capacities of the human race may develop. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Idea for a Universal History [1784], 8th) | |
A reaction: Apart from Diogenes of Sinope, Kant seems to have been the first great champion of the cosmopolitan ideal. As I write (2018) the western world is putting up growing barriers against immigrants. I think my response may be to adopt Kantian cosmopolitanism. |