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All the ideas for 'What is Logic?st1=Ian Hacking', 'Answer to 'What is Enlightenment?'' and 'Mathematical Methods in Philosophy'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
A decent modern definition should always imply a semantics [Hacking]
     Full Idea: Today we expect that anything worth calling a definition should imply a semantics.
     From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §10)
     A reaction: He compares this with Gentzen 1935, who was attempting purely syntactic definitions of the logical connectives.
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / d. Basic theorems of PL
'Thinning' ('dilution') is the key difference between deduction (which allows it) and induction [Hacking]
     Full Idea: 'Dilution' (or 'Thinning') provides an essential contrast between deductive and inductive reasoning; for the introduction of new premises may spoil an inductive inference.
     From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §06.2)
     A reaction: That is, inductive logic (if there is such a thing) is clearly non-monotonic, whereas classical inductive logic is monotonic.
Gentzen's Cut Rule (or transitivity of deduction) is 'If A |- B and B |- C, then A |- C' [Hacking]
     Full Idea: If A |- B and B |- C, then A |- C. This generalises to: If Γ|-A,Θ and Γ,A |- Θ, then Γ |- Θ. Gentzen called this 'cut'. It is the transitivity of a deduction.
     From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §06.3)
     A reaction: I read the generalisation as 'If A can be either a premise or a conclusion, you can bypass it'. The first version is just transitivity (which by-passes the middle step).
Only Cut reduces complexity, so logic is constructive without it, and it can be dispensed with [Hacking]
     Full Idea: Only the cut rule can have a conclusion that is less complex than its premises. Hence when cut is not used, a derivation is quite literally constructive, building up from components. Any theorem obtained by cut can be obtained without it.
     From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §08)
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
The various logics are abstractions made from terms like 'if...then' in English [Hacking]
     Full Idea: I don't believe English is by nature classical or intuitionistic etc. These are abstractions made by logicians. Logicians attend to numerous different objects that might be served by 'If...then', like material conditional, strict or relevant implication.
     From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §15)
     A reaction: The idea that they are 'abstractions' is close to my heart. Abstractions from what? Surely 'if...then' has a standard character when employed in normal conversation?
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
First-order logic is the strongest complete compact theory with Löwenheim-Skolem [Hacking]
     Full Idea: First-order logic is the strongest complete compact theory with a Löwenheim-Skolem theorem.
     From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13)
A limitation of first-order logic is that it cannot handle branching quantifiers [Hacking]
     Full Idea: Henkin proved that there is no first-order treatment of branching quantifiers, which do not seem to involve any idea that is fundamentally different from ordinary quantification.
     From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13)
     A reaction: See Hacking for an example of branching quantifiers. Hacking is impressed by this as a real limitation of the first-order logic which he generally favours.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Second-order completeness seems to need intensional entities and possible worlds [Hacking]
     Full Idea: Second-order logic has no chance of a completeness theorem unless one ventures into intensional entities and possible worlds.
     From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13)
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 9. Philosophical Logic
Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: Three periods can be distinguished in philosophical logic: the syntactic stage, from Russell's definite descriptions to the 1950s, the dominance of possible world semantics from the 50s to 80s, and a current widening of the subject.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 1)
     A reaction: [compressed] I've read elsewhere that the arrival of Tarski's account of truth in 1933, taking things beyond the syntactic, was also a landmark.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: Logical formalization forces the investigator to make the central philosophical concepts precise. It can also show how some philosophical concepts and objects can be defined in terms of others.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 2)
     A reaction: This is the main rationale of the highly formal and mathematical approach to such things. The downside is when you impose 'precision' on language that was never intended to be precise.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
With a pure notion of truth and consequence, the meanings of connectives are fixed syntactically [Hacking]
     Full Idea: My doctrine is that the peculiarity of the logical constants resides precisely in that given a certain pure notion of truth and consequence, all the desirable semantic properties of the constants are determined by their syntactic properties.
     From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §09)
     A reaction: He opposes this to Peacocke 1976, who claims that the logical connectives are essentially semantic in character, concerned with the preservation of truth.
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
Perhaps variables could be dispensed with, by arrows joining places in the scope of quantifiers [Hacking]
     Full Idea: For some purposes the variables of first-order logic can be regarded as prepositions and place-holders that could in principle be dispensed with, say by a system of arrows indicating what places fall in the scope of which quantifier.
     From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §11)
     A reaction: I tend to think of variables as either pronouns, or as definite descriptions, or as temporary names, but not as prepositions. Must address this new idea...
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: A (logical) model is a set with functions and relations defined on it that specify the denotation of the non-logical vocabulary. A series of recursive clauses explicate how truth values of complex sentences are compositionally determined from the parts.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 3)
     A reaction: See the ideas on 'Functions in logic' and 'Relations in logic' (in the alphabetical list) to expand this important idea.
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
If it is a logic, the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem holds for it [Hacking]
     Full Idea: A Löwenheim-Skolem theorem holds for anything which, on my delineation, is a logic.
     From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13)
     A reaction: I take this to be an unusually conservative view. Shapiro is the chap who can give you an alternative view of these things, or Boolos.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: If there is indeed no property of existence that is expressed by the word 'exist', then it makes no sense to ask for its essence.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 2)
     A reaction: As far as I can tell, this was exactly Aristotle's conclusion, so he skirted round the question of 'being qua being', and focused on the nature of objects instead. Grand continental talk of 'Being' doesn't sound very interesting.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: A Tarskian model can in a sense be seen as a model of a possible state of affairs.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 3)
     A reaction: I include this remark to show how possible worlds semantics built on the arrival of model theory.
The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: The notion of a possible worlds model was extended (resulting in the concept of a 'spheres model') in order to obtain a satisfactory logical treatment of counterfactual conditional sentences.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 4)
     A reaction: Thus we add 'centred' worlds, and an 'actual' world, to the loose original model. It is important to remember when we discuss 'close' worlds that we are then committed to these presuppositions.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: The idea of 'impossible worlds' was introduced into epistemic logic.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 4)
     A reaction: Nathan Salmon seems interested in their role in metaphysics (presumably in relation to Meinongian impossible objects, like circular squares, which must necessarily be circular).
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: Each possible worlds model contains a set of possible worlds. For this reason, possible worlds semantics is often charged with smuggling in heavy metaphysical commitments.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 3)
     A reaction: To a beginner it looks very odd that you should try to explain possibility by constructing a model of it in terms of 'possible' worlds.
Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: When the possible worlds semantics were further extended to model notions of knowledge and of moral obligation, the application was beginning to look distinctly forced and artificial.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 5)
     A reaction: They accept lots of successes in modelling necessity and time.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Enlightenment requires the free use of reason in the public realm [Kant]
     Full Idea: The public use of man's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men; the private use of reason may quite often be very narrowly restricted (…in a particular civil post or office).
     From: Immanuel Kant (Answer to 'What is Enlightenment?' [1784], p.55)
     A reaction: The private aspect seems to be the common restriction on speech by employees of the state. Does free speech have only instrumental value? Is the life of virtue possible without it?