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All the ideas for 'The Meaning of the Word', 'Philosophical Analysis' and 'Tropes'

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6 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analysis aims at the structure of facts, which are needed to give a rationale to analysis [Urmson, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Urmson explains the direction of analysis as 'towards a structure...more nearly similar to the structure of the fact', adding that this metaphysical picture is needed as a 'rationale of the practice of analysis'.
     From: report of J.O. Urmson (Philosophical Analysis [1956], p.24-5) by Jonathan Schaffer - On What Grounds What n30
     A reaction: In other words, only realists can be truly motivated to keep going with analysis. Merely analysing language-games is doable, but hardly exciting.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
You can only define a statement that something is 'true' by referring to its functional possibilities [James]
     Full Idea: Pragmatism insists that statements and beliefs are inertly and statically true only by courtesy: they practically pass for true; but you cannot define what you mean by calling them true without referring to their functional possibilities.
     From: William James (The Meaning of the Word "Truth" [1907], p.2)
     A reaction: I think this clarifies an objection to pragmatism, because all functional definitions (e.g. of the mind, or of moral behaviour) are preceded by the question of WHY this thing is able to function in this way. What special quality makes this possible?
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true [James]
     Full Idea: On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true.
     From: William James (The Meaning of the Word "Truth" [1907], p.299), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 35 'Prag'
     A reaction: How you get from 'widely satisfactory' to 'true' is beyond my comprehension. This is dangerous nonsense. This view of truth seems to be a commonplace in American culture. Peirce hurray! James boo! James accepted verification, where possible.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
We might treat both tropes and substances as fundamental, so we can't presume it is just tropes [Daly]
     Full Idea: Since C.B. Martin accepts both tropes and substances as fundamental, the claim that tropes are the only fundamental constituents is a further, independent claim.
     From: Chris Daly (Tropes [1995], §4)
     A reaction: A dubious mode of argument. Martin may only make the claim because he is ignorant, of facts or of language. Why are some tropes perfectly similar? Is it the result of something more fundamental?
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
More than one trope (even identical ones!) can occupy the same location [Daly]
     Full Idea: More than one trope can occupy the same spatio-temporal location, and it even seems possible for a pair of exactly resembling tropes to occupy the same spatio-temporal location.
     From: Chris Daly (Tropes [1995], §6)
     A reaction: This may be the strongest objection to tropes. Being disc-shaped and red would occupy the same location. Aristotle's example of mixing white with white (Idea 557) would be the second case. Individuation of these 'particulars' is the problem.
If tropes are linked by the existence of concurrence, a special relation is needed to link them all [Daly]
     Full Idea: To explain how tropes form bundles, concurrence relations are invoked. But tropes F and G and a concurrence relation C don't ensure that F stands in C to G. So trope theory needs 'instantiation' relations (special relational tropes) after all.
     From: Chris Daly (Tropes [1995], §7)
     A reaction: Campbell presents relations as 'second-order' items dependent on tropes (Idea 8525), but that seems unclear. Daly's argument resembles Russell's (which he likes), that some sort of universal is inescapable. It also resembles Bradley's regress (7966).