24 ideas
21032 | Speak truth only to those who deserve the truth [Sandel] |
Full Idea: The duty to tell the truth applies only to those who deserve the truth. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05) | |
A reaction: [from Benjamin Constant, in opposition to Kant] I prefer the idea that we should use people 'after our own honour and dignity' (Hamlet), which means speaking the truth even to Donald Trump (for those of you who remember 2018). But not always. |
21033 | Careful evasions of truth at least show respect for it [Sandel] |
Full Idea: A carefully crafted evasion pays homage to truth-telling in a way that an outright lie does not. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05) | |
A reaction: Nicely put. He refers to an incident in Kant's life. I think of the great equivocation controversy at the time of the 1605 Gunpowder Plot. See the porter in Macbeth. All I ask is that people care about the truth. Many people don't. Why? |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
8825 | It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data [Kim] |
Full Idea: It is agreed on all hands that the classical epistemological project, conceived as one of deductively validating physical knowledge from indubitable sensory data, cannot succeed. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (What is 'naturalized epistemology'? [1988], p.304) | |
A reaction: This is the 'Enlightenment Project', which had a parallel in morality. Kim refers to the difficulty as 'The Humean Predicament'. Hume also hoped that induction might be deductive. One obvious move is to expand from 'deduction' to 'reason'. |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
21036 | Not all deals are fair deals [Sandel] |
Full Idea: The mere fact that you and I make a deal is not enough to make it fair. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) |
21038 | Does consent create the obligation, or must there be some benefit? [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Legal thinkers have debated this question for a long time: can consent create an obligation on its own, or is some element of benefit or reliance required? | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) | |
A reaction: Clearly mere consent could be under some compulsion, either by the other party, or by some other forces. Keeping a deathbed promise usually brings no benefit, but is a matter of honour. Ah, honour! Can anyone remember what that is? |
21039 | Moral contracts involve both consent and reciprocity; making the deal, and keeping it [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Despite a tendency to read consent into moral claims, it is hard to make sense of our morality without acknowledging the independent weight of reciprocity. If my wife is unfaithful I have two different grounds of outrage: our promise, and my loyalty. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) | |
A reaction: The point is that Hobbes and co over-simplify what a contract is. Compare a contract with a promise. One must be two-sided, the other can be one-sided. |
21030 | The categorical imperative is not the Golden Rule, which concerns contingent desires [Sandel] |
Full Idea: The Golden Rule depends on contingent facts about how people like to be treated. The categorical imperative asks that we abstract from such contingencies and respect persons as rational beings, regardless of what they might want in particular situations. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05) | |
A reaction: I think the Golden Rule is wrong for a different reason. It assumes that we all want similar things, which we don't. Focus on other people's needs, not yours. |
21031 | Man cannot dispose of himself, because he is not a thing to be owned [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Man cannot dispose over himself because he is not a thing; he is not his own property. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05) | |
A reaction: [Kant lecture note] This is an important qualification to persons as ends. If a person owned themselves, that would separate the person from what they owned. Sandel mentions selling your own organs. Kant is considering prostitution. Why is slavery wrong? |
21035 | Just visiting (and using roads) is hardly ratifying the Constitution [Sandel] |
Full Idea: It is hard to see how just passing through town is morally akin to ratifying the Constitution. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) | |
A reaction: They say that philosophical ideas are never refuted, and no progress is made, but this sure put paid to John Locke. |
21037 | A ratified constitution may not be a just constitution [Sandel] |
Full Idea: The fact that a constitution is ratified by the people does not prove that its provisions are just. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) | |
A reaction: Yes indeed. And the fact that a majority won a referendum does not make their decision wise. Hence all constitutions must be open to evaluation. Gun laws in the US are the obvious example. |
21034 | A just constitution harmonises the different freedoms [Sandel] |
Full Idea: As Kant sees it, a just constitution aims at harmonising each individual's freedom with that of everyone else. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05) | |
A reaction: [source?] Nice statement of the project. I increasingly see political philosophy as constitution design. I say philosophers have got fifty years to design an optimum constitution, and they should then down tools and promote it, in simple language. |
21049 | Liberal freedom was a response to assigned destinies like caste and class [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Liberal freedom developed as an antidote to political theories that consigned persons to destinies fixed by caste or class, station or rank, custom, tradition or inherited status. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 09) | |
A reaction: Virtually all human beings before modern times found that they had been 'assigned destinies'. The huge exception is war, especially civil war, which must be a huge liberation for many people, despite the danger. |
21040 | Libertarians just want formal equality in a free market; the meritocratic view wants fair equality [Sandel] |
Full Idea: The libertarian view of distributive justice is a free market with formal equality of opportunity. The meritocratic view is a free market with fair equality of opportunity. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) | |
A reaction: The obvious question is what has to be done, by intervention, to make the market fair. There are two major rival views of equality here. Is the starting point fair, and is the race itself fair? |
21028 | We can approach justice through welfare, or freedom, or virtue [Sandel] |
Full Idea: We have identified three ways of approaching the distribution of goods: welfare, freedom and virtue. ...and these are three ways of thinking about justice. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 01) | |
A reaction: Virtue is Sandel's distinctively Aristotelian contribution to the problem. The best known instance of justice is punishment, which is a distribution of harms. |
21027 | Justice concerns how a society distributes what it prizes - wealth, rights, power and honours [Sandel] |
Full Idea: To ask whether a society is just is to ask how we distribute the things we prize - income and wealth, duties and rights, powers and opportunities, offices and honours. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 01) | |
A reaction: There is, of course, the prior question of what things should be controlled by a society for distribution. But there is also justice in the promotional and pay structure of institutions within a society, including private institutions. |
21042 | Should we redress wrongs done by a previous generation? [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Can we ever have a moral responsibility to redress wrongs committed by a previous generation? | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 07) | |
A reaction: Just asking for a friend. It seems to depend on how close we feel to the previous generation. Regretting the crime committed by a beloved parent is one thing. Despising the crime committed by some right bastard who shares my nationality is another. |
21043 | Distributive justice concern deserts, as well as who gets what [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Debates about distributive justice are about not only who gets what but also what qualities are worthy of honour and reward. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 07) | |
A reaction: So the 'undeserving poor' get nuffink? Does just being a human being deserve anything? Obviously yes. That said, we can't deny the concept of 'appropriate reward'. |
21052 | Justice is about how we value things, and not just about distributions [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Justice is not only about the right way to distribute things. It is also about the right way to value things. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 10) | |
A reaction: This is Sandel's distinctively Aristotelian contribution to the justice debate - with which I have great sympathy. And, as he argues, the values of things arise out of assessing their essential natures. |
21048 | Work is not fair if it is negotiated, even in a fair situation, but if it suits the nature of the worker [Sandel] |
Full Idea: For the libertarian free exchange for labour is fair; for Rawls it requires fair background conditions; for Aristotle, for the work to be just it must be suited to the nature of the workers who perform it. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 08) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Aristotle's idea is powerful, and Sandel performs a great service in drawing attention to it. Imagine the key negotiation in an interview being whether this particular work suits your nature! |
21045 | Teleological thinking is essential for social and political issues [Sandel] |
Full Idea: It is not easy to dispense with teleological reasoning in thinking about social institutions and political practices. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 08) | |
A reaction: I think teleological thinking is also indispensable in biology. You can't understand an ear or an eye if you don't know what it is FOR. If it relates to a mind, it is teleological. The eye of a dead person is for nothing. |