26 ideas
13838 | A decent modern definition should always imply a semantics [Hacking] |
Full Idea: Today we expect that anything worth calling a definition should imply a semantics. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §10) | |
A reaction: He compares this with Gentzen 1935, who was attempting purely syntactic definitions of the logical connectives. |
15924 | Predicative definitions are acceptable in mathematics if they distinguish objects, rather than creating them? [Zermelo, by Lavine] |
Full Idea: On Zermelo's view, predicative definitions are not only indispensable to mathematics, but they are unobjectionable since they do not create the objects they define, but merely distinguish them from other objects. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite V.1 | |
A reaction: This seems to have an underlying platonism, that there are hitherto undefined 'objects' lying around awaiting the honour of being defined. Hm. |
13833 | 'Thinning' ('dilution') is the key difference between deduction (which allows it) and induction [Hacking] |
Full Idea: 'Dilution' (or 'Thinning') provides an essential contrast between deductive and inductive reasoning; for the introduction of new premises may spoil an inductive inference. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §06.2) | |
A reaction: That is, inductive logic (if there is such a thing) is clearly non-monotonic, whereas classical inductive logic is monotonic. |
13834 | Gentzen's Cut Rule (or transitivity of deduction) is 'If A |- B and B |- C, then A |- C' [Hacking] |
Full Idea: If A |- B and B |- C, then A |- C. This generalises to: If Γ|-A,Θ and Γ,A |- Θ, then Γ |- Θ. Gentzen called this 'cut'. It is the transitivity of a deduction. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §06.3) | |
A reaction: I read the generalisation as 'If A can be either a premise or a conclusion, you can bypass it'. The first version is just transitivity (which by-passes the middle step). |
13835 | Only Cut reduces complexity, so logic is constructive without it, and it can be dispensed with [Hacking] |
Full Idea: Only the cut rule can have a conclusion that is less complex than its premises. Hence when cut is not used, a derivation is quite literally constructive, building up from components. Any theorem obtained by cut can be obtained without it. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §08) |
17608 | We take set theory as given, and retain everything valuable, while avoiding contradictions [Zermelo] |
Full Idea: Starting from set theory as it is historically given ...we must, on the one hand, restrict these principles sufficiently to exclude as contradiction and, on the other, take them sufficiently wide to retain all that is valuable in this theory. | |
From: Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908], Intro) | |
A reaction: Maddy calls this the one-step-back-from-disaster rule of thumb. Zermelo explicitly mentions the 'Russell antinomy' that blocked Frege's approach to sets. |
17607 | Set theory investigates number, order and function, showing logical foundations for mathematics [Zermelo] |
Full Idea: Set theory is that branch whose task is to investigate mathematically the fundamental notions 'number', 'order', and 'function', taking them in their pristine, simple form, and to develop thereby the logical foundations of all of arithmetic and analysis. | |
From: Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908], Intro) | |
A reaction: At this point Zermelo seems to be a logicist. Right from the start set theory was meant to be foundational to mathematics, and not just a study of the logic of collections. |
10870 | ZFC: Existence, Extension, Specification, Pairing, Unions, Powers, Infinity, Choice [Zermelo, by Clegg] |
Full Idea: Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms: Existence (at least one set); Extension (same elements, same set); Specification (a condition creates a new set); Pairing (two sets make a set); Unions; Powers (all subsets make a set); Infinity (set of successors); Choice | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by Brian Clegg - Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable Ch.15 |
13012 | Zermelo published his axioms in 1908, to secure a controversial proof [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
Full Idea: Zermelo proposed his listed of assumptions (including the controversial Axiom of Choice) in 1908, in order to secure his controversial proof of Cantor's claim that ' we can always bring any well-defined set into the form of a well-ordered set'. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by Penelope Maddy - Believing the Axioms I §1 | |
A reaction: This is interesting because it sometimes looks as if axiom systems are just a way of tidying things up. Presumably it is essential to get people to accept the axioms in their own right, the 'old-fashioned' approach that they be self-evident. |
17609 | Set theory can be reduced to a few definitions and seven independent axioms [Zermelo] |
Full Idea: I intend to show how the entire theory created by Cantor and Dedekind can be reduced to a few definitions and seven principles, or axioms, which appear to be mutually independent. | |
From: Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908], Intro) | |
A reaction: The number of axioms crept up to nine or ten in subsequent years. The point of axioms is maximum reduction and independence from one another. He says nothing about self-evidence (though Boolos claimed a degree of that). |
13017 | Zermelo introduced Pairing in 1930, and it seems fairly obvious [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
Full Idea: Zermelo's Pairing Axiom superseded (in 1930) his original 1908 Axiom of Elementary Sets. Like Union, its only justification seems to rest on 'limitations of size' and on the 'iterative conception'. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by Penelope Maddy - Believing the Axioms I §1.3 | |
A reaction: Maddy says of this and Union, that they seem fairly obvious, but that their justification is of prime importance, if we are to understand what the axioms should be. |
13015 | Zermelo used Foundation to block paradox, but then decided that only Separation was needed [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
Full Idea: Zermelo used a weak form of the Axiom of Foundation to block Russell's paradox in 1906, but in 1908 felt that the form of his Separation Axiom was enough by itself, and left the earlier axiom off his published list. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by Penelope Maddy - Believing the Axioms I §1.2 | |
A reaction: Foundation turns out to be fairly controversial. Barwise actually proposes Anti-Foundation as an axiom. Foundation seems to be the rock upon which the iterative view of sets is built. Foundation blocks infinite descending chains of sets, and circularity. |
13486 | Not every predicate has an extension, but Separation picks the members that satisfy a predicate [Zermelo, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Zermelo assumes that not every predicate has an extension but rather that given a set we may separate out from it those of its members satisfying the predicate. This is called 'separation' (Aussonderung). | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 3 |
13020 | The Axiom of Separation requires set generation up to one step back from contradiction [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
Full Idea: The most characteristic Zermelo axiom is Separation, guided by a new rule of thumb: 'one step back from disaster' - principles of set generation should be as strong as possible short of contradiction. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by Penelope Maddy - Believing the Axioms I §1.4 | |
A reaction: Why is there an underlying assumption that we must have as many sets as possible? We are then tempted to abolish axioms like Foundation, so that we can have even more sets! |
13845 | The various logics are abstractions made from terms like 'if...then' in English [Hacking] |
Full Idea: I don't believe English is by nature classical or intuitionistic etc. These are abstractions made by logicians. Logicians attend to numerous different objects that might be served by 'If...then', like material conditional, strict or relevant implication. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §15) | |
A reaction: The idea that they are 'abstractions' is close to my heart. Abstractions from what? Surely 'if...then' has a standard character when employed in normal conversation? |
13840 | First-order logic is the strongest complete compact theory with Löwenheim-Skolem [Hacking] |
Full Idea: First-order logic is the strongest complete compact theory with a Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13) |
13844 | A limitation of first-order logic is that it cannot handle branching quantifiers [Hacking] |
Full Idea: Henkin proved that there is no first-order treatment of branching quantifiers, which do not seem to involve any idea that is fundamentally different from ordinary quantification. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13) | |
A reaction: See Hacking for an example of branching quantifiers. Hacking is impressed by this as a real limitation of the first-order logic which he generally favours. |
13842 | Second-order completeness seems to need intensional entities and possible worlds [Hacking] |
Full Idea: Second-order logic has no chance of a completeness theorem unless one ventures into intensional entities and possible worlds. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13) |
13837 | With a pure notion of truth and consequence, the meanings of connectives are fixed syntactically [Hacking] |
Full Idea: My doctrine is that the peculiarity of the logical constants resides precisely in that given a certain pure notion of truth and consequence, all the desirable semantic properties of the constants are determined by their syntactic properties. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §09) | |
A reaction: He opposes this to Peacocke 1976, who claims that the logical connectives are essentially semantic in character, concerned with the preservation of truth. |
13839 | Perhaps variables could be dispensed with, by arrows joining places in the scope of quantifiers [Hacking] |
Full Idea: For some purposes the variables of first-order logic can be regarded as prepositions and place-holders that could in principle be dispensed with, say by a system of arrows indicating what places fall in the scope of which quantifier. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §11) | |
A reaction: I tend to think of variables as either pronouns, or as definite descriptions, or as temporary names, but not as prepositions. Must address this new idea... |
13843 | If it is a logic, the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem holds for it [Hacking] |
Full Idea: A Löwenheim-Skolem theorem holds for anything which, on my delineation, is a logic. | |
From: Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §13) | |
A reaction: I take this to be an unusually conservative view. Shapiro is the chap who can give you an alternative view of these things, or Boolos. |
13487 | In ZF, the Burali-Forti Paradox proves that there is no set of all ordinals [Zermelo, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: In Zermelo's set theory, the Burali-Forti Paradox becomes a proof that there is no set of all ordinals (so 'is an ordinal' has no extension). | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 3 |
18178 | For Zermelo the successor of n is {n} (rather than n U {n}) [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
Full Idea: For Zermelo the successor of n is {n} (rather than Von Neumann's successor, which is n U {n}). | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.2 n8 | |
A reaction: I could ask some naive questions about the comparison of these two, but I am too shy about revealing my ignorance. |
13027 | Zermelo believed, and Von Neumann seemed to confirm, that numbers are sets [Zermelo, by Maddy] |
Full Idea: Zermelo was a reductionist, and believed that theorems purportedly about numbers (cardinal or ordinal) are really about sets, and since Von Neumann's definitions of ordinals and cardinals as sets, this has become common doctrine. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by Penelope Maddy - Believing the Axioms I §1.8 | |
A reaction: Frege has a more sophisticated take on this approach. It may just be an updating of the Greek idea that arithmetic is about treating many things as a unit. A set bestows an identity on a group, and that is all that is needed. |
9627 | Different versions of set theory result in different underlying structures for numbers [Zermelo, by Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: In Zermelo's set-theoretic definition of number, 2 is a member of 3, but not a member of 4; in Von Neumann's definition every number is a member of every larger number. This means they have two different structures. | |
From: report of Ernst Zermelo (Investigations in the Foundations of Set Theory I [1908]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 4 | |
A reaction: This refers back to the dilemma highlighted by Benacerraf, which was supposed to be the motivation for structuralism. My intuition says that the best answer is that they are both wrong. In a pattern, the nodes aren't 'members' of one another. |
22230 | Sartre gradually realised that freedom is curtailed by the weight of situation [Sartre, by Daigle] |
Full Idea: Sartre evolved from a notion of absolute freedom to one that truly takes into account the weight of situation. | |
From: report of Jean-Paul Sartre (works [1950]) by Christine Daigle - Jean-Paul Sartre 2.3 | |
A reaction: This change seems to have come much later, in the 1960s. The main influence seems to have been Marxism, which claims that consciousness is created by society, rather than by free individuals. |