12 ideas
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The laws of associations were held to explicate the semantic coherence of intentional processes, which adjust the causal relations among Ideas to reflect corresponding relations among the things that they're ideas of. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.296) | |
A reaction: With the support of evolution, and the backing of a correspondence theory of truth, plus more sophistication in the associations, this might work. |
3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If there is to be an intentional science, there must be semantically evaluable things which have causal powers, and there must be laws relating beliefs and desires to one another, and to actions. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.293) | |
A reaction: The semantics and causation sound fair enough, but the prospect of finding laws looks bleak (though, contrary to Davidson, I don't see why they can't exist). |
3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
Full Idea: It may be that intentional states are relations to mental symbols, and mental processes are implemented by causal relations among these symbols. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.296) | |
A reaction: It is hard to see how something could have causal powers just by being a symbol. The theory needs something else to drive the causation. |
3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
Full Idea: These days most philosophers of mind suppose that most psychological properties are multiply realisable. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.298) | |
A reaction: This is just speculation. The physical part may seem very different, but turn out to be identical in the ways that matter (like a knife made of two different metals). |
3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Folk psychology is primarily intentional explanation; it's the idea that people's behaviour can be explained by reference to the contents of their beliefs and desires. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.292) | |
A reaction: Sounds good. To reject folk psychology (as reductivists tend to) is to reject the existence of significant intentional states which have causal properties |
3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
Full Idea: It is hard to see how the extrinsic properties of thoughts could supervene on their intrinsic properties. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.299) | |
A reaction: This doesn't seem a big problem. Sometimes represented experiences establish the match; sometimes the match is not very good, or even wrong. |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Laws are true generalisations that support counterfactuals and are confirmed by their instances. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (Jerry A. Fodor on himself [1994], p.293) | |
A reaction: This seems correct, but it doesn't disentangle laws as mental states from laws as features of nature |
19414 | Men are related to animals, which are related to plants, then to fossils, and then to the apparently inert [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: Men are related to animals, these to plants, and the latter directly to fossils which will be linked in their turn to bodies which the senses and the imagination represent to us as perfectly dead and formless. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Varignon [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: Leibniz would be a bit surprised to find the way in which this has turned out to be largely true, since he is basing it on his picture of a hierarchy of monads. Nevertheless, the idea that we are all related wasn't invented in 1859. |