7 ideas
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
| A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
| A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
| A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
| 18671 | The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing] |
| Full Idea: The ground for an attitude lies not in some other ethical concept, goodness, but in the concrete, factual characteristics of what we pronounce good. ...We shall not be better off if we interpolate an indefinable characteristic of goodness besides. | |
| From: A.C. Ewing (The Definition of Good [1948], p.172), quoted by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 1.4 | |
| A reaction: This is a forerunner of Scanlon's Buck-Passing theory of the source of value (in other properties). I approve of this approach. If I say 'actually this very strong cheese is really good', I'm not adding goodness to the cheese. |
| 21989 | Man is dominated by money, which is the essence of his alienation [Marx] |
| Full Idea: Money is the alienated essence of man's labour and life, and this alien essence dominates him as he worships it. | |
| From: Karl Marx (On the Jewish Question [1844], p.60), quoted by Peter Singer - Marx 3 | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is inherit in the very nature of money, rather than in the wickedness of capitalists who control it. But money is not inherently alienting for the rich, or for the comfortable bourgeoisie (is it?). |
| 20519 | Marxists say liberal rights are confrontational, and liberal equality is a sham [Marx, by Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: For Marx liberal rights are egoistic rights of separation: they encourage each individual to view others as limitations to his or her freedom. ....Liberals set up a sham community of 'equal' citizens. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (On the Jewish Question [1844]) by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 4 'Marxist' | |
| A reaction: The point is that equality in law does not ensure equal treatment in daily life. I suppose a liberal right can be seen as an opt-out clause for some aspect of society. |