12 ideas
8679 | We perceive the objects of set theory, just as we perceive with our senses [Gödel] |
Full Idea: We have something like perception of the objects of set theory, shown by the axioms forcing themselves on us as being true. I don't see why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception (i.e. mathematical intuition) than in sense perception. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964], p.483), quoted by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 2.4 | |
A reaction: A famous strong expression of realism about the existence of sets. It is remarkable how the ingredients of mathematics spread themselves before the mind like a landscape, inviting journeys - but I think that just shows how minds cope with abstractions. |
9942 | Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L [Gödel, by Putnam] |
Full Idea: Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L (which implies the axiom of choice and the generalized continuum hypothesis). This established the full independence of the continuum hypothesis from the other axioms. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964]) by Hilary Putnam - Mathematics without Foundations | |
A reaction: Gödel initially wanted to make V = L an axiom, but the changed his mind. Maddy has lots to say on the subject. |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
18062 | Set-theory paradoxes are no worse than sense deception in physics [Gödel] |
Full Idea: The set-theoretical paradoxes are hardly any more troublesome for mathematics than deceptions of the senses are for physics. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964], p.271), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 03.4 |
10868 | The Continuum Hypothesis is not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory [Gödel, by Clegg] |
Full Idea: Gödel proved that the Continuum Hypothesis was not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964]) by Brian Clegg - Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable Ch.15 |
13517 | If set theory is consistent, we cannot refute or prove the Continuum Hypothesis [Gödel, by Hart,WD] |
Full Idea: Gödel proved that (if set theory is consistent) we cannot refute the continuum hypothesis, and Cohen proved that (if set theory is consistent) we cannot prove it either. | |
From: report of Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 10 |
10271 | Basic mathematics is related to abstract elements of our empirical ideas [Gödel] |
Full Idea: Evidently the 'given' underlying mathematics is closely related to the abstract elements contained in our empirical ideas. | |
From: Kurt Gödel (What is Cantor's Continuum Problem? [1964], Suppl) | |
A reaction: Yes! The great modern mathematical platonist says something with which I can agree. He goes on to hint at a platonic view of the structure of the empirical world, but we'll let that pass. |
3900 | Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Armstrong, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: Armstrong has argued that experience, as normally understood, is not necessary to perception. To perceive is to acquire beliefs, through a causal process. | |
From: report of David M. Armstrong (Belief Truth and Knowledge [1973]) by Roger Scruton - Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey 23.4 |
4253 | Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true [Armstrong] |
Full Idea: Externalist accounts of non-inferential knowledge say what makes a true non-inferential belief a case of knowledge is some natural relation which holds between the belief state and the situation which makes the belief true. | |
From: David M. Armstrong (Belief Truth and Knowledge [1973], 11.III.6) | |
A reaction: Armstrong's concept is presumably a response to Quine's desire to 'naturalise epistemology'. Bad move, I suspect. It probably reduces knowledge to mere true belief, and hence a redundant concept. |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |