7 ideas
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
| A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
| A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
| A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
| 15160 | Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames] |
| Full Idea: Davidson held that knowledge of truth and reference could give us a notion of meaning. He embraced Quine's rejection of analyticity, synonymy and ordinary meaning, and substituted truth and reference, when there was something genuine to capture. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Semantics for Natural Languages [1970]) by Scott Soames - Philosophy of Language 2.3 | |
| A reaction: I always get a warm glow when anyone suggests that the concept of meaning involves the concept of truth. I largely reject Quine. Davidson made a helpful suggestion! |
| 14612 | Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart] |
| Full Idea: Davidson's program was to show the underlying structure of natural languages as that of first-order logic. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Semantics for Natural Languages [1970], 2) by J.J.C. Smart - The Tenseless Theory of Time 2 | |
| A reaction: First order logic just reasons about a domain of objects with predicates attached to them. Language appears to refer to properties and relations as well as objects. |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
| Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
| From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
| 7073 | I am a creative nothing, out of which I myself create everything [Stirner] |
| Full Idea: I am not nothing in the sense of emptiness, but I am the creative nothing, the nothing out of which I myself as creator create everything. | |
| From: Max Stirner (The Ego and Its Own [1844]), quoted by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: This appears to be the germ of the entire existentialist view, which gives a helpful gloss on the concept of 'nothing' - as the motivation for human creation, the vacuum in the mind that has to be filled. Call it 'creative boredom'. |