12 ideas
21962 | Metaphysics is the roots of the tree of science [Descartes] |
Full Idea: The whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences. | |
From: René Descartes (Preface to 'Principles of Philosophy' [1647]), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 01.2 | |
A reaction: If Descartes had not believed this he would not have bothered with metaphysics, and philosophy might have been dead by 1650. |
3659 | I know the truth that God exists and is the author of truth [Descartes] |
Full Idea: I have very clearly deduced the following truths, that there is a God who is the author of all that is in the world, and who is the source of all truth. | |
From: René Descartes (Preface to 'Principles of Philosophy' [1647], p.180) |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
5637 | Nowadays logic is seen as the science of extensions, not intensions [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Logicians have come increasingly to realise that logic is the science not of the intension, but of the extension of terms. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: I take this to be because the notion of a 'set' is basic, which is defined strictly in terms of its members. This move is probably because we can be clear about extensions, but not intensions. Tidiness is no substitute for complex truth. |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
3657 | Understanding, not the senses, gives certainty [Descartes] |
Full Idea: Certainty is not in the sense but in the understanding alone, when it has evident perceptions. | |
From: René Descartes (Preface to 'Principles of Philosophy' [1647], p.177) |
5636 | Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Cartesian 'ideas' seem to be both concepts and propositions at once. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the simple reason why modern philosophers don't like this seventeenth century notion. There is something slightly too tidy about the modern notion of propositions built out of concepts. Animals see propositions in a flash. |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
5660 | Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Personally I regard allegiance, in the manner of Hegel, as prior to the recognition of individual rights. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Bibliog) | |
A reaction: Scruton notoriously generates rather right-wing views from this basis, but it is also the basis of communitarianism, which can take a softer form. It seems to me self-evident that rights cannot be the prime concept in a society. What society? |
5653 | A right is a power which is enforced in the name of justice [Scruton] |
Full Idea: Rights are enforced in the name of justice, whereas power is enforced come what may. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: Presumably rights can be claimed as well as enforced, and the notion of a natural right is at least a discussable concept, as in the 'right' of self-defence. Scruton offers us a very right-wing definition of rights. |
3660 | Atheism arises from empiricism, because God is intangible [Descartes] |
Full Idea: The existence of God has been doubted by some, because they attributed too much to the perceptions of the senses, and God can be neither seen nor touched. | |
From: René Descartes (Preface to 'Principles of Philosophy' [1647], p.180) |