9 ideas
15102 | S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron] |
Full Idea: S4 says there must be some necessary truths, because the actual necessary truths must be necessary. (It says if there are some actual necessary truths then that is so - but the S4 axiom is an actual necessary truth, if true). | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (On the Source of Necessity [2010], 2) |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
15103 | Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron] |
Full Idea: I conclude that Blackburn has not shown that any grounding of the necessary in the contingent (the Contingency Horn of his dilemma) is doomed to failure. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (On the Source of Necessity [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: [You must read the article for details of Cameron's argument!] He goes on to also reject the Necessity Horn (that there is a regress if necessities must rely on necessities). |
18699 | Carnap tried to define all scientific predicates in terms of primitive relations, using type theory [Carnap, by Button] |
Full Idea: Carnap's ultimate ambition in the Aufbau is to provide a constitution-system within which any predicate of any scientific vocabulary can be explicitly defined in terms of primitive relations holding among basic elements, using type theory. | |
From: report of Rudolph Carnap (The Logical Structure of the World (Aufbau) [1928]) by Tim Button - The Limits of Reason 05.2 | |
A reaction: David Chalmers has a modern shot at the same project in 'Constructing the World'. Ramsey sentences seem to be part of the same game. |
12131 | All concepts can be derived from a few basics, making possible one science of everything [Carnap, by Brody] |
Full Idea: In the 'Aufbau', Carnap tried to show how all of our concepts can be derived from a few basic concepts. ..Consequently there can be one science which studied all that existed, the science of the objects corresponding to the basic concepts. | |
From: report of Rudolph Carnap (The Logical Structure of the World (Aufbau) [1928]) by Baruch Brody - Identity and Essence 2.2 | |
A reaction: This is Carnap's Constructionist programme. |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
15104 | The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron] |
Full Idea: What seems so wrong about the 'moving spotlight' theory is that here one time is privileged, but all the times are on a par ontologically. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (On the Source of Necessity [2010], 4) | |
A reaction: The whole thing is baffling, but this looks like a good point. All our intuitions make presentism (there's only the present) look like a better theory than the moving spotlight (that the present is just 'special'). |