17 ideas
20455 | Philosophy really got started as the rival mode of discourse to tragedy [Critchley] |
Full Idea: The pre-Socratics are interesting, but philosophy really begins in drama; it's a competitive discourse to tragedy. Which is why Plato's 'Republic' excludes the poets: they're the competition; gotta get rid of them. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 6) | |
A reaction: That's an interesting and novel perspective. So what was the 'discourse' of tragedy saying, and why did that provoke the new rival? Was it too fatalistic? |
20446 | Philosophy begins in disappointment, notably in religion and politics [Critchley] |
Full Idea: I claim that philosophy begins in disappointment, and there are two forms of disappointment that interest me: religious and political disappointment | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: You are only disappointed by reality if you expected something better. To be disappointed by the failures of religion strikes me as rather old-fashioned, which Critchley sort of admits. Given the size and tumult of modern states, politics isn't promising. |
20449 | Science gives us an excessively theoretical view of life [Critchley] |
Full Idea: One of the problems with the scientific worldview is that it leads human beings to have an overwhelmingly theoretical relationship to the world. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: Critchley is defending phenomenology, but this also supports its cousin, existentialism. I keep meeting bright elderly men who have immersed themselves in the study of science, and they seem very remote from the humanist culture I love. |
20448 | Phenomenology uncovers and redescribes the pre-theoretical layer of life [Critchley] |
Full Idea: Phenomenology is a philosophical method that tries to uncover the pre-theoretical layer of human experience and redescribe it. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: I would be delighted if someone could tell me what this means in practice. I have the impression of lots of talk about phenomenology, but not much doing of it. Clearly I must enquire further. |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
8698 | Modal structuralism says mathematics studies possible structures, which may or may not be actualised [Hellman, by Friend] |
Full Idea: The modal structuralist thinks of mathematical structures as possibilities. The application of mathematics is just the realisation that a possible structure is actualised. As structures are possibilities, realist ontological problems are avoided. | |
From: report of Geoffrey Hellman (Mathematics without Numbers [1989]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 4.3 | |
A reaction: Friend criticises this and rejects it, but it is appealing. Mathematics should aim to be applicable to any possible world, and not just the actual one. However, does the actual world 'actualise a mathematical structure'? |
9557 | Statements of pure mathematics are elliptical for a sort of modal conditional [Hellman, by Chihara] |
Full Idea: Hellman represents statements of pure mathematics as elliptical for modal conditionals of a certain sort. | |
From: report of Geoffrey Hellman (Mathematics without Numbers [1989]) by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 5.3 | |
A reaction: It's a pity there is such difficulty in understanding conditionals (see Graham Priest on the subject). I intuit a grain of truth in this, though I take maths to reflect the structure of the actual world (with possibilities being part of that world). |
10263 | Modal structuralism can only judge possibility by 'possible' models [Shapiro on Hellman] |
Full Idea: The usual way to show that a sentence is possible is to show that it has a model, but for Hellman presumably a sentence is possible if it might have a model (or if, possibly, it has a model). It is not clear what this move brings us. | |
From: comment on Geoffrey Hellman (Mathematics without Numbers [1989]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.3 | |
A reaction: I can't assess this, but presumably the possibility of the model must be demonstrated in some way. Aren't all models merely possible, because they are based on axioms, which seem to be no more than possibilities? |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
20454 | Wallace Stevens is the greatest philosophical poet of the twentieth century in English [Critchley] |
Full Idea: Wallace Stevens is the greatest philosophical poet of the twentieth century in the English language - full stop - in my humble opinion. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 6) | |
A reaction: I include this because I tend to agree, and love Stevens. Hear recordings of him reading. I once mentioned Stevens in a conversation with Ted Hughes, and he just shrugged and said Stevens 'wasn't much of a poet'. Wrong. |
20456 | Interesting art is always organised around ethical demands [Critchley] |
Full Idea: I don't think that art can be unethical. I think that interesting art is always ethical. It is organised around ethical demands. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 8) | |
A reaction: It is a struggle to make this fit instrumental music. Critchley likes punk rock, so he might not see the problem. How to compare Bachian, Mozart, Beethovenian and Debussyian ethics? Not impossible. |
20447 | The problems is not justifying ethics, but motivating it. Why should a self seek its good? [Critchley] |
Full Idea: The issue is not so much justification as motivation, that in virtue of which the self can be motivated to act on some conception of the good. ...How does a self bind itself to whatever it determines as its good? | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 2) | |
A reaction: That is a bold and interesting idea about the starting point for ethics. It is always a problem for Aristotle, that he can offer no motivation for the quest for virtue. Contractarians start from existing motivations, but that isn't impressive. |
20452 | Anarchism used to be libertarian (especially for sexuality), but now concerns responsibility [Critchley] |
Full Idea: Anarchism in the 1960s was libertarian and organised around issues of sexual liberation. That moment has passed. People are and should be organising around responsibility. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 3) | |
A reaction: So there are two types of anarchism, focused on freedom or on responsibility. An organisation like Greenpeace might represent the latter. |
20450 | The state, law, bureaucracy and capital are limitations on life, so I prefer federalist anarchism [Critchley] |
Full Idea: I begin with the ontological premise that the state is a limitation on human existence. I am against the state, law, bureaucracy, and capital. I see anarchism as the only desirable way of organising, politically. ...Its political form is federalist. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 3) | |
A reaction: Hm. Some sympathy, but caution. All systems, even federalist anarchism, are limitations on our lives, so which limitations do we prefer? The law aspires to a calm egalitarian neutrality, which seems promising to me. |
20451 | Belief that humans are wicked leads to authoritarian politics [Critchley] |
Full Idea: If you think human beings are wicked, you turn to an authoritarian conception of politics, the Hobbesian-Machiavellian-Straussian lie. | |
From: Simon Critchley (Impossible Objects: interviews [2012], 3) | |
A reaction: Right-wingers also tend to believe in free will, so they can blame and punish. Good people are more inspired by a great leader than bad people are? (Later, Critchley says authoritarians usually believe in original sin). |