16 ideas
23825 | We seek truth only because it is good [Weil] |
Full Idea: Truth is sought not because it is truth but because it is good. | |
From: Simone Weil (Gravity and Grace (9 extracts) [1943], p.233) | |
A reaction: A perfect instance of modern platonism. A few weird people seem to enjoy lying. Personally I cannot find enough content in the word 'good' in such claims. |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
11127 | If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke] |
Full Idea: We might say that the concept just is the mental representation, ...but there are concepts that human beings may never acquire. ...But if concepts are individuated by their possession conditions this will not be a problem. | |
From: Christopher Peacocke (Rationale and Maxims in Study of Concepts [2005], p.169), quoted by E Margolis/S Laurence - Concepts 1.3 | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that I understand the notion of a concept we (or any other creature) may never acquire. They no more seem to exist than buildings that were never even designed. |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
23826 | Beauty, goodness and truth are only achieved by applying full attention [Weil] |
Full Idea: The authentic and pure values - truth, beauty and goodness - in the activity of a human being are the result of one and same act, a certain application of the full attention to the object. Teaching should only aim to train the attention for such an act. | |
From: Simone Weil (Gravity and Grace (9 extracts) [1943], p.234) | |
A reaction: A distinctive Weil idea, that absorbed 'attention' produces almost mystical results. I am not convinced that a great still life painter (than which there is no higher criterion of attention) achieves contact with goodness thereby. But attention is good! |
23833 | The good is a nothingness, and yet real [Weil] |
Full Idea: The good seems to us a nothingness, since there is no thing that is good. But this nothingness is not unreal. | |
From: Simone Weil (Gravity and Grace (9 extracts) [1943], p.278) | |
A reaction: A neat move in the notoriously difficult platonic problem of specifying the actual nature of the good. |
23808 | There are two goods - the absolute good we want, and the reachable opposite of evil [Weil] |
Full Idea: There are two goods - one which is the opposite of evil, and one which is the absolute. …That which we want is the absolute good. That which is within our reach is the good which is correlated with evil. | |
From: Simone Weil (Gravity and Grace (9 extracts) [1943], p.142) | |
A reaction: Elsewhere she seems in tune with the thought of Nietzsche (whom she despised) that good and evil are false social constructs which are quite different from healthy values. Weil, of course, sees the absolute as transcendent. |
23831 | The essence of power is illusory prestige [Weil] |
Full Idea: Prestige, which is an illusion, is the very essence of power. | |
From: Simone Weil (Gravity and Grace (9 extracts) [1943], p.255) | |
A reaction: It is hard to maintain illusory prestige if there is no actual power behind it. |
23830 | A group is only dangerous if it endorses an abstract entity [Weil] |
Full Idea: Any group which has not secreted an abstract entity will probably not be dangerous. | |
From: Simone Weil (Gravity and Grace (9 extracts) [1943], p.255) | |
A reaction: Written in the 1930s, the era of many political -isms. No group can be united if it lacks a clear label, and a few simple slogans. |
23809 | Our only social duty is to try to limit evil [Weil] |
Full Idea: Our only duty with regard to the social is to try to limit the evil of it. | |
From: Simone Weil (Gravity and Grace (9 extracts) [1943], p.143) | |
A reaction: This is one of Weil's occasional remarks that have an anarchist flavour. I increasingly sympathise with this less idealistic view as I get older. |
23807 | The collective is the one and only object of false idolatry [Weil] |
Full Idea: The Great Beast is the great object of idolatry, the only ersatz of God. …Only one thing can be taken as an end, for in relation to the human person it possesses a kind of transcendence: this is the collective. | |
From: Simone Weil (Gravity and Grace (9 extracts) [1943], p.140) | |
A reaction: [Society as the Great Beast is in Republic Bk 6] She is referring to both fascist and communist states. Weil seems to be a left-wing liberal, with a tendency towards anarchism, because her priority is the individual, not the group. |
23810 | Charity is the only love, and you can feel that for a country (a place with traditions), but not a nation [Weil] |
Full Idea: We must not have any other love than charity. A nation cannot be an object of charity. But a country can be one - as an environment bearing traditions which are eternal. Every country can be that. | |
From: Simone Weil (Gravity and Grace (9 extracts) [1943], p.146) | |
A reaction: This definitely strikes a chord with me. I am English and British to the core, but don't feel any love at all for the current central institutions of the state. But I love my island, and its history, and its culture, and its style. |
23811 | If effort is from necessity rather than for a good, it is slavery [Weil] |
Full Idea: To strive from necessity and not for some good - ...that is always slavery. | |
From: Simone Weil (Gravity and Grace (9 extracts) [1943], p.180) | |
A reaction: It is usual to see the possibility of anarchism as the starting point for political thinking, but I think for Weil the state of slavery has that role. |
23765 | The soul is the intrinsic value of a human [Weil] |
Full Idea: The soul is the human being considered as having a value in itself. | |
From: Simone Weil (Gravity and Grace (9 extracts) [1943], p.294) | |
A reaction: [from 'Gravity and Grace'] A rather modern view, treating the soul as an abstraction, rather than as an entity. |