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All the ideas for 'A Problem about Substitutional Quantification?st1=Saul A. Kripke', 'Reply to Hellman' and 'Deriving Kripkean Claims with Abstract Objects'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)]
     Full Idea: Kripke proposes that the substitutional quantifier is not a replacement for, or in competition with, the standard interpretation.
     From: report of Saul A. Kripke (A Problem about Substitutional Quantification? [1976]) by Ruth Barcan Marcus - Nominalism and Substitutional Quantifiers p.165
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Abstract objects are actually constituted by the properties by which we conceive them [Zalta]
     Full Idea: Where for ordinary objects one can discover the properties they exemplify, abstract objects are actually constituted or determined by the properties by which we conceive them. I use the technical term 'x encodes F' for this idea.
     From: Edward N. Zalta (Deriving Kripkean Claims with Abstract Objects [2006], 2 n2)
     A reaction: One might say that whereas concrete objects can be dubbed (in the Kripke manner), abstract objects can only be referred to by descriptions. See 10557 for more technicalities about Zalta's idea.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it [Quine]
     Full Idea: A sentence is obvious if (a) it is true and (b) any speaker of the language is prepared, for any reason or none, to assent to it without hesitation, unless put off by being asked so obvious a question.
     From: Willard Quine (Reply to Hellman [1975], p.206), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III
     A reaction: This comes from someone who is keen to deny a priori knowledge, but what are we to make of the expostulations "It's obvious, you idiot!", and "Now I see it, it's obvious!", and "It seemed obvious, but I was wrong!"?
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Abstract objects are captured by second-order modal logic, plus 'encoding' formulas [Zalta]
     Full Idea: My object theory is formulated in a 'syntactically second-order' modal predicate calculus modified only so as to admit a second kind of atomic formula ('xF'), which asserts that object x 'encodes' property F.
     From: Edward N. Zalta (Deriving Kripkean Claims with Abstract Objects [2006], p.2)
     A reaction: This is summarising Zalta's 1983 theory of abstract objects. See Idea 10558 for Zalta's idea in plain English.