9286
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Consciousness is not a stuff, but is explained by the relations between experiences [James]
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Full Idea:
Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation, and not a special stuff or way of being. The peculiarity of our experiences, that they not only are, but are known, is best explained by their relations to one another, the relations being experiences.
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From:
William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], §3)
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A reaction:
This view has suddenly caught people's interest. It might be better than the higher/lower relationship, which seems to leave the basic problem untouched. Does a whole network of relations between experiences gradually 'add up' to consciousness?
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9285
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'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul' [James]
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Full Idea:
'Consciousness' is the name of a nonentity. ..Those who cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumour left behind by the disappearing 'soul' upon the air of philosophy. ..I deny that it stands for an entity, but it does stand for a function.
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From:
William James (Does Consciousness Exist? [1904], Intro)
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A reaction:
This kind of view is often treated as being preposterous, but I think it is correct. No one is denying the phenomenology, but it is the ontology which is at stake. Either you are a substance dualist, or mind must be eliminated as an 'entity'.
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11214
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We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]
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Full Idea:
The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A.
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From:
Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV)
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A reaction:
[compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role).
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19813
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All legislators invoke God in support of extraordinary laws, because their justification is not obvious [Machiavelli]
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Full Idea:
There has never been a single legislator who, in proposing extraordinary laws, did not have recourse to God, for otherwise they would not be accepted, since many benefits known to a prudent man do not have evident persuasive reasons.
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From:
Niccolo Machiavelli (The Discourses [1520], 1.11), quoted by Jean-Jacques Rousseau - The Social Contract (tr Cress) II.7 n8
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A reaction:
It does seem to be an important role for God and state religion, to give support to decisions and laws which might not be intrinsically popular.
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7126
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Rulers should preserve the foundations of religion, to ensure good behaviour and unity [Machiavelli]
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Full Idea:
It is the duty of the rulers of a republic or a kingdom to preserve the foundations of the religion they hold; if they do this, it will be an easy thing for them to keep their state religious, and consequently good and united.
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From:
Niccolo Machiavelli (The Discourses [1520], I.12)
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A reaction:
This is the germ of Marx's view, that the sole role of religion is political, as a tool used by the ruling classes to keep the populace in their place. The same idea can be found in Critias (Idea 542). But what is wrong with some central moral guidance?
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