17 ideas
6806 | Do not multiply entities beyond necessity [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Do not multiply entities beyond necessity. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335]) | |
A reaction: This is the classic statement of Ockham's Razor, though it is not found in his printed works. It appears to be mainly aimed at Plato's Theory of Forms. It is taken to refer to types of entities, not numbers. One seraph is as bad as a hundred. |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If a designated conclusion follows from the premisses, but the argument involves two howlers which cancel each other out, then the moral is that the path an argument takes from premisses to conclusion does matter to its logical evaluation. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], II) | |
A reaction: The drift of this is that our view of logic should be a little closer to the reasoning of ordinary language, and we should rely a little less on purely formal accounts. |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: If 'and' and 'but' really are alike in sense, in what might that likeness consist? Some philosophers of classical logic will reply that they share a sense by virtue of sharing a truth table. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000]) | |
A reaction: This is the standard view which Rumfitt sets out to challenge. |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: A connective will possess the sense that it has by virtue of its competent users' finding certain rules of inference involving it to be primitively obvious. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], III) | |
A reaction: Rumfitt cites Peacocke as endorsing this view, which characterises the logical connectives by their rules of usage rather than by their pure semantic value. |
22132 | Species and genera are individual concepts which naturally signify many individuals [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: In his mature nominalism, species and genera are identified with certain mental qualities called concepts or intentions of the mind. Ontologically they are individuals too, like everthing else, ...but they naturally signify many different individuals. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335]), quoted by Claude Panaccio - William of Ockham p.1056 | |
A reaction: 'Naturally' is the key word, because the concepts are not fictions, but natural responses to encountering individuals in the world. I am an Ockhamist. |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that affirming not-A is more complex than affirming the atomic sentence A itself, with the latter determining its sense. But we could learn 'not' directly, by learning at once how to either affirm A or reject A. | |
From: Ian Rumfitt ("Yes" and "No" [2000], IV) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This seems fairly anti-Fregean in spirit, because it looks at the psychology of how we learn 'not' as a way of clarifying what we mean by it, rather than just looking at its logical behaviour (and thus giving it a secondary role). |
4061 | The right to life is not a right not to be killed, but not to be killed unjustly [Thomson] |
Full Idea: Maybe the right to life consists not in the right not to be killed, but in the right not to be killed unjustly. | |
From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.131) | |
A reaction: Sounds tautological. There is no right to life, then, but just the requirement that people behave justly? |
4057 | A newly fertilized ovum is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree [Thomson] |
Full Idea: A newly fertilized ovum, a newly implanted clump of cells, is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree. | |
From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.125) | |
A reaction: This relies heavily on the philosopher's concept of a 'person', but it seems right to me. |
4695 | Maybe abortion can be justified despite the foetus having full human rights [Thomson, by Foot] |
Full Idea: Thomson suggests that abortion can be justified without the need to deny that the foetus has the moral rights of a human person. | |
From: report of Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971]) by Philippa Foot - Killing and Letting Die p.86 | |
A reaction: Thomson uses a dubious analogy between pregnancy and being hooked up to someone for life-support. Presumably killing an innocent person is occasionally justifiable, but the situation would normally be more abnormal than pregnancy. |
4059 | It can't be murder for a mother to perform an abortion on herself to save her own life [Thomson] |
Full Idea: It cannot seriously be thought to be murder if a mother performs an abortion on herself to save her own life (if, say, she had a serious heart condition). | |
From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.127) | |
A reaction: An extreme view might condemn such an action, but it can hardly be based on the 'sanctity of life'. |
4696 | The foetus is safe in the womb, so abortion initiates its death, with the mother as the agent. [Foot on Thomson] |
Full Idea: A fetus is not in jeopardy because it is in the womb, so an abortion originates the fatal sequence, and the mother is the agent. Hence Thomson's argument is invalid, and we must return to question of the moral status of the foetus. | |
From: comment on Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971]) by Philippa Foot - Killing and Letting Die p.86 | |
A reaction: The problem would be if a 'person' was safe, but only if I continue some sustained effort which is not required of me by normal duties. |
4058 | Is someone's right to life diminished if they were conceived by a rape? [Thomson] |
Full Idea: Can we say that a person has a right to life only if they didn't come into existence through rape, or that the latter have less right to life? | |
From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.126) | |
A reaction: This would clearly be an inconsistency for some opponents of abortion who allow rape as an exception. |
4060 | The right to life does not bestow the right to use someone else's body to support that life [Thomson] |
Full Idea: Having a right to life does not guarantee having either a right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed continued use of another person's body. | |
From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.131) | |
A reaction: A very nice point. You have a right to your life once you are the sole owner of it. |
4062 | No one is morally required to make huge sacrifices to keep someone else alive for nine months [Thomson] |
Full Idea: No one is morally required to make large sacrifices, of health, and other interests and commitments, for nine months, in order to keep another person alive. | |
From: Judith (Jarvis) Thomson (A Defense of Abortion [1971], p.135) | |
A reaction: It is a trade-off. It might become a duty if society (or even a husband) urgently needed the baby. |
19381 | The past has ceased to exist, and the future does not yet exist, so time does not exist [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: Time is composed of non-entities, because it is composed of the past which does not exist now, although it did exist, and of the future, which does not yet exist; therefore time does not exist. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335], 6:496), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 7 'Nominalist' | |
A reaction: I've a lot of sympathy with this! I favour Presentism, so the past is gone and the future is yet to arrive. But we have no coherent concept of a present moment of any duration to contain reality. We are just completely bogglificated by it all. |
8010 | William of Ockham is the main spokesman for God's commands being the source of morality [William of Ockham] |
Full Idea: The most notable philosopher who makes God's commandment the basis of goodness, rather than God's goodness a reason for obeying him, is William of Occam. | |
From: William of Ockham (works [1335]), quoted by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.9 | |
A reaction: Either view has problems. Why choose God to obey? Obey anyone who is powerful? But how do you decide that God is good? How do we know the nature of God's commands, or the nature of God's goodness? Etc. |
16679 | Even an angel must have some location [William of Ockham, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Ockham dismisses the possibility of non-location out of hand, remarking that even an angel has some location. | |
From: report of William of Ockham (works [1335]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.4 |